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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a' detailed study of the regulation of Independent
Local Radio by the Independent Broadcasting Authority. The I.B.A. is an
independent regulatory agency established to decide questions affecting
both public and private rights. Two key functions performed by regulatory
agencies	 are identified: law-elaboration and law-application.	 Law-
elaboration is a quasi-legislative power which involves both the making of
policy and the subsequent articulation of that policy through rule-making.
Law-application entails the application of those rules in individual
decisions.
It is argued that the exercise of such powers can usefully be
analysed in terms of legitimacy. What can validate the exercise of
legislative powers by an unelected and largely unaccountable agency? In
addressing this question, use is made of four ideal-type models of
regulatory legitimacy: (1) legislative; (2) accountability; (3) 	 due
process; and (4) expertise.
The general conclusion drawn is that it would be problematical for
the I.B.A. to claim legitimacy for its policies and rules on the basis of
its legislative mandate, its accountability, its respect for due process or
its expertise.	 In particular, it is argued that there is little direct
correlation between the I.B.A.'s activities and its legislative mandate.
This is stated to be a problem inherent in the nature of the relqtionship
between the legislature and a regulatory agency.
It is argued that the present system of regulating I.L.R. is in need
of reform if it is to make out a more convincing case for its legitimacy.
The two main approaches to reform are deregulation and procedural
innovation. Administrative lawyers have tended to focus on the latter type
of reform.	 It is argued that administrative lawyers should widen their
horizons beyond the procedural and become concerned with the outcome of the
regulatory process: the concern should be with substantive as well as
procedural legitimacy
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PART ONE - REGULATION AND LEGITIMACY 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
This study presents a detailed examination of the regulation of
Independent Local Radio (I.L.R.) by the Independent Broadcasting Authority
(I.B.A.).	 The main foci of the research are the making of regulatory policy
by the Authority and the subsequent articulation of that policy in the form
of administrative rules. Three areas of I.B.A. policy-making are considered
in detail: the award of I.L.R. programme contracts; the supervision of
programming; and the control of advertising.
What follows is not simply a descriptive account of the regulation of
I.L.R.	 There is an examination of the problems of evaluating regulatory
regimes and a possible method of assessment is put forward. This method is
then applied to the regulation of I.L.R.
The regulation of I.L.R. is a topical and contentious area. It is a
sphere of regulation which has been subject to unusually harsh criticism.
Indeed, it is a regulatory regime which is commonly regarded as a failure.
It appears that the responsibility for regulating I.L.R. is to be taken away
from the I.B.A. by the Government.' In this context, it would seem that the
regulation of I.L.R. offers an interesting example for an exercise in
regulatory evaluation.	 The remainder of Part One sets out in detail the
analytical framework which is to be utilised.
Regulation: General Issues 
Government control of economic activity by means of legislation is both
varied and pervasive in contemporary society. 	 Indeed, regulation is now so
widespread that it would be difficult to maintain that the organising premise
of our economy is one of laissez-faire.	 It is probable that governmental
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regulation of industry will continue to play an important part in our social
organisation. Nevertheless, there continues to be ambivalence in attitudes
towards regulatory activity by governments.	 These attitudes will vary
depending upon the area concerned. 	 In one situation regulation may be
perceived as an undue infringement of individual freedom and in another
situation as an unjustified interference with private enterprise and the
operation of the market economy. Moreover, even where there is a relative
consensus over the appropriateness of regulation, there may still be
controversy over the mechanisms or procedures to be employed.
	 One method
of analysing regulation is to view it as an attempt to solve various problems
of 'market failure'. 2	Regulation can be justified on the basis that the
market has failed to protect or to represent consumer or public interests
adequately.
	 This view, which is popular with economists, treats the
unregulated marketplace as the norm and holds that consumer interests will be
best satisfied as the result of competition. The onus is placed on those who
advocate regulation to demonstrate that it is necessary to protect an
important public interest that an unregulated market cannot. 	 The literature
on regulation identifies a number of different market 'defects' upon which
demands for regulation have been based:
(1) The need to control monopoly power.
(2) The need to control 'windfall' profits.
(3) The need to correct for 'spillover' costs.
(4) The need to compensate for inadequate information.
(5) The need to eliminate 'excessive' competition.
(6) The need to alleviate scarcity.
(7) The need to overcome conservative business practices.
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(8) The need to equalise bargaining power.
(9) The need to protect individuals from their own
irresponsibility.
(10) The need to conserve scarce resources.
An economic rationale for government regulation can thus be found in
3
the need to supply 'the elements of responsibility' which are missing in
an unregulated market. The question of whether a particular programme or
system is necessary can only be answered on an individual basis and will
give rise to differing interpretations.
A number of political and social factors also have to be taken into
account when considering the need for regulation. The fact that
regulation operates within a legal framework goes some way towards ensuring
that important public decisions are not the result of 'bargaining between
4
the powerful'	 and that both public and private interests are properly
protected.
An example of a respectable case for regulation can be found in the
field of broadcasting.
	
	 A number of different justifications for the
5
regulation of broadcasting can be put forward. 	 These include the
arguments that broadcasting frequencies are a limited resource and that
broadcasting is a powerful medium which has a great potential to influence
Or offend people.	 Further, radio broadcasting possesses three features
which may lead to market failure. 	 First, entry into the market is
restricted and as a consequence of this the market structure is non-
competitive.	 Second, radio can be seen as a public good. 	 This means
that once the service is available, it can be made more widely available at
little or no additional cost and without diminishing the supply. Thirdly,
the market place cannot deal adequately with non-economic social costs and
benefits such as a value in diversity and in having an informed populace.
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As Garnham has pointed out:
...[I]ts [public regulation of broadcasting] justification lies in its
superiority to the market as a means of providing all citizens,
whatever their wealth or geographical location, equal access to a wide
range of high quality entertainment, information and education, and as
a means of ensuring that the aim of the programme producer is the
satisfaction of a range of audience taste rather than only those
tastes that show the largest profit.
Arguments such as these would not be accepted by those who favour a
more market-based approach to broadcasting regulation. 	 They would argue
that regulation interferes with the market place's ability to achieve
7
consumer satisfaction and to increase social utility. 	 In particular, it
could be argued that radio spectrum scarcity does not provide a sufficient
rationale for government regulation. If one were to accept the view that
the airwaves are no different from any other scarce commodity, then it
would be the function of the marketplace to allocate such limited resources
to their most highly valued uses. Moreover, technological advance and the
development of alternative methods of broadcasting, including cable and
satellite, may alleviate spectrum scarcity.
Thus there is nothing inevitable about a strict system of broadcast
regulation based on a system of licences or franchise contracts and control
of programming.	 In economic terms, either the creation of transferable
property rights in the spectrum or the auctioning of contracts to broadcast
8
could be adequate alternative means of allocating frequencies. 	 In
political terms, either of these two alternatives could be preferred on the
basis that they would avoid government control of programming.
There are, however, important social concerns that can only be served
adequately by a system of regulation, quite apart from any economic
considerations of allocational efficiency. In other words, even if one
were able to demonstrate satisfactorily that a free market in broadcasting
would be efficient, then one could still argue that regulation is in the
public interest on social grounds. 	 Both radio and television can have a
considerable impact on public attitudes and the shaping of its preferences.
This is particularly true in the case of children.
	 Further, the
limitation in the possible number of channels can lead to a 'bunching'
effect, which means that the content of programmes is limited to areas
9
desired by large groups with congruent interests.
	 As a result, minority
groups do not receive an adequate service.
Even where, as in broadcasting, a reasonable case can be made out for
regulation, there can still be debate as to the precise balance to be
struck between regulation and market-based alternatives. The precise
scope, degree and direction of regulation can also be matters for analysis
and debate. Among the various alternative approaches to regulatory reform
to be considered in any one area are the identification of regulatory
mismatches,	 deregulation and the improvement of 	 administrative
10
procedures.
These and other strategies for the reform of regulation have appeared
on the political agenda in recent years as the result of a growing
disenchantment with regulation. This is partly the result of the growth
and expansion of regulation and partly the realisation that the costs as
well as the benefits of regulation need to be more carefully assessed.
This is at a time when the finite nature of the country's economic
resources has become sharply apparent. Regulation in practice is not
always as attractive as regulation in theory, especially where a regulated
industry is in a financial crisis.
As yet, however, it is impossible to detect a coherent and consistent
programme for regulatory reform either in general or in broadcasting.	 An
11
examination of the various proposals for reform would seem to show that:
The response to regulatory failure has been confused and contradictory
as commentators, regulators and other political leaders grope for a
theory and rely in the meantime on pet nostrums to solve systemic
failures.
Regulatory Agencies 
Criticisms of regulation per se are closely linked to those of the
institutions established to enforce it. A common theme in the literature
on regulation is that a regulatory authority can become subverted by
pressures from those it regulates, that is, 'captured'. 	 Alternatively,
the human and financial resources of the regulatory agency may be
inadequate.	 A pervasive problem confronting regulators is that the
statute conferring authority on them will be vague, ambiguous and perhaps
even contain conflicting or impossible goals. All these factors can lead
to an agency performing in an unexpected or undesirable manner. A further
possibility is that the regulation has been introduced to be more symbolic
than effective, to persuade the public that a problem is being dealt with.
The present study is concerned with one government agency involved in
regulation (the I.B.A) and with one particular sphere of regulation, I.L.R.
The I.B.A is but one example of an increasing number of regulatory agencies
which have been established to decide questions affecting both public and
private rights independently of government departments and the courts.
In addition to the I.B.A., among the better known contemporary examples of
independent regulatory agencies are the Equal Opportunities Commission, the
Commission for Racial Equality, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Office
of Telecommunications.
At first, such a disparate group of agencies may not appear to have
much in common, but Baldwin has identified six properties that they each
possess.	 These are that, 'they are non-departmental; act in some sense on
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behalf of government; make rules that are backed up by force of law;
exercise continuing control over an industry, trade or practice; differ from
courts or tribunals in employing a substantial number of expert staff and in
expending considerable resources; decide issues between parties or enforce a
particular body of law'. 12 To this list could be added the observation that
such agencies play a key role in the making of policy.
There are a number of reasons why the creation of independent regulatory
agencies has been an attractive option for governments. 	 First, there has
been perceived to be a need for specialised bodies to manage particular fields
of regulation.	 Second, there has been the desire to depoliticise certain
sensitive issues and to relieve politicians of responsibility for them.
Third, the agency model enables a number of governmental functions (including
management, adjudication, policy making and rule making) to be combined in a
single institution.
These arguments would seem to militate strongly in favour of the
establishment of an independent agency, such as the I.B.A., for the regulation
of broadcasting.	 Janisch has made the point that:13
Political realism and political idealism ... 	 both favour an
independent regulatory authority for broadcasting. From a
realistic point of view broadcasting simply throws up too many hot
potatoes for the politicians, while from an idealistic viewpoint it
can be said that broadcasting is too sensitive an area for direct
government regulation.
Despite their apparent usefulness, a number of difficulties do beset the
existence of independent regulatory agencies. Firstly there is the public
lawyer's traditional concern that agencies make decisions affecting
individual and property rights. Agencies are deemed to be in need of careful
oversight in order to prevent arbitrary and unfair decision-making. It is
not too much of a charicature to say that the more that agency procedures
approach those of a court, the happier the administrative lawyer
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will be.	 The importance of judicial review of regulatory decision-making
will also be stressed.
The main weakness of this legalistic and judicial approach is that it
serves to emphasise the importance of adjudication and the strict
application of law at the expense of the regulators' concern with long-term
planning and efficiency. Furthermore, an emphasis on judicial review and
strictly legal procedures can divert attention from the need for wider
participation in agency policy making and for better mechanisms of
political and public accountability.
A further problem besetting independent regulatory agencies is that
they are not easily situated within our traditional constitutional theory
of responsible government. According to this theory of government,
executive actions are performed by ministers who are answerable to
Parliament for their actions. 	 In contrast, the very notion of an agency
being 'independent' implies the exclusion of governmental control and of
ministerial responsibility for an agency's activities. To the purist,
therefore, independent regulatory agencies can appear to be, '"structural
heretics" which do violence to the constituted system of ministerial
14
responsibility'.
It would be a mistake, however, to exaggerate the degree of
independence enjoyed by regulatory agencies. They are created by
Parliament and can be reformed or abolished by it. They receive their
statutory mandate from Parliament and judicial review will be available in
the courts to ensure that an agency does not act outside its terms. 	 In
addition, a government can affect an agency by its appointments.
Discretion, Law-elaboration and Legitimacy 
Nevertheless, in its classical form an independent regulatory agency
will possess a considerable degree of structural •independence in the
performance of essentially governmental functions.	 This independence will
be enhanced by the fact that agencies commonly have a statutory mandate
which is expressed in broad terms. 	 Indeed, some agencies are given a
mandate so vague that it is, as K.C. Davis noted, 'the practical equivalent
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of instructing an agency, "Here is the problem. 	 Deal with it".
In reality it is impossible for an agency's statutory mandate to be so
precise that the agency need not interpret it. This process of
interpretation will inevitably leave an agency considerable room for the
exercise of discretion, in the sense of, 'autonomy and finality in settling
the standards on which decisions are to be based and on their application
16
to specific situations'.
The formulation of these standards can usefully be described as 'law-
17
elaboration'.	 Law-elaboration amounts to a quasi-legislative power and
involves both the making of policy by an agency and the articulation of
that policy through rule-making. The ensuing rules and standards will
represent the agency's own interpretation of its parent statute. They
will be used to guide and structure the agency's regulatory decision-
making.
	
The rules can also have an extra-statutory origin in judicial
decisions, established administrative practice and commercial custom or
usage.
The subsidiary function to that of law-elaboration is law-
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application.	 This entails the application of the agency's rules in
individual decisions. Inevitably there is an overlap between the two
functions, with experience gained in law-application being reflected in
further attempts at law-elaboration.
The process of law-elaboration provides the main focus for the present
study. It is important not to understate the importance and significance
of the law-elaboration function of regulatory agencies. An examination of
an agency's own rules and standards will often be far more revealing of the
regulatory process than a reading of the statutory provisions.
A central question on law-elaboration concerns the source of an
agency's authority to exercise what are essentially legislative powers.
The issue can be seen as one of legitimacy.
	 The concept of legitimacy is
discussed in the next chapter. It is sufficient for the present to say
that legitimacy is concerned with popular attitudes towards governmental
power and whether this power is being exercised on an acceptable basis.
The identification of a basis for the legitimacy of the law-elaboration
function is problematic. 	 Firstly, independent regulatory agencies lack
the validation of democratic election.
	 Secondly, their statutory mandates
will be too broadly phrased to lend legitimacy to many of their regulatory
activities.	 There are, however, a number of other sources of regulatory
legitimacy and these are outlined in the next chapter.
It is important to realise that, in practice, many of the rules and
policies made by an agency are not publicly available and exist as what
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K.C. Davis condemned as 'secret law'.
	 This secrecy, which generally
surrounds the regulatory process, raises in a crucial form the issue of
legitimacy. Without openness in the processes of law-elaboration and law-
application it becomes difficult to examine whether a regulatory agency is
acting arbitrarily or improperly.
	 In such circumstances, the very
legitimacy of an agency's activities can be brought into question.
To some extent the duty of the student of regulatory legitimacy must
be to attempt to pierce the veil of secrecy surrounding the regulatory
process.	 Such is one aim of the present study of the I.B.A. and the
regulation of I.L.R. 	 The I.B.A. is a good example of a regulatory agency
with a broad statutory mandate and which engages in the processes of law-
elaboration and law-application.
	 Furthermore, the I.B.A.'s regulatory
methods have been subject to severe enough criticism to make it a
potentially fruitful case for the application of the concept of legitimacy.
The ensuing analysis of the I.B.A. in terms of its regulatory
legitimacy can be broken down into a number of separate issues:
(1) From what source does the I.B.A. derive the legitimacy for its
role as law-elaborator?
(2) Are the powers exercised by the I.B.A. kept within well-
articulated and reasonable limits?
(3) To whom is the I.B.A. accountable for its policies	 and
decisions?
(4) Do the procedures adopted by the I.B.A. result in informed and
fair regulatory decision-making?
(5) Does the I.B.A. perform its functions in an efficient manner?
(6) Is adequate consideration given by the I.B.A. to the interests
of those affected by its policies and decisions?
Implicit in this catologue of the principal concerns of the present
study is a particular view of the regulatory process and of the socio-legal
values to which it should conform. These values are set forth explicitly
in the next chapter. By now it should be clear to the reader that the
approach to be taken to the issue of regulatory reform is that of the
introduction of political and procedural safeguards. Such an approach is
not necessarily incompatible with some measure of deregulation, but the
primary concern here will be the construction of a legal and political
framework for assessing the regulatory legitimacy of the I.B.A. Emphasis
will be placed on the control and validation of the I.B.A.'s exercise of
quasi-legislative powers. A recurring theme will be that of whether the
I.B.A.	 is accountable sufficiently to the public, Parliament, 	 the
government and the courts for its decisions. At the same time, however,
11
there will be an awareness, 'of the dangers of arbitarily imposed legal
structures causing institutional dysfunctions, and of too stringent
20
procedural safeguards bringing decision-making to a grinding halt'.
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CHAPTER TWO - REGULATION AND LEGITIMACY 
Introduction 
1
Legitimacy is a familiar concept in legal and political theory.
Like most theoretical terms, however, a number of very different
interpretations can be found in the literature. The sense in which it is
most commonly used defines legitimacy as involving, 'the capacity of the
system to engender the belief that the existing political institutions are
2
the most appropriate ones for society'.
	
The corollary of this belief in
3
'the quality of rightness' of the social order is that the actions and
decisions of those in authority ought to be recognised as binding.
An alternative use of the concept of legitimacy is as a simple term of
legal description, under which one could speak of a particular statutory
provision or judicial decision lending legitimacy to the acts of either
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state officials or individuals.	 This use of term does not imply that
there need be a popular belief in the rightness of the particular activity.
In other words, legitimacy can be used simply as a positivist term of legal
description.
A third use of the term is as an explicitly evaluative concept. 	 One
may describe a particular law or procedure as lacking legitimacy and be
arguing that it really is morally wrong, inappropriate and not worthy of
support. This normative usage of the concept does not refer to popular
belief in legitimacy, but there is the implication that describing an
institution as illegitimate is to do something more than to assert one's
5
own subjective political viewpoint.
A fourth use of the concept of legitimacy is that employed by
Habermas, discussed below. Habermas uses the term to represent the orders
that he argues would be found to be rational in discursive will-formation
by an ideal community.	 This critical use of the concept of legitimacy,
'asserts that standards can be developed for the assessment and evaluation
of social institutions which are not arbitrary but are rooted in inherent
6
elements of the human condition'.
The value of an evaluative concept of legitimacy to a study of a
regulatory institution such as the I.B.A. is that it can provide a starting
point for assessment, critique and evaluation.	 In fact, there are a
number of different ways in which the concept of legitimacy can be applied
to the study of a regulatory agency.	 First, one might argue that the
regulation	 of I.L.R., for example, is illegitimate because it	 is
7
inefficient, unnecessary, unpredictable or too expensive. 	 Second, one
could claim that the I.B.A., as the institution entrusted with the task of
regulation, lacks legitimacy because it is an unelected bureaucracy making
8
important political decisions and performing legislative functions. 	 A
third issue could relate to the legitimacy of a particular regulatory
decision, given that most or many of those affected by it may find it
9
unacceptable.
The purpose of the present study is to assess the legitimacy of the
regulation of I.L.R. by examining the validity of these types of
criticisms.	 This testing of the I.B.A.'s legitimacy will be achieved
partly by assessing the extent to which its regulatory processes reflect a
number of important socio-legal values and partly by an examination of the
principal potential sources of legitimacy for its activities of law-
elaboration and law-application. 	 As was pointed out in the previous
chapter, the function of law-elaboration results from the fact that most
10
economic regulation is legislated in 'evasive generalities', 	 leaving it
to the regulators themselves to formulate regulatory policies and rules.
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Freedman has pointed out that:
The simplification implicit in such broad delegations of legislative
power is to make administrative agencies ... the arena for debate and
decision on complex policy questions .... This consequence has had
distressing implications for the legitimacy of the administrative
process.
Freedman is not using legitimacy in an evaluative sense, but it will be
argued here that a critical concept of legitimacy can be usefully employed in
a study of the regulatory processes of law-elaboration and law- application.
In a positivist approach to legitimacy, the important issues would be the
control and validation of the exercise of the powers of law-elaboration and
law-application by a regulatory agency lacking either a firm statutory
mandate or the legitimation of democratic election. These are valid concerns
and will be addressed further.	 In contrast, an evaluative concept of
legitimacy would take the analysis one necessary stage further and address
the, 'worthiness to be recognised' 12 of the regulatory agency's policies and
rules.
The Theoretical Basis of Legitimacy 
It would be inappropriate to indulge here in an extended discussion
ofvarious theories of legitimacy, but an attempt will be made to outline the
contrasting concepts of legitimacy employed by Weber and Habermas. Any
discussion of legitimacy must include Weber since most contemporary usages of
the word legitimacy are playing to some extent on the sense in which he uses
it.° Weber argued that the authority of an institution rests ultimately upon
a popular belief in its legitimacy. 14 The work of Habermas is relevant because
it provides a philosophical basis for an evaluative concept of legitimacy.
Furthermore, it is increasingly being recognised that the writings of
Habermas have a particular relevance to public lawyers.°
Weber identified legitimacy as one of a number of possible motives for
social action, closely associating the concept with the stability of the
17
political order:16
Action, especially social action which involves a social
relationship, may be guided by the belief in the existence of a
legitimate order. The probability that action will actually be so
governed will be called the 'validity' ... of the order in question.
Thus the validity of an order means more than the mere existence of
a uniformity of social action determined by custom or self-interest.
... Only ... will an order be called 'valid' if it's in some
appreciable way regarded by the actor as in some way obligatory or
exemplary for him. Naturally, in concrete cases, the orientation of
action to an order involves a wide variety of motives. But the
circumstances that, along with the other sources of conformity, the
order is also held by at least part of the actors to define a model
or to be binding, naturally increases the probability that action
will in fact conform to it, often to a very considerable degree.
Weber identified several possible reasons for attributing legitimacy
to an order. These included belief in the sanctity of tradition,
affectual ties, natural law, rational belief in its absolute value and
belief in legality. Weber maintained that, 'the most common form of
legitimacy is the belief in legality, the compliance with enactments which
are formally correct and have been made in the accustomed manner'.17
Weber's concept of legitimacy is thus based on the premise that
a belief in the obligatory or exemplary nature of an order provides a
reason for action, quite apart from any considerations of self-interest or
custom. He uses legitimacy in a non-evaluative sense, in that there is no
absolute need for a political order to be legitimate in order to command
obligation. There is no requirement that the reasons for belief in the
legitimacy of an order be valid ones.
A very different idea of legitimacy can be found in the work of
Habermas. Its utility to the present study is that, whereas Weber's main
concern is with the legitimacy of a particular social order or state,
Habermas provides a concept of legitimacy which can be used to assess the
individual institutions and methods of government. 	 Habermas argues that
in a rationally formed society it is possible to elaborate valid criteria
18
of legitimacy against which to assess the acts of those who hold political
authority.	 He rejects the Weberian theory of legitimacy, under which
'belief in legitimacy is conceived as an empirical phenomenon without an
18
immanent relation to truth'.	 Habermas maintains that in the Weberian
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definition of legitimacy:
[T]he connection between reasons and motives that exist in
communicative action is screened out of the analysis. At least any
independent evaluation of reasons is methodically excluded - the
researcher himself refrains from any systematic judgment of the
reasons on which the claim to legitimacy is based. Since the days of
Max Weber this has been regarded as a virtue; however, even if one
adopts this interpretation, the suspicion remains that legitimacy, the
belief in legitimacy, and the willingness to comply with a legitimate
order have something to do with motivation through 'good reasons'.
But whether reasons are 'good reasons' can be ascertained only in the
performative attitude of a participant in argumentation, and not
through the neutral observation of what this or that participant in a
discourse holds to be good reasons.
Having rejected the Weberian approach, Habermas adopts what he calls a
20
'reconstructive' concept of legitimacy:
Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order's
claim to be recognised as right and just; a legitimate order deserves
recognition. Legitimacy means a political order ?s worthiness to be 
recognised.	 The definition highlights the fact that legitimacy is a
contestable validity claim 	
According to Habermas's epistemology of contestable validity claims:
'It is a question of finding arrangements which can ground the assumption
that the basic institutions of society and the basic political decisions
would meet with the unforced agreement of all those involved, if they could
21
participate as free and equal, in discursive will-formation'.
It is through this critical device of the 'ideal speech situation'
that the validity of claims to legitimacy can be assessed. In an 'ideal
speech situation' all parties suppose that genuine agreement is possible,
'that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal
understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one
22
another'.
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Habermas's theory can quite accurately be described as 'wildly
23
utopian',	 but it does present a valuable potential for critique of
existing institutions and an objective base for assessing legitimacy
claims. If one accepts a critical conception of legitimacy along the lines
of Habermas, the problem then becomes one of translating the criteria of
the 'ideal speech situation' into practical legal and political concepts.
According to Prosser, it is possible to do so and the three concepts he
24
identifies are participation, accountability and openness. 	 It is
arguable, however, whether these concepts are sufficiently expansive to
reflect all the socio-legal values that should be present in the
regulatory process. The values against which the I.B.A. will be assessed
are outlined in the next section.
Prosser argues that participation and accountability are necessary
aspects of efficiency and effectiveness, since, 'participation is the only
means by which input from the changing environment can reach planners and
the only way in which representation can take place of other interests on
whom implementation depends'. Similarly, he maintains that, 'it is only
through accountability that it is possible to bring different viewpoints to
bear on experience and so increase the opportunities for learning from
25
it'.	 There is clearly some force in these arguments, but the problem
with making efficiency a subsidiary or consequential value is that it tends
to suggest that demands for participation and accountability should be
26
considered independently of their cost. 	 In many cases, however, a
judgment has to be made between on the one hand furthering the values that
Prosser outlines and on the other conserving human and material resources.
This is a recurrent theme in the literature on regulation.
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Socio-Legal Values 
Any coherent framework for assessing the legitimacy of a particular
regulatory agency or process must be based on assumptions concerning the
socio-legal values to which it should conform. 	 That is, to maintain that
a regulatory agency's act, decision or policy lacks legitimacy is to assert
that a number of values have been left unsatisfied. For the sake of
clarity, it will be useful at this stage to state explicitly the values
which should be reflected in the policies and procedures of the I.B.A. in
its regulation of I.L.R.
28
(1) Accountability 
Few people would argue with the general principle that the I.B.A.
should be accountable for its actions and decisions in the exercise of its
legislative mandate. Put simply, accountability requires that there be a
legal and political framework through which the I.B.A. can be made
answerable for its activities.	 The contentious question concerns the way
in which to achieve this, as well as to whom the accountability is due.
The traditional view is that accountability can best be achieved by
29
ministerial responsibility to Parliament.	 In practice, however, the
theory of ministerial responsibility does not necessarily apply in any
clear way to independent regulatory agencies, including the I.B.A. Such
expert agencies are designed to be to some extent independent of government
departments in order to allow them freedom from political interference in
the conduct of their regulatory functions.
Two other important sources of accountability to consider are those of
the courts and of the public.	 The I.B.A. is accountable to the courts if
it exceeds or abuses its legal powers. 	 It can be argued that it should be
accountable to the public by basing its decisions, 'on the inclusive
representation of relevant interests and on appropriate consideration and
30
weighing of those interests'.
	 More will be said about these aspects of
accountability in later chapters.
(2) Participation 
Participation is one of the basic principles of democracy. 	 It is
concerned with, 'the creation of opportunities for widening debate to
encompass
	
	 a range of affected interests and a fuller range of
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information'.
	 In considering its implications for a regulatory agency,
two types of participation should be mentioned.
	 These are participation
by the public and participation by the regulated.
In general it could be said that public participation in an agency's
procedures will be favoured by those observers who place a premium on the
democratic tradition of popular participation in government.
	 Their
intention in advocating public participation will be to ensure that, for
32
example, the regulation of I.L.R. is conducted in the 'public interest'.
it is possible to identify a number of reasons for favouring public
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participation in the regulatory process:
(i) Public involvement will tend to lessen regulator 'capture' by
regulatees,	 and will therefore produce more
	 'balanced'
decisions.
(ii) Since the regulatory agency must take an objective position, it
is necessary for the public or public interest groups to become
involved so that some voice apart from the industry's will be
heard and therefore the traditionally unrepresented interests
will have an influence on the decision-makers.
(iii) A greater ability on the part of an individual or group to
participate in the process will have an immediate effect on the
amelioration of public confidence, both in the process itself
and the regulator involved.
(iv) Public presence in the regulatory process provides a form of
oversight in that the regulatory agency, if subjected to public
scrutiny, will become more efficient and produce policies and
decisions more responsive to the needs of the public.
(v) An open agency will be required to provide well-reasoned and
complete decisions, and therefore justify its actions via
established, identifiable policy, which should also be subject
to public comment and evaluation.
(iv) The presence of alternative critics will provide what Lenny
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refers to as a 'double-check' 	 on the standards set by
regulatory agencies.
(vii) Public	 intervention	 will produce	 greater	 regulator
accountability.
(viii) The capacity of an individual or group to intervene in the
regulatory process can serve to reduce both the amount of
distrust generated by closed proceedings and grievances and
frustrations. Public participation also allows for challenge
of illegal, ineffective or inappropriate actions before they
come into force.
Public participation on anything other than a minor scale may well be
opposed, however, by those whose primary concern is the efficiency of the
regulatory process.	 From this viewpoint, participation should be limited
to those who can provide an informed insight on the way that an agency
should go about the performance of its statutory role. 	 In the case of the
I.B.A. this would mean that the primary concern should be with the
participation of the regulatees - the programme companies.
This kind of limited participation can promote the fairness of the
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regulatory process in two major ways. 	 Firstly, participation can
increase confidence that the views of the regulated have been made known to
the regulators. Secondly, it can produce greater understanding of the
reasons for a particular decision.
In fact, both kinds of participation could have benefits for the
I.B.A. in the formulation and articulation of its policies. Participation
by interested parties would allow the I.B.A. to expand its information base
and thereby improve the quality of its decisions. More significantly,
participation could add to the legitimacy of the regulation of I.L.R. by
satisfying any desire for involvement on the part of constituent interests.
(3) Efficiency 
An efficient regulatory agency is one that achieves its goals and in
doing so exploits its human and material resources so as to maximise
36
'value'.	 Regulatory activities should be organised economically,
avoiding the waste of resources.
It should not be thought, however, that an open regulatory agency will
always be less efficient than one that discourages accountability and
participation. It will cost more to run an open regulatory process in the
short term, but in the long term it could prove very expensive to have to
change policies because they are subsequently found to be unacceptable or
incorrect.
	 This would not be an efficient way to proceed.
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(4) Fairness 
By tradition public lawyers have been concerned primarily with the
fairness of the regulatory process. Fairness requires that those affected
by the decision of a regulatory agency should be given an opportunity to
put their case. If a regulatory agency operates fairly, the result will
be the trust and credibility that can lend legitimacy to the policy making
process.
The value of fairness can be furthered both by the structure of agency
procedures and by the supervision of the courts.
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(5) Authoritativeness and Integrity 
Authoritativeness implies that the decisions of a regulatory agency
should possess the quality of finality, subject to any appeal or review
procedures. It requires that the regulatory functions delegated to an
agency should in fact be performed by that agency, and not by either the
courts or by politicians.
Likewise, integrity requires that an agency act with full commitment
to further its statutory objectives and in doing so be free from hidden
government pressures. Governments should respect the integrity of the
regulatory process and refrain from 'pulling strings'.
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(6) Comprehensibility 
Comprehensibility requires that the regulatory process be
understandable to those it affects. Attempts should be made to make an
agency's policies and procedures known and understood by interested
parties.	 In particular, those affected by particular decisions should
know whom to approach and what the relevant issues are.
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(7) Principled Decision Making 
The notion that decision making be principled requires that regulatory
agencies should base their rules and decisions on policies which are
identified and articulated clearly. Stewart points out that a,
'requirement that agencies articulate and consistently pursue policy
choices	 can serve as a useful tool
	
. to	 force agency
25
reconsideration of questionable decisions and to direct attention to
41
factors that may have been disregarded'.	 In other words, agency
decision making should be guided by a rational assessment of the
information at its disposal.
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Openness 
Openness provides a window onto the regulatory process and makes it
accessible to interested parties. Openness would seem to require both that
a large amount of information be made publicly available and that reasons
for decisions be given.
The value of openness also supports the other socio-legal values
outlined above.	 An open process encourages participation and is more
accessible than a closed one. It is more comprehensible and encourages
fairness.	 More accurate decisions are produced, thereby promoting an
agency's efficiency.	 Openness also encourages the articulation of the
policies and standards guiding decision making.
Openness is thus a vital aspect of the regulatory process. 	 Without
it, public and politicians alike will be unable to exercise any democratic
right of control.
Evaluating Regulatory Legitimacy
The significance of the eight socio-legal values outlined above is
that they provide some standards against which to assess the legitimacy of
the I.B.A.'s regulatory policies and procedures. It is possible that they
may conflict with one another in any given situation, but they should
normally be supportive or compatible. The relative weighting to be given
to any particular value is a matter of political judgment, but a regulatory
process with pretensions to legitimacy should reflect all of these values
in one way or another.
When evaluating the legitimacy of a particular agency activity or
policy in terms of the satisfaction or otherwise of these values, it is
helpful to make reference to a number of different models of regulatory
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legitimacy.	 Four such models are utilised here. These are:
(1) The Legislative Model
(2) The Due Process Model
(3) The Accountability and Control Model
(4) The Efficiency and Expertise Model
These four models of regulatory legitimacy are ideal-types. As such,
they extract different ways of understanding the regulatory process, 'from
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a myriad of particular legal doctrines and works of legal scholarship.'
The main weakness of these models is undoubtedly oversimplification, but
this weakness need not be fatal. The potential utility of such models is
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indicated clearly in the following passage by Frug:
Rather than pretending to be objective, they are designed to appeal to
you, the reader, as a convincing way to understand the phenomenon
of...legitimation in administrative...law...[T]hey are designed to
allow us to grasp the theory...without being overwhelmed by the very
richness of detail that they omit.
(1) The Legislative Model
Regulatory agencies wield considerable power over private economic
rights. They formulate rules and standards and enforce sanctions for non-
compliance.	 They choose between competing societal interests and values.
To a large extent, their legitimacy in exercising these powers derives from
the fact that the source of their power is a grant of authority from
46
Parliament.
	 The role of Parliament as a legitimiser is an important one.
27
The legislative model asserts that agency actions are legitimate
because the agency is acting, 'as a mere transmission belt for implementing
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legislative directives in particular cases'. 	 It justifies regulatory
action on the basis that as citizens control the legislature through the
democratic process, so the legislature in turn controls the activities of
regulators.	 Thus the legitimacy of any particular agency decision can be
established by determining to what extent it carries forward legislative
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prescriptions.	 The more specific the legislative prescriptions, the
stronger will be the regulators' claim to legitimacy. Conversely, a broad
statutory mandate conferring discretionary powers will provide a weak basis
for claiming that legitimacy.
In practice, it is well-nigh impossible to legitimate the actions of
regulatory agencies by the 'transmission belt' theory. Clearly there is
some importance in a legislative connection as a basis for regulatory
legitimacy, but the legislative model fails to mirror the realities of the
regulatory process.	 When the I.B.A. is instructed by Parliament to
provide services, 'of high quality' and to ensure that broadcasts,
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'maintain a high general standard in all respects',
	 the legislature could
not be said to have given crystal clear instructions.
	 We will see in Part
Three just how capacious and vague the I.B.A.'s statutory mandate is.
	 The
I.B.A. possesses more than a mere discretion over the implementation of
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statutory provisions.
	
As Mashaw points out:
A search for the relationship between [a regulatory agency's) exercise
of discretion and the democratic expression of public policy in a
statute can begin and end in a verbal haze.
The	 'transmission belt' theory fails because broad statutory
provisions will fail to provide a solution to most of the situations
confronting a regulatory agency.	 Furthermore, most regulatory decision
making involves not just the implementation of legislative policy, but also
setting the priorities to be given to competing social interests and
values.	 Even	 the	 straightforward'	 application of	 legislative
instructions will require that an agency, in Stewart's words, 'reweigh and
reconcile the often nebulous or conflicting policies behind the directives
in the context of a particular factual situation with a particular
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constellation of affected interests.' 	 This procedure	 is 'inherently
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discretionary' and 'necessarily political'.
In short, the legislative model poorly describes the reality of the
tasks given to regulatory agencies. 	 The I.B.A. will thus find it
difficult to argue that its actions are legitimate because they are
in accordance with Parliament's instructions.
(2) The Due Process Basis 
The fundamental principle supporting the due process basis is that the
legitimacy of the regulatory process can be enhanced by a popular
perception that its decision making procedures are fair in that they allow
the participation of affected interests. 	 Procedures for consultation and
participation render the regulator directly accountable to those parties
concerned in the relevant issue.
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There are, however, a number of problems with the due process model.
First, there are questions concerning who is to be held to be eligible to
participate and the extent of that participation. 	 Second, there can be no
guarantee that fair and open procedures will result in efficient or
rational decision making. 	 Third, an interest representation model of
legitimacy will be challenged if a regulatory agency proves to be biased in
favour of regulated and client groups.	 Fourth, there is the problem of
making an agency responsive to unorganised interests.
29
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(3) The Accountability and Control Model 
The accountability and control model is based on the premise that the
actions of regulatory agencies may further be accepted as legitimate to the
extent that the regulatory process embodies significant elements of
political accountability and control.	 It involves a direct appeal to the
public,	 but not through the voice of Parliament as reflected in
legislation. Legitimacy on this basis derives from the existence of
various mechanisms to ensure the accountability of agency policies and
performance.
The major problem with this model is that the very label 'independent
regulatory agency' implies a considerable degree of independence from
outside control. Two subsidiary problems concern to whom the agency is to
be made accountable, or by whom it will be controlled, and how to make the
system of accountability or control effective.
In practice an agency will become ineffective if it is cut off from
political power centres. A regulatory agency will only survive in the
long term where the legislature and government agree with its policies and
where the courts approve of the way it interprets its mandate. An agency
under attack from either politicians or the judiciary will lose the public
support that is essential to its effective operation.
Where accountability and control are not exercised by elected
representatives, however, problems of unrepresentativeness will undermine
claims to legitimacy. This is particularly true of the potential
influence of the courts in affecting the policies to which regulatory
agencies adhere. In general, the courts can, at the behest of a person
aggrieved, review an agency's decision to determine whether it has exceeded
its statutory powers, erred in law or failed to observe standards of
fairness in making a decision.	 Although the main function of the courts
in applying the principles of judicial review is to police the limits of an
agency's legal authority and not to substitute the judges', view of the
merits of a decision, a court's authority to interpret the law will have
important policy implications, not only with respect to any particular
decision but on the broader application of the agency's mandate.
(4) The Efficiency and Expertise Model 
This model asserts that the legitimacy of regulatory agencies may be
enhanced by their effectiveness in meeting their statutory responsibilities.
On this view, the particular strengths of the regulatory process are
expertise and specialisation. In his classic discussion of the regulatory
process written in 1938, Landis argued that, 'the art of regulating an
industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to
shift requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate, the pursuit
of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency, and the power
through enforcement to realise conclusions as to policy'.55
The expertise model is attractive because it promises to provide a
solution to the problem of granting discretionary powers to regulators.
Landis argued that an agency can only achieve its goals through the
acquisition of the knowledge that comes from specialised experience. The
discretion given to formulation of policy being simply a reresult of the
goal to be achieved and the state of the agency's environment.56
Yet there are a number of weaknesses in an expertise basis for
regulatory legitimacy. First, it relies on continuous success to sustain
legitimacy when it is impossible to measure the result of much regulatory
activity. 57
 Claims to regulatory success will always be contentious and
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open to different interpretations. Expertise also has anti-egalitarian
connotations and can lead to regulators neglecting the impact of their
decisions on other values in society.
Conclusion 
From the discussion thus far it should be clear that any attempt to
test the legitimacy of the I.B.A.'s regulation of I.L.R. will involve, in
Freedman's words, 'an intricate and perplexing inquiry, filled with
theoretical and practical subtleties'. 58
 The student of the regulator
process must confront these subtleties in any attempt to assess the
responsiveness of regulatory institutions to democratic principles and the
degree to which their procedures are efficient and fair.
It is certainly not the case, however, that the legitimacy of the
regulatory process can turn simply upon its lack of direct accountability
to the public through the majoritarian democratic process. The other
potential bases for regulatory legitimacy have been outlined above.
In fact, the significance of legitimacy in providing a reason for the
popular acceptance of a regulatory institution can be over-estimated. An
equally important factor may be rational calculation, including evaluation
of self-interest. 59
 Legitimacy must therefore be tested pragmatically,
with an awareness of the problematic nature of the concept.
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PART TWO - THE INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY AND INDEPENDENT 
LOCAL RADIO 
CHAPTER THREE - THE INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY 
Introduction 
The Independent Broadcasting Authority is the public body authorised by
Parliament to organise and supervise the Independent Broadcasting System.
This system consists of Independent Television (I.T.V.) in addition to I.L.R.
Both I.L.R. and I.T.V. have been established as a twotier system comprising
the I.B.A. and a number of private companies. The radio and television
stations are awned by these private companies who enter into contracts with
the I.B.A. to provide local radio or television services.' Both are financed
by the sale of advertising time. In fact, the Independent Broadcasting system
is almost wholly dependent upon advertising revenue for its financing. The
broadcast services are paid for by the sale of 'spot' advertising time by the
programme companies. The I.B.A. obtains its income from rentals paid by the
programme companies under the terms of their contracts with the Authority.
The I.L.R. companies are subject to the financial conditions imposed
by the Broadcasting Act and their contracts with the I.B.A., in addition to
those which flow from company law. The initial funds required by the
companies are found in the normal way, by the issue of shares or acceptance
of loans from third parties. The I.L.R. companies must therefore seek to
secure an income from the sale of advertising time which is sufficient to
meet the cost of their operations and to provide a reasonable return for
their share holders.
The I.B.A. consists of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and ten other
Members. At present its existence is guaranteed by statute until 1996,
subject to extension by statutory order. All the Members are appointed
3/6
by the Home Secretary.
	 Three of the Members are specifically appointed
to make the interests of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland,
respectively, their special responsibility. 	 A Member holds office for a
3
fixed period at the time of his appointment, not exceeding five years.
The I.B.A. has a staff of approximately 1,500, two thirds of whom are
concerned with engineering matters.	 I.L.R. is the specific responsibility
of the Radio Division, assisted by the I.B.A.'s other department and its
various regional offices. 	 At present, some 15% of Regional Office time is
4
spent on I.L.R.
With regard to I.L.R., four main functions for the I.B.A. are laid
down in the relevant legislation, now consolidated in the Broadcasting Act
1981:	 selection and appointment of the programme companies;	 supervision
of the programming; control of the amount and content of the advertising;
and transmission of all the programmes and services. 	 The functions of the
programme contractors are to provide the programme material and to raise
revenue from the sale of advertising time in order to provide the finance
on which the system depends.
One major role of the I.B.A. is to attempt to reconcile the commercial
interests of the broadcasting companies with the public interest.
	 The
main aspect of this role is to make sure that the pursuit of commercial
objectives does not become the companies' dominant activity to the
detriment of programme standards. 	 Equally, of course, it has a
responsibility to make sure that any requirements which it imposes on the
broadcasting companies' output of programmes remain compatible with a
successful appeal to substantial numbers of the audience. 	 In short, the
I.B.A. represents an example of the traditional British compromise between
tight state control and unfettered commercial activity.
The I.B.A. became responsible for the development of I.L.R. as a
result of the Sound Broadcasting Act 1972, which first introduced local
commercial radio to the United Kingdom. This Act renamed the Independent
Television Authority as the I.B.A. and gave to it the powers to establish,
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'local sound broadcasting services', now known as I.L.R. 	 There are at
present 48 I.L.R. stations which serve 51 locations in the United Kingdom.
I.L.R. is part of the public service broadcasting system of the United
Kingdom.	 The precise meaning of the 'public service' concept 	 of
broadcasting has proved to be a fruitful topic for debate, but, in essence,
it means that broadcasting, 'is not determined simply by market forces, in
6
terms either of programming or of access to the broadcast services'. 	 Two
further aspects of the public service concept are that broadcasting is to
be used for the benefit of the public as a whole, rather than for the
benefit of a minority, and that the broadcast service should be of a high
standard.
Various implications as regards the regulation of broadcasting flow
from this concept of public service. 	 In the case of the I.B.A., it means
that its responsibility for broadcasting is that of a trustee for the
public interest and that it is independent of Government in its decision-
making.	 The relationship between the I.B.A. and the Government should be
at at-Ms length, with the independence and integrity of the Authority being
respected.	 There are also positive duties imposed on the I.B.A. to
provide a certain type and standard of service.
The report of the Committee on Financing the B.B.C. suggested that,
'the best operational definition of public service is simply any major
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modification of purely commercial provision resulting from public policy'.
When defined in this way, the Committee noted that the scope of public
service would vary with the state of broadcasting itself. 	 In fact, this
limited concept of public service is far from helpful if an attempt is to
be made to clarify what the present implications of the concept are.Public
service broadcasting is perhaps better understood as, 'imposing
requirements on broadcasters not simply to refrain from transmitting
material which is inaccurate, misleading or unsuitable, but positively to
provide wide-ranging programmes of quality'.8
This definition of the concept of public service broadcasting makes it
clear that various consequences must flow from this in terms of the
regulation of broadcasting and is closer to present day realities, as
reflected in the Broadcasting Act.	 In fact, the Broadcasting Act 1981
does attempt to incorporate the essence of public service broadcasting into
the functions and duties of the I.B.A. Section 2 states:
The function of the Authority shall be to provide, in accordance with
this Act ... television and local sound broadcasting services,
additional in each case to those of the B.B.C. and of high quality
(both as to the transmission and as to the matter transmitted), for so
much of the United Kingdom ... as may from time be reasonably
practicable.
It shall be the duty of the Authority -
(a) to provide the television and local sound broadcasting services as a
public service for disseminating information, education and
entertainment,
(b) to ensure that the programmes broadcast by the Authority in each area
maintain a high general standard in all respects (and in particular in
respect of their content and quality), and a proper balance and wide
range in their subject matter, having regard both to the programmes as
a whole and also to the days of the week on which, and the times of
the day at which, the programmes are broadcast; and
(c) to secure a wide showing or (as the case may be) hearing for
programmes of merit.
Requirements such as these reflect what is known as the 'principle of
universality', 9 which is an important aspect of public service
broadcasting. According to this principle, broadcast service should
attempt to provide some programming of appeal to every member of the
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listening or viewing public, because the fact of spectrum scarcity means
that services are restricted in number.
	 The principle also requires that
news and coverage of socially controversial topics be politically impartial
in character.
	 Certain material, for example that would be an incitement
to crime of highly offensive, cannot be broadcast.
	 It may also be
necessary, as in the case of I.L.R., to broadcast a proportion of
programmes in minority languages.
Functions of the I.B.A. 
(1) Selection and appointment of the programme companies 
In practice, the I.B.A.'s most important function is that of choosing
the programme contractor. This fact was recognised by the Annan Committee
when it stated that, 'the most important way in which they [the I.B.A.]
exercise their watching brief is by selecting the company which in their
belief will give the best service to its region ... and then by awarding
10
it the franchise'.
	 The selection of a particular contractor from
competing applicants is entirely a matter for the Authority.
	 Among the
relevant considerations are financial strength, the extent of local support
11
and past performance or future potential.
Other important decisions within the discretion of the I.B.A. are the
determination of the areas to be advertised and the requirements of the
service to be provided by contractors.
	 Among the relevant factors in this
context are financial circumstances, technical requirements and the
character of the region to be served.
(2) Supervision of programming 
Although not itself involved in programme making, the I.B.A. is
answerable to Parliament and to the public for everything it transmits.
The I.B.A.'s function under the Broadcasting Act is to provide local sound
broadcasting services of high quality, 'both as to transmission and as to
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The matter transmitted'. 12 The Act imposes a statutory duty on the I.B.A.
to ensure that the programmes provide a proper balance of information
education and entertainment; a high general standard in all respects; and,
so far as possible, accuracy in news, due impartiality in matters of
political and industrial controversy, and the avoidance of offence to good
taste and decency. The programmes have to be made available to as much of
the United Kingdom as possible.
Each I.L.R. company has to observe the requirements of the
Broadcasting Act, the terms of its contract with the I.B.A. and the I.B.A.
requirements that stem from these sources. The I.B.A. examines programme
schedules in advance of broadcasting and monitors the output. This
monitoring process includes audience research. The public also participate
in the regulation of I.L.R. through General Advisory Committees in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and Local Advisory Committees in each
I.L.R. area.
The I.B.A.'s role in the supervision of programming is, however,
considerably more expansive than that of simply imposing statutory and
contractual duties on the I.L.R. companies. The I.B.A. is closely involved
in the formulation of programme policy and in the processes of programme
planning. In this way, the Authority has a much more positive, pro-active
involvement than that of a programme censor. Similarly, the I.B.A. has a
greater responsibility for the strategy of the Independent Broadcasting
system than its description as a 'regulatory agency' might suggest.
The I.B.A.'s powers of direction over the I.L.R. companies are
undoubtedly considerable, but, of course, the mere exercise of such powers
will not lead in themselves to the desired end result of high quality
programmes. To this end, the I.B.A.'s concern must be as much with the
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creation of the conditions in which a good service will be produced and to
encourage quality in the variety of ways available to it.
	 This
encouragement takes the form of a dialogue between the I.B.A. and the
I.L.R. companies.
	 The Authority makes known to the companies its general
views on the quality of companies' output and effectiveness.
	 The I.B.A.'s
view emerges from a continuing assessment of programmes, in the light of
audience research, comments and complaints from the listening public and
judgments made by the staff and Members of the Authority.
There are factors other than those within the influence of the
I.B.A.'s powers and responsibilities which can affect the broadcast output.
Most importantly in terms of the quality of their programming, they are in
competition with the B.B.C.
The more negative aspects of the I.B.A.'s control of programme content
derive from the particular duties which the Authority is given under the
Broadcasting Act.
	 The specific rules relating to programme standards are
to be found in the I.L.R. Notes of Guidance.
	 The Notes of Guidance 
assemble the outcome of discussions between the I.B.A. and the companies on
many programme matters over the years, including possible offence to good
taste and decency, accuracy, privacy, fairness, impartiality, crime,
politics and so on.
The Notes of Guidance cover highly controversial issues about which
there are strong disagreements within society.
	 Moreover, it is within
these areas of possible controversy that the programme companies tend to be
most jealous of their own editorial role alongside the statutory
responsibility of the I.B.A.
	 The Authority must therefore perform a neat
balancing act if it is not to act as a purely negative and restrictive
influence on programme companies. This is an example of the dilemma
between what Kagan has called 'stringency' and 'accommodation' in the
13
implementation of a statutory mandate. 	 The Notes of Guidance are
intended to give the programme companies the greatest possible freedom of
action within the Authority's interpretation of the terms of the Act. The
Notes of Guidance stress the preparedness of the I.B.A. to discuss
individual problems on an ad hoc basis, and this dialogue is one of the
more important functions fulfilled by the Authority.
(3) Control of the Advertising 
The I.B.A. controls all the advertising transmitted on I.L.R. It
checks that the frequency, amount and nature of the advertisements are in
accordance with the Broadcasting Act and with the rules and standards laid
down by the I.B.A. itself. The Authority also regulates the frequency and
duration of the advertising intervals in order that they do not detract
from the statutory requirement that the medium be one of information,
14
education and entertainment.
All	 advertisements have to comply with the I.B.A.'s Code of
Advertising Standards and Practice, which is drawn up in consultation with
the I.B.A.'s Advertising Advisory Committee. Specialist staff at the
I.B.A. and the Independent Television Companies Association (I.T.C.A.),
which acts in this respect on behalf of the radio companies also, have to
satisfy themselves that advertisements comply with the law, meet all the
provisions contained in the Code and that advertisers' claims have been
substantiated.
The I.B.A. and, on occasion, Government have responsibility for
changes to the Code and to matters of taste and truthfulness. Under the
Broadcasting Act, the I.B.A. is required to consult from time to time with
the Home Secretary as to the classes and designation of advertisements
which must not be broadcast, and to carry out any directions he may give
15
them in those respects.
	 The I.B.A. also has the responsibility to
16
regulate programmes funded by non-broadcasters (that is, sponsorship).
(4) Transmission of the programmes 
Responsibility for transmission of programme services has long been
recognised as an essential part of the Authority's functions. In the
White Paper published in November 1953 on Television Policy, before the
setting up of the I.T.A., the then Government recognised that the body
regulating the new service would need to own and operate the transmitting
stations. The I.B.A.'s continued responsibility for transmission gives it
ultimate control over what is broadcast and enables it to plan the
transmitter network so as to achieve the Broadcasting Act's requirement of
bringing the services to as much of the country as is reasonably
practicable.
The I.B.A.'s main engineering functions are:
(i) to plan the transmitter networks, their frequencies, assignments
and the distribution networks;
(ii) to plan and build all transmitting stations radiating I.T.V. and
I.L.R. programmes;
(iii) to operate and maintain these transmitting stations;
(iv) to ensure transmissions of a high quality;
(v) to maintain a specialised programme of engineering research in
order to keep the Independent Broadcasting system up-to-date in
terms of technological development;
The I.B.A. has drawn up an Engineering Code of Practice and Technical 
Regulations for I.L.R. which set out the minimum technical standards for
the performance and operation of the I.L.R. companies' equipment. The
companies are required to meet the standards laid down in the Code and any
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revised standards that may be agreed from time to time.
Conclusion - Independence and Accountability 
Given the broad range of the duties, the I.B.A. can quite safely be
described as a multi-functional regulatory agency. 	 This means that a
variety of functions are represented by the shorthand term, 'regulator'.
In the performance of the functions outlined above, the I.B.A. is of
necessity engaged in the process of law-elaboration, which entails both
policy-making and rule-making. This latent power to make its own policy
or expand on government policy manifests itself in the Authority's power to
award contracts to programme companies, to make regulations to control
programming,	 advertising and technical standards, to exercise its
discretion in a number of different contexts and, most significantly, to
interpret its statutory mandate.
It may be, of course, that the I.B.A.'s ability to make policy is the
result of accident rather than design or delegation. 	 It arises most
clearly when one considers that the statutory mandate of the I.B.A. is
17
expressed in terms of the 'public interest' 	 and contains a number of
vague criteria that have had to be given content by the I.B.A. before it
could proceed with its specific duties. Inevitably, policy-making of this
sort raises in a crucial form the issue of accountability.
The issue of accountability is also raised by the I.B.A.'s function of
rule-making. Rule-making, in the sense of the ability to formulate
policies in the form of rules and standards, is a highly significant and
important function. This ability to make rules such as the I.L.R. Notes 
of Guidance that can apply to a number of cases has advantages both for
the I.B.A. and for the I.L.R. companies, for whom the existence of rules
and standards can serve to provide a degree of predictability in their
affairs.
	
The existence of rules can also further the values of
consistency and fairness by the application of the same standards to
different parties. The main disadvantage of rules is that they can lead
to inflexibility by the regulatory agency and to a lessening of the
opportunity to argue an individual case before the agency's policy is
applied.
One major dilemma raised by the I.B.A.'s performance of its various
statutory functions is that of reconciling the value of maintaining the
Authority's independence with that of making it accountable. The
independence of the I.B.A. is perhaps its most crucial characteristic.
Slatter has written of independent regulatory agencies that, 'the medium
through which the government function is performed can be said in a very
18
real sense to be itself a part of the message'.	 In the field of
broadcasting government has always felt it necessary to maintain an arms-
length relationship with the regulators. No doubt a government department
could fulfil the statutory duties of the I.B.A., but it would not be able
to provide this added independence.	 In this sense, the I.B.A. serves an
19
important function as an 'insulator'	 between the listening public and the
government.
As was mentioned in Chapter One a possible reason for the creation of
an independent regulatory agency is to deal with a political 'hot potato'.
Such agencies have indeed been established when, 'public feeling was
20
intense but its drift was obscure'. 	 In circumstances such as these, the
establishment of an agency can give an opportunity to government to
formulate a more coherent policy and to deflect unwanted criticism. In
addition, the creation of a regulatory agency relieves the Government of
direct responsibility for any decisions or policies made and hence for any
ensuing criticism or controversy.
There are, however, more legitimate reasons for the use of an
independent regulatory agency. In the case of the I.B.A. and the
allocation of I.L.R. contracts, the fact that the Authority is independent
of government serves to minimise political lobbying and the invocation of
political favours. The power to allocate these contracts is quite clearly
outwith the control of government and politicians. This is not to say, of
course, that the I.B.A. itself is not subject to lobbying and political
pressure, but the intention is that such arguments be evaluated
independently and on their merits.
In a similar vein, it has generally been felt desirable to keep the
day-to-day regulation of broadcasting free from partisan political
influence.	 The independence of the Authority provides this necessary
impartiality. It is arguable that decisions made independently of party
politics are more readily accepted as legitimate both by the public and by
those directly affected by the regulatory regime.
It may be, however, that this faith in 'de-politicised' regulation is
21
somewhat naive and misplaced.
	
	
In order to, 'make significant headway
22
against the opposition of the regulated interests',	 a regulatory agency
will inevitably be reliant upon political support. Furthermore, the very
process of regulation can itself be seen to be political. As Cutler and
23
Johnson have pointed out:
Regulatory agencies are deeply involved in the making of 'political'
decisions in the highest sense of that term - choices between
competing social and economic values and competing alternatives for
government action - decisions delegated to them by politically
accountable officials.
The emphasis in the discussion thus far has been on the desirability
of maintaining regulatory agency independence, but an equally, if not more
important value in a democratic system of government is that of
accountability.	 The possible tension between these two values is
reflected in the fact that a gain in independence will lead to a loss of
accountability.	 Any increase in accountability will result in less room
for manoeuvre on the part of the agency and less flexibility in the
application of its expertise to the problems confronting it. Too much
emphasis on accountability would tend to defeat the purpose of creating an
independent agency in the first place.
The trite solution to this dilemma is to attempt to strike a balance
between the competing values and not to choose to emphasise one at the
expense of another.
	
Striking such a balance is no easy task, of course,
and there are a number of complicating factors. First, agencies such as
the I.B.A. habitually have a wide range of functions to perform and it may
be that each function calls for a different degree of accountability.
Second, there is the great diversity among regulatory agencies and there
can be no guarantee that the best possible solution for the I.B.A. will be
applicable to other agencies.	 Each regulatory agency needs to be treated
as a separate case.
It should be pointed out, however, that there is in fact considerable
scope for the Government direction and control of the I.B.A. through
24
reserve powers given to the Home Secretary under the Broadcasting Act.
These powers include the ability to limit the amount of broadcasting time,
to require the broadcasting of Government announcements, to prevent the
broadcasting of any matter or classes of matter, to prevent exclusive
arrangements for broadcasting sporting or other events of national
interest. Admittedly there have been few occasions on which any of these
powers have been exercised, but they do indicate that the I.B.A. cannot act
25
independently of Government wishes in all circumstances.
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT LOCAL RADIO 
Origins of I.L.R. 
Before looking in detail at the history of I.L.R., it is necessary to
outline the early days of radio broadcasting and the role played by the
B.B.C.	 Prior to the grant of its first Royal Charter in 1926, the B.B.C.
had been a limited company, formed in 1922 by the manufacturers of
wirelesses in order to promote the sales of their equipment. As Burns has
pointed out, the transition to a public corporation marked the acceptance
of the view that because the social and political possibilities of
broadcasting were as great as its technical potential, the new form of
communication should be run in the interests of the whole nation and not
I
just to promote the financial interests of commercial companies.
Accordingly, the B.B.C. was to be run as a public service.
This view that broadcasting should be run as a public service owes
much to the early political and social environment of the B.B.C. Among the
factors described by Coase in his seminal work, 'British Broadcasting: A
Study in Monopoly', are: 'widespread dissatisfaction with the ad hoc nature
of industrial competition' in early part of the century; the growth of
public corporations exercising governmental control over utilities in these
same years; and the desire of government not to be seen to be acting
2
unfairly by giving a monopoly to a single commercial company.
It was felt that a monopoly in broadcasting was essential if high
standards were to be maintained and that the only alternative to a public
monopoly was the broadcasting chaos which had reigned in the U.S.A., where,
according to Coase, there was, 'no co-ordination, no standard, no guiding
3
policy'.
	 Furthermore, it was believed that a radio service financed by
advertising was incompatible with a wide ranging broadcasting system
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4operating in the public interest.
There were, of course, those who held very different views about the
aims of broadcasting and were attracted by the commercial opportunities
that it presented. The origins of commercial broadcasting reflect this
divergence of views about the purposes of broadcasting. 	 Should
broadcasting be treated as a public resource or as a private commercial
enterprise?
According to Briggs, the reason why the B.B.C.'s monopoly (over
television broadcasting) was finally broken in 1954 was that the commercial
lobby saw in broadcasting, ' a potential for profit and power which
encouraged them to struggle against any continuation of the institutional
5
status quo'.
	
	
The lobby for commercial television was an amalgam of
6
advertising, industrial and political interests. 	 It was a similar
alignment of economic and political interests which succeeded in the
introduction of commercial radio in the form of I.L.R. in 1972.
The advertising industry quite naturally was associated with moves to
commercialise radio broadcasting. 	 It was impressed by the medium's ability
to make money, as demonstrated by experience in Europe and the U.S.A.
Various	 other industrial and financial organisations brought their
considerable influence to the lobby for commercial radio.	 The pirates,
who broadcast a mix of pop music and advertisements from off-shore
locations, were able to exploit a genuine demand which was not adequately
catered for by the B.B.C. at that time.
Thus, during the 1960s there was a powerful, if loosely aligned lobby
who supported the introduction of commercial radio into the U.K. They were
helped by the existence of the pirates and also by the willingness of
British companies to use radio to advertise their products.
The natural political allies of this lobby for commercial radio were
the Conservative Party. 	 It was a Conservative government which had
introduced commercial television in 1954 and an influential section of the
party believed that the commercial opportunities in radio would further
7
industrial interests and the market economy.
	
Wilson points out, however,
that support for comercial broadcasting within the Conservative Party was
by no means unanimous in the 1950s and that the introduction of commercial
television marked a shift away from 'philosophic' and towards opportunistic
8
or practical Conservatism in the post-war period.
But whatever the internal debates within the party, by 1970
Conservative support for commercial radio was overt. 	 The Conservative
manifesto of that year pledged to introduce 'private enterprise radio
9
closely linked with the local community'.
It is interesting to examine the various arguments used to support
commercial radio and which created the atmosphere which enabled its
introduction.	 Similar arguments can still be heard in contemporary
debates about broadcasting policy. In 1959, supporters of commercial radio
were contending that the B.B.C's monopoly in radio broadcasting was,
contrary to the best interests of the large listening public' and that,
'independent	 sound broadcasting organisations' 	 would improve the
10
situation.
	
Perhaps the most cogent argument put forward was that which
associated commercial radio with other forms of free enterprise in
communications. In 1971, for example, the Conservative Minister for Posts
and Telecommunications stated that the Labour Party was unable, 'to think
of any reason why commercial radio was wrong in principle if commercial
11
television was right'.
Another frequently aired argument was that commercial radio would be
a local form of broadcasting, in contrast to the B.B.C.'s national and
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regional services. 	 Localism proved to be an attractive and fruitful
concept to the commercial radio lobby. Significantly, perhaps, the concept
has public service implications. Also, there was no such existing service
implying that the 'job description' for a local radio service was a matter
for debate. The adroit use made of the local radio concept is demonstrated
by the fact that when commercial radio was introduced in 1972, it was in
12
fact called 'local sound broadcasting'.
Doubts were expressed at the time, however, about what was meant by
13
the term 'local'. As 'The Economist' put it:
Local radio must be clearly shown to have greater intrinsic virtues
than national commercial stations. That would be far from the case if
all the government did was to set up a number of stations which were
local only in so far as their transmitters covered a local area, while
stations were virtually indistinguishable from one another in their
output.
Powerful though the lobby for commercial radio may have been, there
was also considerable opposition which both delayed the arrival of I.L.R.
and ensured that it was a regulated system of broadcasting within a public
service framework.
The B.B.C. were forceful opponents of the introduction of commercial
radio and were able to bring considerable pressure to bear on governments.
It attempted to demonstrate that local radio could be run on a public
service basis by establishing a number of local radio stations in the late
1960s.
Another consistent source of opposition was the Labour Party, which
had already opposed the introduction of I.T.V. in 1954. In a debate in the
House of Lords in 1959 over proposals for commercial radio, the Labour peer
Lord Shackleton claimed that its supporters were, 'firing the first shot in
a new campaign to extend the range of commercial and advertising interests
14
into radio.'
The Labour governments of 1964 and 1970 supported the B.B.C's
attempts to undermine the case for commercial radio by allowing the B.B.C.
to experiment with local stations and to create Radio 1 to cater for
demands for pop music. The Government also acted strongly against pirate
radio stations with the passage of the 1967 Maritime Offences Act. Whalin
opposition, the Labour Party vigorously opposed the 1971 Sound Broadcasting
Bill. The Labour Party's attitude was summed up well by Wedgwood-Benn, who
wrote in 1971 that there was a need to oppose those who would, 'put
15
commerce before communication, profits before programmes'.
The Sound Broadcasting Act 1972 
It has already been seen that the Conservative Party came into
government in 1970 promising to introduce commercial radio. In order to
carry out its manifesto commitment it had to contend with the British
tradition of public service broadcasting and with the considerable
opposition to commercial radio. The resultant compromise was the Sound
16
Broadcasting Act of 1972. Phillips claims that:
In Britain commercial radio is local because of a [n].. .accident of
history... The desire to compromise with radio's non-commercial
heritage...led the Heath Government to settle for a new service of
advertisement-financed local broadcasting.
Not too surprisingly, perhaps, there was no precise defintion in the
17
Act of a 'local sound broadcast'.
	 Section 2(3) of the Act stated
18
that:
In this Act 'local sound broadcast' means a programme which is
broadcast...from a station so constructed and operated as to have a
range of transmission limited to that which is sufficient, in normal
circumstances, to ensure adequate reception throughout a particular
locality.
In response, the Minister for Posts and Telecommunications agreed
that the Bill did not contain a definition of a 'locality' and that the
task of defining the concept was to be left entirely to the discretion and
20
expertise of the I.B.A.
The definition of what constitutes a 'local' programme was left
21
similarly vague in the Act:
In the case of local sound broadcasting services...the programmes
broadcast from different stations for reception in different
localities [should] not consist of identical or similar material to an
extent inconsisbi-t with the character of the services as local sound
broadcasting services.
The 1972 Act placed the new local sound broadcasting services under
broadly the same framework as I.T.V. and by doing so paid service to the
ideas of public service broadcasting. 	 Admittedly the public service
obligations were very loosely defined but, had it not been for the strength
of the public service tradition and the opposition to commercial radio, a
much more loosely regulated system of broadcasting could have been
introduced.
The Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting and the 1978 
White Paper
The newly elected Labour Government of 1974 acted quickly to stop any
further expansion of I.L.R. In April 1974 they established the Committee
on the Future of Broadcasting under the chairmanship of Lord Annan. The
22
task set the Committee was:
To consider the future of the broadcasting services in the United
Kingdom...; to consider the implications for present or any
recommended additional services...; and to propose what consitutional,
organisational and financial arrangements and what conditions should
apply to the conduct of all these services.
Much of the evidence to the Committee on the quality of service
provided by I.L.R. was highly critical. A great deal of criticism was
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directed at the perceived failure of I.B.A. to hold I.L.R. contractors to
23
the terms of their original applications.	 Despite such evidence,
however, the Annan Committee itself gave a cautious approval both of the
performance of the service provided by I.L.R. stations and of the role of
24
the I.B.A. The Report concludes that:
Most of us, however, approved of the way in which the I.B.A. had
handled the matter....Too many fearsome regulations in the initial
stages can cripple commercial enterprises. We agreed with the I.B.A.
that rigid adherence to the terms of the franchise application was not
necessarily the right policy, the stations' programming policies
should develop in the light of experience...It was up to the Authority
to ensure that the programming was varied and gave a good service to
the locality.
Yet again one sees here the desire, already evident in the 1972 Act,
to leave the discretion of the I.B.A. largely untramelled. 	 There is a
reliance on the expertise of the I.B.A. to legitimate its policies.
Somewhat inconsistently, the Annan Committee took a critical line on
whether the I.B.A. should continue to be responsible for the development
and regulation of I.L.R. The Committee observed that, 'the I.B.A. had
tended to transpose a system of supervision devised for network television
services into local radio' and concluded that the I.B.A. had not,
'developed quite the right touch for supervising a very large number of
25
disparate radio stations'.	 The Committee recommended the establishment
of a Local Broadcasting Authority to take the responsibility for all local
26
radio services.
Subsequent to the publication of the Report in March 1977, the Labour
27
Government produced a White Paper in July 1978. 	 It rejected many of the
Annan Comittee's recommendations and proposed that expansion of I.L.R.
should be allowed under certain guidelines, which included that, 'the
initial phase of expansion should include, if practicable, a station run by
28
a non-profit-making trust'.
	 This White Paper never reached the
legislative stage, however, owing to the Labour Government's fall from
office in May 1979.
The Broadcasting Acts of 1980 and 1981 
The newly elected Conservative Government published their
Broadcasting Bill in February 1980.	 This Bill was intended primarily to
extend the life of the I.B.A. and to give the Authority the responsibility
of supervising a fourth television channel. The Bill also contained a
provision requiring 	 the I.B.A. to terminate I.L.R. contracts after an
eight year period and to test public opinion in the areas concerned before
awarding new contracts. The Authority's initial response to the draft
legislation was that it would permit them to continue with existing
29
contract procedures.	 This would have meant the continuation of the
'rolling' contract procedures under which the termination and renewal of
contracts would have been a privately conducted formality.
During the passage of the Bill, however, a number of M.P.s pressed
for the public re-advertisement of contracts at these eight year periods
and for the I.B.A. to hold public hearings during the re-advertisment
process. The concept of re-advertisement had earlier been proposed by both
the Annan Committee in 1977 and the Select Committee on Nationalised
Industries in 1978. It was also in line with the Government's commitment
to the promotion of competition policy. Consequently, and against the
wishes of the I.B.A., the 1980 Broadcasting Act carried a clause requiring
the I.B.A. to terminate and re-advertise I.L.R. contracts at fixed
30
intervals.
I.L.R. in the 1980s: Decline and Deregulation
The 1980s have witnessed a gradual decline in the expansion of
I.L.R., largely as a result of mounting economic pressures on the industry.
There has been increasing concern about the financial basis of I.L.R. and
about the difficult financial situation of many of the programme companies.
In particular, I.L.R. has not been successful at attracting advertising
revenue, even though total advertising expenditure by industry has been
expanding rapidly. By early 1987, only 27 I.L.R. companies were in profit
and the pattern of the industry was of a small number of large companies
producing healthy profits and a large number of small companies facing
growing financial difficulties through a failure to attract sufficient
advertising. In fact, 6 I.L.R. companies accounted for £2.6 million out of
a total profit of £3.7 million in 1986 and the two I.L.R. contractors for
London together attracted more advertising revenue than the 36 smallest
contractors in total.
I.L.R. has also been facing increased competition from other meida.
In particular the introduction of breakfast television had a clear impact
on the audience figures for radio at what had been traditionally the peak
period for radio listening. Other developments which may also work to the
detriment of I.L.R. include day-time television and satellite and cable
services.
As a result of such pressures, there has been an increasing trend
towards concentration of ownership in the industry, with failing I.L.R.
stations being acquired by more profitable contractors. 	 Thus far, two
I.L.R. stations (Gwent Broadcasting and Centre Radio) have gone out of
business and these were taken over by Red Rose Radio and Radio Trent
respectively. Red Rose had already acquired a major holding in Radio Aire
in Leeds and has subsequently acquired a controlling interest in Cardiff
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Broadcasting.	 Such developments have been permitted by the I.B.A. which,
it should be remembered, has an obligation under the Broadcasting Act for
ensuring that services maintain their local character. The I.B.A. has also
sanctioned the building up of shareholdings by foreign investors.
The difficult financial status of the industry has led to growing
complaints from the I.L.R. contractors that the regulation being imposed
upon them is excessively burdensome. In particular, they have targetted
their fire on the public service duties to maintain a certain quality of
output and balance of programmes. This campaign achieved partial success
when, in November 1984 the I.B.A. announced a number of important changes
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in the administration and regulation of I.L.R.	 Although the I.B.A. took
the opportunity to stress its continuing commitments to the requirements of
public service broadcasting under the Broadcasting Act 1981, 	 these
'deregulation' measures did represent a considerable change in emphasis by
the Authority.
This change was the result of persistent lobbying by the Association
of Independent Radio Contractors (A.I.R.C.) - an organisation to which the
I.L.R. programme contractors belong - and the Home Office putting its
weight behind the A.I.R.C. The intention was to make savings in I.B.A.
costs which can be passed on to the I.L.R. companies through a reduction in
the level of rentals paid by the companies to the I.B.A. for transmitters
and administration.
As part of the economy measures, I.L.R. development on the present
basis was limited to the 51 areas for which contract arrangements had
already been made.	 Services for future new separate contract areas, as
well as extensions to existing contract areas, were to be achieved by
'forward funding'.	 Previously, both the capital and running costs of
stations
	 including I.B.A. regulation
 - had been met by the I.B.A. and
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recouped by the annual rentals charged to the companies. 	 This has
continued for existing contracts. 	 For future new contract areas or
extensions to present areas offered by the I.B.A., contractors would be
expected to meet the full costs, including an advance payment to cover the
initial capital outlay, without support from the rest of the I.L.R system.
Running costs have continued to be met by an annual rental to the I.B.A.
The A.I.R.C. based its arguments for less regulation by the I.B.A. on
Government moves to deregulate telecommunications, the upsurge in pirate
activity and the prospect of community and cable radio in the 1990s, as
well as the forthcoming national commercial stations. I.L.R. contractors
submit to I.B.A. regulation as a quid pro quo to protect their advertising
monopoly and if that monopoly is to be eroded, then, it could be argued,
the regulations should be relaxed accordingly.
The I.B.A. did emphasise, however, that the changes arose from the
poor financial state of the I.L.R. network - two stations had collapsed and
as many as twenty were trading either at a loss or too low a profit to pay
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a dividend - and did not herald a shift towards deregulation.
	
In fact, a
close examination of the measures announced by the Authority demonstrated
that they could not be viewed as anything other than 'deregulatory' in both
intent and effect.
Perhaps the most significant change announced by the I.B.A. was that
mid-term contract reviews of the programme companies were to be introduced
in place of the existing biennial 'roll' of contracts. 	 The system of
'rolling' was originally devised instead of fixed term contracts. However,
under the terms of the Broadcasting Act 1981 the I.B.A. was obliged to re-
33
advertise all I.L.R. contracts at fixed periods. 	 The new review
procedure has considerably reduced the Authority's regulatory role.
Within the discipline of this mid-term review system and terms of the
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Broadcasting Act, I.L.R. companies were to be allowed to diversify their
business activities without seeking I.B.A. permission. For example, the
I.B.A. withdrew the guidelines to I.L.R. stations on involvement in
publications and contractors could now publish newspapers and magazines.
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These guidelines	 laid down that I.L.R. publications should deal 'wholly
or predominantly' with I.L.R. or the arts and should not come out more than
six times a year.	 Advertising space in publications had to be sold
separately from the selling of radio air-time and they could only carry
enough advertising to pay their way, but, by implication, should not be
treated as profit-making. With the withdrawal of these guidelines, I.L.R.
publishing was deregulated.
One change very welcome to the I.L.R. companies was that they were to
have greater freedom to raise money from shareholders outside their own
areas, and over their share structure generally. This was an important
aspect of I.L.R. at a time when many companies were declaring no dividends,
which was discouraging potential investors. At the time approximately
seventy-five per cent of investment in I.L.R. was in the hands of local
companies or local people, but there was nothing in the Broadcasting Act
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1981 which says that this must be so. The Act merely lists the sorts of
bodies or individuals who cannot have a 'controlling' - fifty-one percent
or more - interest in any station because of a conflict of interest, for
example, those involved in the music industry. At a time when money was
tight, it appeared increasingly unrealistic to insist that shareholding
should be local. In one legendary case, a shareholder died and left about
one hundred	 shares to his son, but the I.B.A. refused permission for him
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to become a shareholder because he did not live in the area.	 In
Leicester the I.B.A. rules held up the start of a replacement station for
37
the failed Centre Radio. 	 Local investors were not eager to come forward
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after witnessing the collapse of Centre Radio with debts of over £400,000.
Clearly it made sense to try and avoid such difficulties, but one cannot
help wondering whether this might not have been achieved by more judicious
applications of the existing rules. Any relaxation of the regulation of
ownership must inhere the risk of a reduction of the 'local' element in
I.L.R.
Among the other measures announced by the I.B.A. were that extensions
and reductions in broadcasting hours were to be at the I.L.R. companies'
own discretion.	 The I.B.A.'s regional offices	 would in future be
concerned with public response to the services rather than with day-to-day
programme monitoring. The work of the Local Advisory Committees - which
are intended to act as a channel for local opinion in each area - would be
'streamlined' and each committee would meet three, not four, times a year.
Two specialist posts of the I.B.A. concerned with education and religion on
radio were merged with television.
Subsequent to these changes in 1984, rental payments were reduced
in April 1985 and by at least 26% in April 1986. But despite the I.B.A.'s
best efforts, the financial squeeze on I.L.R. has continued and this has
been reflected in programme standards. The drama and education output has
largely disappeared and economies in local news coverage have been
effected.	 There has been an increasing questioning of the realism of
expecting each small I.L.R. service to fulfil public service broadcasting
obligations.	 Consequently, it has been argued increasingly that fresh
legislation is needed to relieve the I.L.R. companies of their statutory
obligations and the I.B.A. of its statutory responsibilities. The A.I.R.C.
supports deregulation in areas such as programming, advertising and
technical standards, hours of broadcasting, news services and ownership of
stations.
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Certainly, it would seem unlikely that the I.B.A. will be able to go
any further along the 'deregulation' route within the requirements of the
Broadcasting Act.
	 A fresh legislative initative would be required to
effect any major change.
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Report of the Committee on Financing the B.B.C. 
Such a legislative initiative was recommended by the Committee on
Financing the B.B.C. (the Peacock Committee) in 1986. 	 The Committee
although clearly not focussing specifically on the Independent Broadcasting
sector, did make some important recommendations in relation to both I.T.V.
and I.L.R. The basic conclusion of the Committee was that broadcasting in
the United Kingdom, 'should move towards a sophisticated market system
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based on consumer sovereignty'.	 Under such a system the public would
have, 'the option of purchasing the broadcasting services they require from
40
as many alternative sources of supply as possible'.
	
The overall vision
of the Committee was thus of a world where broadcasting, as a result of
technological developments, could be like publishing. It identified 'the
fundamental aim of broadcasting policy' as being, 'to enlarge both the
freedom of choice of the consumer and the opportunities available to
41
programme makers to offer alternative wares to the public'.
The Committee was clearly of the view that technological developments
held the key to the abandonment of the current model of 'strict
regulation of broadcasting, including pre-broadcast vetting of programmes.
Yet by advocating a 'consumer sovereignty' model of broadcasting, the
Peacock Committee was able to reject a free market. The Committee noted
that a laissez-faire approach to broadcasting would not meet, 'British
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standards of public accountability for the private use of public assets'.
In relation to I.L.R. the Committee advocated a looser regulatory
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regime in line with its philosophy as outlined above. It emphasised the
need for reform in order to allow the industry to attain some basis of
43
profitability.	 The Committee accepted the proposals of the A.I.R.C. as
to what revisions to the Broadcasting Act 1981 would be needed to bring
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about the 'looser regime' it envisaged. 	 Under the A.I.R.C.'s proposals
the I.B.A. would retain control over the allocation of frequencies and
transmitter power and would continue to formulate guidelines for
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programming and advertising, but the I.L.R. stations would henceforth:
(I)
	
own their own transmitters and be responsible for broadcasting in
their franchise area;
(ii) be permitted to accept any advertising currently acceptable for
the print media;
(iii) decide their own hours of broadcasting, sources of programme
material, manning levels, news-services, ownership and technical
standards;
(iv) be free to carry sponsored programmes;
(v) be released from the obligation to:
- achieve a certain quality of output
- maintain 'proper balance' in programming
- provide a service of information,	 education and
entertainment.
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The Peacock Committee's conclusion was that: 	 'Regulation of the
(commercially hard-pressed) commercial sector does little for the
listener.'
A further recommendation of a majority of the Committee was that
47
I.L.R franchises should in future be auctioned to the highest bidder.
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The 1987 Green Paper 
The Government's response to the Peacock Comittee's proposals in
relation to I.L.R. had reached a stage of 'stagnation' and that, 'the
prognosis for the financial well-being of I.L.R. under the present
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statutory framework is poor' 49 .	 It identified the cause of the financial
difficulties in, increasing competitive pressures, both for audiences and
for advertising revenue'. 50	The Government's recommended 'cure' was
unsurprising :51
The I.L.R. companies believe that a lighter and less expensive
regulatory framework is possible. A development along these lines
would be consistent with the Government's general policy of
encouraging enterprise by enhancing competition and minimising
regulation, while retaining essential protections.
This last caveat is significant, for the Green Paper still envisages
a continuing role for regulation, albeit a much less rigorous system of
regulation than now governs I.L.R. The Government'
 clearly rejects any idea
of a free market in radio services, based on the principle of consumer
sovereignty. 52
 The traditional justification for government regulation of
broadcasting is reasserted:53
The frequency spectrum is a finite public resource. For this
reason, and...considerations about frequency planning and frequency
management..., control of the spectrum used for broadcasting must
remain with the Government or a public authority acting on behalf of
the Government.
In relation to the regulation of I.L.R., the proposals in the Green
Paper centre around a relaxation of the public service requirements
currently imposed on the industry. 54 The argument put forward is that only
the local services of the B.B.C. should have such requirements imposed and
that the I.L.R. companies should be freed from such constraints and be put
in a better position to overcome their financial difficulties. This change
in the current structure is justified on the basis of the increased
competition the I.L.R. companies would face as a result of the additional
commercial radio services (at both national and community level) proposed
in the Green Paper.
The Green Paper envisages that the administration of both national
and local (including community) independent radio services would be
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entrusted to a single authority within a 'light' framework of regulation.
Some limited regulation of programme content, technical standards and
ownership of broadcasting companies would continue, although the companies
would generally have independence in making their own programming,
financial and transmission arrangements. This last change would represent
a major deregulatory move away from the current system in I.L.R., where
transmission is organised by the I.B.A.
One issue left unresolved in the Green Paper is whether the I.B.A.,
subject to amending legislation, is the appropriate authority to be
responsible for the system of independent radio at both the national and
local levels.
	
In favour of the I.B.A. is its experience of developing
I.L.R. and, 'of balancing the competing considerations of regulation in a
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creative field'.
	
On balance, however, the conclusion drawn in the Green
Paper is that the I.B.A. is not the appropriate authority and that the
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functions might be better exercised by a body distinct from the I.B.A.:
But, despite the real achievements which stand to its credit, there
would be some awkwardness in combining the I.B.A.'s responsibilities
as a broadcasting authority for television within a public service
framework with a separate role as a regulatory authority for radio
under different and lighter rules. ... There is also a view ...
that an authority which can devote all its attention to radio - and
the I.B.A. manifestly cannot - would best serve the interests of the
medium. On this argument a new authority should be created.
Another suggested possibility is that the role of the Cable Authority
could be expanded, since this Authority, 'has experience of the sort of
regulatory regime which would be appropriate to independent national and
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local radio.'
A further proposal in the Green Paper is that there should no longer
be a contractual relationship between the independent radio authority and
the radio companies. The radio authority would instead issue licences to
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stations for a renewable period of a maximum of eight years. 	 The
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significance of such a change will be discussed further in the next chapter,
but it is worth noting that, unlike a contractual relationship, a
relationship based on a licence would be more justiciable, that is, subject
to the supervision of the courts. Whether the possible involvement of the
courts in the continuing relationship between radio authority and radio
stations is compatible with the 'light' regulation envisaged in the Green
Paper is clearly an open question.	 It is possible that a justiciable
licensing system might result in legal proceedings and be just as
'cumbersome' as the present public service regulatory regime.69
The programming requirements suggested in the Green Paper do not meet
the full requirements of public service broadcasting as defined under the
1981 Broadcasting Act, but certain programming standards are proposed:6°
(i) to ensure that any news given in whatever form in programmes is
presented with accuracy and impartiality;
(ii) to exclude from the programmes all expressions of the views and
opinions of the persons providing the service on religious matters
or on matters which are of political or industrial controversy or
relate to current public policy;
(iii to avoid allowing the views and opinions of particular persons or
bodies on such matters to predominate;
(iv) to ensure that nothing is included in programmes which offends
agains good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite
to crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public
feeling; and
(v) to deliver the kind of services which they had promised when
applying to use the frequency.
It is debatable quite how 'light' these requirements would prove to be
in practice, if enforced effectively. Programming requirement (iv) is in
the 1981 Broadcasting Act 61 and requirements (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) have
their equivalents in the present legislation. Their application in practice
would entail similarly complex judgments to those currently made by the
I.B.A. It would also involve considerable resources. For example, reserve
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the principle of due impartiality in news broadcasts is difficult to
assess.	 In contrast to a judgment on 'incitement to crime' which may be
made by considering a programme in isolation, a judgment as to whether a
radio station is being impartial needs to be built up over a period of
time.	 Similar considerations would apply in assessing whether the views
and opinions of the people providing the radio service are predominating
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and with the other criteria mentioned above.
The Green Paper also envisages that the radio authority would be
under an obligation to regulate the ownership of radio stations coming
within its supervision. It would not be permitted to issue licences to
stations which were, 'owned or financed in whole or in part by political
parties or public authorities, or by a body whose objects are wholly or
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mainly of a political nature, or which is affiliated to such bodies'.
Again it must be debateable how far a requirement such as this is
consistent with the avowed 'light' regulatory touch of the Green Paper. 	 A
prohibition such as this would cause difficulties of interpretation and
might well be held to include trade unions. In fact, trade unions have
invested in I.L.R. since its earliest days. It is difficult to see why as
a matter of principle why they should not be permitted to continue to do so
on a modest scale nor why modest loans and grants from public (local)
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authorities should be disallowed.
The Government does, however, propose a relaxation of controls on the
concentration of editorial control, ownership and the accumulation of
newspaper shareholdings in I.L.R. stations which are contained in the 1981
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Broadcasting Act.	 At present the I.B.A. has the power to prevent changes
in ownership.	 The proposal in the Green Paper that the radio authority
would have no powet to prevent such changes (except where they would
conflict with programming and ownership requirements), but would have, 'a
reserve power enabling it to withdraw and re-advertise a licence where a
failure to maintain the promised performance resulted in a reduction in
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consumer choice in the area concerned.' 	 Under the proposed system of
licensing, decisions of this nature would be justiciable, unlike the
I.B.A.'s decisions in relation to its contractors.
The Green Paper envisages a 're-active' rather than a 'pro-active'
regulatory regime. Only selective monitoring is proposed, with the main
trigger for enforcement action being complaints, whether from listeners or
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other radio stations.	 Radio stations would, however, be required by the
terms of their licences to keep tape recordings in order to facilitate the
investigation of any alleged breaches of licence conditions on programme
content.
The ultimate sanction available to the radio authority would be
withdrawal of a licence to broadcast and it would also have the, 'power to
issue informal and formal warnings; to insist that transcription of its
recorded output be submitted for a period on a routine basis; and to
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suspend the licence or to shorten the period for which the licence runs'.
Advertising would be regulated on lines similar to these existing at
present, with the radio authority required to draw up a code regulating
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advertising.	 There would continue to be a ban on political advertising.
It is suggested, however, that it may be possible to loosen restrictions on
the sponsorship of radio programmes, given that the services are not to be
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run on a public service basis.
From the proposals put forward in the Green Paper, it is clear that
the Government believes that all independent national and local services
should be more lightly regulated than at present. The case for a new radio
authority to regulate all national commercial, independent local and
miscellaneous radio services within a statutory framework is put forward.
The regulatory system would be self-financing. The Government proposes a
limited range of statutory requirements relating to programme content,
ownership and funding of services. The function of the radio authority
would be to regulate the services within this statutory framework and it
would have available a number of sanctions, including withdrawal of
licences.
In fact, the Green Paper's proposed statutory requirements are not as
limited as the Government appears to suggest. They will involve the radio
authority in complex judgments if they are to be taken seriously and
enforced effectively. It is arguable that the Government will have to make
a more decisive choice between two options: first, a relatively expensive
regulatory system to enforce stringent requirements; or second, allowing
broadcasters greater freedom than the Green Paper suggests.
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The 1988 White Paper 
The White Paper published in November 1988 adds little to the
proposals put forward in the Green Paper, other than representing a firm
commitment to legislate. The premise underlying these proposals is that;
'The case for substantial deregulation of independent local radio is
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compelling'.
	
The White Paper makes it clear a new authority will be
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established to regulate all independent radio services.
Conclusion
The I.B.A. 's experience of regulating I.L.R. has been far from easy.
The I.B.A.'s effectiveness as a regulatory agency has been called into
question on numerous occasions. To a considerable extent, however, many of
the problems currently dogging the I.L.R. are the result of its origins and
development over the past seventeen years.
The criticisms which have been made of the I.B.A. over the years
take two general forms. First, there are the critics who accuse the
I.B.A. of interpreting its statutory mandate too strictly and of
imposing overly stringent regulations on the I.L.R. companies, as a
consequence of which the industry has found itself in financial
difficulties. Second, there have been critics who accuse the I.B.A. of
being too lax in applying the legislative requirements and of being
overly accommodative to the I.L.R. companies, thereby failing to impose
sufficiently stringent regulations. A more realistic criticism might be
that the I.B.A. has failed to strike the right regulatory balance. 
The validity of such criticisms is a question of judgment, but
those criticisms are sometimes misdirected at the I.B.A. 	 They would
perhaps be better aimed at the architects of the statutory framework
which has left the crucial decisions on which the development of I.L.R.
has depended to a largely unaccountable I.B.A. 	 It should also be
pointed out that little coherent thought on broadcasting policy has been
forthcoming from Government, with the 1987 Green Paper representing a
welcome break from tradition.
The criticisms made of the I.B.A. do demonstrate the problems
inherent in basing claim to regulatory legitimacy on expertise.
Efficient regulation must strike a balance between the values of
stringency and accommodation.	 The I.B.A. will always be liable to
accusations of inefficiency. This is partly because radio broadcasting
is a specialist area requiring judgment and it is difficult for the
I.B.A. to give convincing justifications for adopting a particular
strategy. Further, it is always difficult to measure regulatory success
and impossible to silence the critics. Who can say what would have
happened in the absence of regulation or if a different regulatory
strategy had been adopted?
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CHAPTER FIVE - THE FRANCHISING PROCESS 
Introduction
Since the start of commercial television in Britain in 1954 contracts
have been used as a means of allocating broadcasting frequencies.	 The
same technique has been applied to I.L.R. since its inception in 1972.
The task of allocating these contracts has been assigned to the I.B.A.
1
under what can be called a 'public interest' standard. 	 This means that
the I.B.A.'s task is to allocate a scarce resource 	 (broadcasting
frequencies) to those best qualified to use them in accordance with public
interest standards.	 In doing so, the I.B.A. has to decide three main
substantive issues: what exactly to give away; what threshold standards
will weed out unqualified applicants; and which of the applicants is
2
'best' by these standards.	 In short, the focus is on the applicant
itself, rather than, for example, the price which it intends to charge for
its product or service.
The regulatory approach exemplified by the award of I.L.R. contracts
is an alternative to allocating a valuable resource by use of a market
price, that is, an auction, or other simple objective measure, such as a
lottery.	 The difficulty with this method of allocation is that since the
contract is in effect being awarded below the market price, there are
nearly always more applicants that meet the threshold standards than
possible allocations.	 As a consequence, the I.B.A. is required to make a
judgment as to which among the various applicants is 'best' qualified.
Not too surprisingly, the development of the appropriate criteria by which
to make such a judgment and their application under a public interest
standard remains vague and undefined. As Breyer has noted, the 'problem
is the tension between a desire to find standards that will "objectively"
select the winner	 and a belief that the exercise of subjective
judgment is inevitable because no set of standards exists that will work
uniformly to select the "best" applicants in terms of the objective of the
3
regulatory programme'.
This idea of subjectively choosing the 'best' applicant raises
particular problems in the case of broadcasting.	 It would be virtually
impossible, for example, to achieve any consensus about what constitutes
'good' or 'bad' broadcasting by an I.L.R. station. 	 Such a state of
affairs serves only to increase the discretion exercised by the I.B.A. in
the allocation process.
Statutory Requirements 
The Broadcasting Act gives remarkably little guide as to the standards
to be applied in the allocation process or as to the procedures to be
adopted.	 The broad discretionary nature of the powers granted to the
I.B.A. has already been stressed. 	 This fact can be illustrated by once
again considering the general duties of the I.B.A. as stipulated in the
Act:
(1) Section 2(1) requires the Authority to provide local sound
broadcasting services, 'of high quality (both as to the transmission
and as to the matter transmitted)'.
(2) Section 2(2) requires the Authority to provide, 'a public service
disseminating information, education and entertainment'. Broadcasts
in each area are required to 'maintain a high general standard in all
respects and particular in respect of their content and quality,
and a proper balance and wide range in their subject matter'.
The meaning to be given to concepts such as 'quality' or 'balance'
gives considerable room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the
IBA.
The difficulty in interpreting precisely what is the I.B.A.'s
legislative mandate is of central relevance to any discussion of the I.L.R.
franchising process.	 For, in assessing the relative merits of the
applicant groups, the main consideration of the Authority must be to
determine which of the applicants is most capable of fulfilling the various
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obligations imposed by the relevant legislation.
There are in fact, only a small number of positive requirements
imposed on the allocation process by the Broadcasting Act.
First, the Authority is under a duty to ensure that no-one who is
ineligible is awarded a contract.
	
	 To this end, the Act contains a number
5
of restrictions as to who may be awarded a contract.
	
Those ineligible
include,	 for	 example:	 individuals not ordinarily resident,	 or
corporations not incorporated, in the U.K. or E.E.C.; 	 companies or
individuals connected with advertising agencies or record manufacturers;
and those with a controlling interest in a local television company in the
area.
Second, the Authority is obliged to ensure, 'that there is adequate
competition to supply programmes between a number of programme contractors
6
independent of each other both as to finance and as to control'. 	 This
provision has been interpreted to mean only that contractors should be
chosen competitively;	 the Authority has never opted for a process of
competitive tendering.
Third, the Authority is under a duty 'to take such steps as appear to
them to be appropriate (including if they think fit the holding of public
meetings) -
(a) to ascertain the opinions of the public about the service proposed to
be provided there ...
(b) to encourage the making of comments and suggestions about that service
by members of the public ...
7
and shall take into account those options...comments and suggestions...'
This provision cannot be said to go very far and, in any case, does 'little
8
more than statutorily approve the I.B.A.'s existing practice'.
Fourth, the authority is obliged to publicise the fact that a contract
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is about to be awarded, along with details of the contract, and also to
9
invite applications.
Fifth, the Authority must make the contract itself available to the
public (although it can charge for this) and also issue a statement of the
10
number of applications.	 The Applications themselves need not be made
11
public until after transmission has started.
It can be seen how little the Broadcasting Act 1981 says about the
procedures to be adopted by the I.B.A. in its consideration of franchise
applicants.	 Thus any attempt by the I.B.A. to justify its policies in the
award of contracts on the basis of a legislative mandate must be open to
serious doubt.	 The very nature of the legislative scheme (which is to
impose broad discretionary duties) will almost always cause problems of
legitimacy for the Authority.	 In this context, it is interesting to note
that in two important respects (discussed further in the next section), the
I.B.A. has gone further in pursuit of openness and due process than a close
reading of the Act would seem to require.
	 First, the I.B.A. always holds
at least one public meeting as part of the allocation process and, second,
the applications are made publicly available at an early stage.
	
One can
surmise, therefore, that the Authority itself is aware of the weakness of
the legislative basis for its activities in this area.
The I.B.A.'s Franchising Procedures 
Contracts are awarded on the basis of applications submitted to the
I.B.A.
	
	
The Broadcasting Act 1981 sets a maximum limit on the length of
12
the contracts.	 This is at present 8 years, with the exception of the
first contract in a new local radio area, where the limit is 10 years.
The 1981 Act imposes a mandatory requirement on the I.B.A. to readvertise
the contracts for I.L.R.	 The Act's intention was to provide a break-point
in the succession of short-term 'rolling' contracts that the I.B.A. had
used previously.
By late 1988 fifty I.L.R. contracts had been awarded. 	 The first
nineteen contracts were awarded between October 1973 and April 1976.
Further expansion then ceased until the Annan Committee had reported in
1977 and its recommendations had been considered.
	
Government approval for
nine new areas was given in 1978.	 In November 1979 approval was given for
a further fifteen localities, bringing the authorised total to forty four.
A further twenty five localities were approved following recommendations in
the Third Report of the Local Radio Working Party, making an authorised
total to date of sixty nine areas.	 This number has, however, been reduced
as the result of amalgamation of some of the designated areas.
As previously noted, in November 1984 the I.B.A. announced that I.L.R.
development on the present basis would be limited to the areas for which
13
contract arrangements had already been made. 	 Only one new contract has
14
been awarded since then,
	
although a number of extensions to contract
areas have been permitted on the basis of 'forward funding'.
Where the contract to be awarded was for a new area, the formal
process would begin with notices placed by the I.B.A. in local papers
announcing the contract and inviting applications. 	 By this stage,
however, the Authority would have already issued a press statement
announcing that applications were about to be sought and preparatory work
would have been done by the I.B.A. and by the groups hoping to be awarded
the contract.
	
These groups would know, in general terms, the requirements
they would be expected to meet from the specifications issued by the I.B.A.
for earlier contracts.
	 But until the contract was advertised and the
related contract specification became simultaneously available, 	 the
prospective applicants would not know the details of such matters as the
population coverage for their particular area and the rental payable to the
I.B.A.
Since November 1983, the I.B.A. has employed a different procedure for
15
re-advertised I.L.R. contracts.
	
Under this procedure, an advertisement
is placed in the local press in three consecutive weeks inviting groups to
indicate to the I.B.A. within one month of the first advertisement if they
intend to apply for the contract. 	 Where a bona fide letter of intent is
submitted, the I.B.A. carries out its normal procedures and a new
advertisement giving the usual three months' notice for applications will
be placed locally.	 If no letter of intent is received (except from the
incumbent), the I.B.A. writes to the company calling for a shorter form of
application, directing attention to any special areas for discussion.
The Contract Specification indicates to prospective applicants the
main statutory and contractual requirements to be met by programme
contractors, and the sort of information that applicants need to supply in
their applications.	 The application itself is in reality no more than a
print manifesto.	 The applicant group is required to present, in written
form, answers and proposals on the following areas: directors and staff;
composition of the company; 	 applicant's other interests;	 finance;
recruitment,	 training and staff relations;	 advertising;	 studios;
consultants; and readiness date.
Three or four months are normally allowed between the date of the
contract advertisement and the deadline by which applications must reach
the I.B.A.	 The I.B.A. then studies, compares and analyses	 the
applications in all their various aspects, 'looking for a combination of
practical realism with the ability to provide an imaginative and steadily
16
developing radio service'.
The I.B.A. has never issued a formal list of criteria used in
assessing contract applications. 	 It is therefore probably better to talk
of 'relevant factors' being taken into account. 	 Among the 'relevant
factors' used in assessing the general quality of applications are: 	 'the
applicant's capacity to run a lively and distinctive radio station;	 their
approach to the provision of such a service; the realism of the plans
submitted and the likelihood of these standing up to the tests of time and
17
practical application; and the financial soundness of the proposals'.
Other 'relevant considerations include 'the extent of local support' and
18
'past performance and future promise'.
In particular, it should be noted that the financial problems of TV-am
and certain ILR companies have made the I.B.A. more concerned that
applicants have sufficient capital and show a reasonable prospect of
reaching profitability in the near future. 	 This concern has manifested
itself in the introduction of forward funding.
A more intangible relevant factor' is the emphasis placed by the
I.B.A. on the need for each applicant to identify with the character and
interests of the area to be served.
	 The I.B.A. seeks contractors capable
of providing, in the words of the 1971 White Paper, 'a truly public service
... combining popular programming with fostering a greater awareness of
19
local affairs and involvement in the community'.
	
On a practical level,
the I.B.A. requires plans to include community service material within the
company's broadcast output and significant elements of local ownership and
knowledge in the composition of applicant groups and companies.	 Not that
local participation in the ownership of a commercial radio station is
necessarily of particular significance:	 it must be open to doubt how much
influence over programming a local shareholder would have.
Quite clearly, therefore, the I.B.A. has articulated a number of
standards over the years which applies when allocating contracts.
	 Indeed,
one might want to argue that the I.B.A. has too many standards.
	 Breyer's
20
pithy comment on the F.C.C. seems equally appropriate for the I.B.A.
The effect of many standards ... is virtually the same as having none
at all. There is no clear indiction of which standards are more
important, how they are to be individually applied, or how varying
degrees of conformity are to be balanced. The existence of so many
standards effectively allows the agency near-total discretion in
making a selection.
Within three to four weeks of applications being received, preliminary
interviews are held with the applicant groups in the main town or city of
the area. The I.B.A. party for the preliminary interviews consists of a
sub-committee of three members of the Authority, supported by three or four
senior staff including the Regional Officer. After the interviews they
report back to the full Authority. Short-listed groups are then invited
to the I.B.A.'s headquarters for a further interview, this time with the
full Authority.
The preliminary interviews are preceded by a public meeting at which
the I.B.A. can, in theory at least, gauge the wants and needs of the people
who live there. Members of the public are invited to comment on the
applications and to give their views on the needs of the area and on what
could be provided by an I.L.R. service in the future.
These public meetings, which were put on a statutory basis by the
Broadcasting Act 1981, are not designed as public hearings and are in no
way comparable to road or town planning inquiries. 	 There is no
opportunity to question the applicants. Questions can only be directed at
the Authority itself, although people can comment on the Applications.
Since December 1980 the full Applications have been made available for
public scrutiny prior to the public meeting. 	 Copies of summaries of the
application are made readily available by the I.B.A.
In addition to the public meeting, the I.B.A.'s Regional Office will
have sought the views of a wide spectrum of local individuals and
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organisations, both political and voluntary.	 The I.B.A. also conducts
audience research in each of the areas as part of the selection process and
a summary of the results is made available at the public meeting.
The final decision as to which applicant is thought most suitable is
taken in private by the I.B.A. 	 There is no legal obligation on the
Authority to specify the reasons for its decisions and usually very little
clarification or explanation is forthcoming. 	 For example, when, in
October 1985, Radio Victory of Portsmouth became the first I.L.R. station
not to have its contract renewed, the I.B.A.'s Chairman made only the
21
following statement:
The decision to offer Ocean Sound Limited the franchise for the new
combined area of Portsmouth and Southampton is accompanied by regret
that Radio Victory cannot ... continue as the I.L.R. contractor for
Portsmouth. The present system ... of statutory readvertisement of
radio franchises ... has meant that such position could always arise.
The Authority is now required to make a choice between the track
record of an existing contractor and the plans and aspirations of a
new contestant.
On this occasion the Authority concluded, after careful deliberation,
that the proposals submitted by Ocean Sound seemed to offer the
likelihood of achieving the best service for listeners ... In
reaching this decision, the Members of the Authority recognised Radio
Victory's significant accomplishments ... [but] only one applicant can
ultimately be successful and, on balance, the Authority considered
that the Ocean Sound group had more convincingly approached the
programming and commercial challenges of serving the combined
Franchise area in the period ahead.
Thus the publicly given reason was that Ocean Sound had a better
conception of what the extended area needed. This seems to have been an
entirely subjective decision and to have been taken against the advice of
22
the I.B.A.'s own officials.	 The private nature of decisions such as
this is a cause for concern for three main reasons.
First, there is the question of fairness to both the incumbent
contractor and to other applicants.
	
As Lewis points out, 'fairness
demands the twin virtues of open and clear standards and reasons for
23
decisions unless an overwhelming case can be made out to the contrary'.
Prima facie, of course, there seems to be no reason why the I.B.A. should
not give their reasons as to why the successful applicant group was
successful and why the others were unsuccessful. The I.B.A. has always
justified its failure to give reasons for its decisions on the basis of an
analogy between the applicants for an I.L.R. contract and job applicants.
This is a doubtful analogy, however, given the public interest present in
the allocation of such a contract. 	 The decision as to which job applicant
to appoint is commonly made on the basis of intuition and subjective
judgment.	 Such a mode of decision-making is not obviously consistent with
formal legal or administrative decision-making. 	 In particular, such a
24
subjective approach leads to largely unchecked discretion, although this
is perhaps inevitable given the task which the I.B.A. has to perform. In
practice, the main method by which the Authority can maintain a high
quality broadcast service is by appointing companies who will broadcast
good programmes.	 Thus the selection of the 'best' broadcasters is
25
generally regarded as lying at the heart of the I.B.A.'s mission.
	 Given
their unwillingness to devise objective criteria to use in the selection of
the 'best' broadcasters, the I.B.A.'s officials tends to see the need for
the exercise of subjective judgment as a both necessary and significant
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part of what they have been appointed to do.
Second, without explicit criteria for the award of contracts it is
difficult for applicants to form accurate judgments of the expectations of
the I.B.A. and to put forward an application of which the Authority will
approve. This results in reduced competition for I.L.R. contracts by
giving incumbent contractors important informational advantages over
prospective applicants.
	 As Domberger and Middleton point out (in relation
27
to I.T.V. franchises):
[T]he incumbent knows more about the objectives of the I.B.A. than a
potential bidder does and will have acquired intimate knowledge of the
regulatory authorities preferences and personalities ... The former
will have had many opportunities, during the lifetime of their
contracts, of receiving comments and signals of various kinds from the
I.B.A. regarding its attitude to their programmes.
That this is so in the case of I.L.R. contracts is evidenced by the
fact that, since the introduction of the mandatory readvertisement of
contracts in 1980, only one contractor, Radio Victory of Portsmouth, has
failed to be reappointed. Moreover, a number of incumbent contractors
have been reappointed without any competitors having come forward.
This apparent tendency to favour incumbent contractors should not be
too surprising.
	
	
If a regulatee has performed reasonably well, this fact
28
can act as what Breyer calls, 'a steady beacon in a storm' 	 to the
Authority.	 Furthermore, reasons of fairness and consistency may tend to
sway subjective judgment in favour of a reasonably proficient contractor.
Third, there is the important factor of the ability of members of the
public, as parties affected by broadcasting, to participate in contract
allocation procedures. At present the I.B.A. provides minimal information
on the reasons why a decision has been made in favour of one applicant
rather than of another and the little information which it does give is so
vague as to be of little use. Although one might in theory be able to
trust the I.B.A. to apply valid and appropriate selection criteria in the
franchising process, there is plainly no guarantee that this happens in
practice. Without the giving of reasons for its decisions, it becomes
virtually impossible for outsiders to evaluate the merits of the I.B.A.'s
procedures.
In other words, the I.B.A. can be seen to rely on an expertise model
of legitimacy to the detriment of due process considerations. 	 Thus the
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I.B.A. seeks to justify its failure to give reasons for decisions and its
closed procedures on the basis of effective results. Such an approach is
inevitably problematic, for it is always difficult to demonstrate claims to
expertise. Regulatory agencies such as the I.B.A. are always liable to
accusations of inefficiency. As we have seen, because radio broadcasting
is a specialist area requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, it
is difficult to give convincing justifications for action. This is one
reason why the I.B.A. is reluctant to give open reasons for its decisions.
Furthermore, as we shall see in the Conclusion, it is very difficult to
measure regulatory success.	 The I.B.A. has to steer a very difficult
28
course between the opposing values of stringency and accommodation. 	 If
I.L.R. companies face financial difficulties, the I.B.A. will be accused of
imposing too stringent regulation of inefficiently handicapping the
industry. At other times, however, the I.B.A. will be accused of
accommodating too readily to the requirements of the I.L.R. companies and
of protecting inefficient operators.
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined some of the problems associated with the
current system of allocating I.L.R. contracts. One possible conclusion
is that these problems are inherent in any attempt to allocate a commodity
in scarce supply by administrative process and that public interest
allocation should be abandoned in favour of market-based procedures. In
contrast, one could argue that the present system is preferable to the
possible alternatives and that the way to increase the legitimacy of the
contract allocation process is to make it more open and fair.
It is not necessarily the case, however, that the two types of reform
are mutually exclusive. A market-based system of allocation would allow
the costs of performance to be assessed by the applicants, who are best
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placed to make such assessments. A greater emphasis on due process would
allow greater public debate and further the principle of 'procedural
fairness'.
The market could be used to allocate I.L.R. contracts by conducting an
auction among the competing applicants and allowing the contracts to be
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treated as assignable property rights. 	 Under such a system, the market
would allocate the contract to the applicant who placed the greatest
monetary value on it, thereby maximising the aggregate consumer welfare.
The monetary value placed on the contract by the applicant would reflect
the amount of money it expected to earn during the period of the contract,
which should, in turn, reflect the aggregate value consumers place on the
30
use each applicant makes of the contract.
There are a number of variants on the 'crude' auction system which
could be adopted in Independent Broadcasting.	 These include the
31	 32
Chadwick/demsetz	 variant	 and the'menu'	 auction.	 In	 a
Chadwick/Demsetz auction the contract would be allocated to the applicant
offering the lowest price or highest quality of broadcast service (or an
efficient combination of the two). In the case of I.L.R., the price
variable would be the proportion of broadcasting time devoted to
commercials.
	
In addition, bids could vary in quality terms in the range
and and cost of broadcasts that were offered.
Under a 'menu' auction competing applicants would submit one or more
bids which could differ in several aspects simultaneously. A bid might
consist of a price (possibly negative) offered for the contract together
with a statement of programming, financial and other intentions. By
comparing such bids, the I.B.A. would be able to explore a wide variety of
options and possible balances between different aspects of the
applications.
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Compared with the I.B.A.'s current allocation procedures, an auction
would have the advantage of being comparatively cheaper and quicker. A
further advantage of 'menu' auctions in particular is flexibility. 	 The
I.B.A. could impose minimum requirements in respect of particular aspects of
the bid where statutory provisions obliged it to. The I.B.A. would be able
to choose the application which most fully met its preferences over a range
of aspects.
It should not be thought that an auction-based system of allocation would
necessarily represent a great break with current practice. To some extent
the current application process can be seen as a type of 'bidding' auction
with applicants vying to outpromise each other, with little actual likelihood
that their programming will be significantly different from the bulk of the
programming presented by other I.L.R. stations.33
It should be remembered, however, the current system of I.L.R. contract
allocation does reflect at least implicit dissatisfaction with the expected
results of using the market as an allocational device. It is, therefore,
worth examining the reasons why regulatory allocation could be preferable to
the market. 34 First, there can be no guarantee that the market will function
as theory suggests.	 One of the assumed conditions underlying effective
operation of the market may be absent.	 For example, in theory, an
applicant's bid for an I.L.R. contract would be based on its desire to
maximise the return on its investment. The amount of money bid would depend
on the applicant's expected income from operating an I.L.R. station. If
however, an applicant based its bid on some aim other than profit
maximisation, such as a desire to broadcast a particular political or
religious philosophy, the allocation of I.L.R. contracts produced by the
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market would not necessarily maximise the aggregate welfare of I.L.R.
listeners.
Second, regulatory allocation of a scarce resource, such as a right to
broadcast, if done at less than market value can act as a means of
redistributing wealth. Such an aim would be desirable if it were to be
concluded that the current distribution of wealth among consumers is in
some sense wrong.
Third, use of the market as an allocational device might interfere
with a possible goal of limiting the revenues of the I.L.R. companies.
A number of the deficiences in I.B.A. contract allocation procedures
that have already been noted would seem to indicate that considerably
increased legitimacy could be derived on the due process front.
As has been shown there are a number of reasons why the due process
rationale for legitimacy is difficult to sustain. The I.B.A. makes its
decisions in private and no meaningful reasons for decisions are given.
Applicants have limited information on the expectations of the I.B.A. as a
result of its failure to publish meaningful criteria in relation to its
franchising policies.
	 In general it can be suggested that any changes
should aim to further the 'procedural fairness' of the allocation process.
This principle, 'requires that all affected parties have an equal
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opportunity to convince the decision maker'.
	 To this end, the I.B.A.
could seek to clarify the basis for its decisions. This clarification
could be achieved by articulating and publishing the criteria used in
allocating contracts and by producing decision documents describing its
policies.
The public meetings held by the I.B.A. are largely ineffective and do
little to enhance the procedural fairness of the allocation process.
Members of the public are allowed their say but they will know little of
the issues at stake and, in any case, the most important parts of the
process are conducted in private by the I.B.A. 	 One possible reform would
be the institution of a system of trial-type public hearings, in which
applicants could be publicly questioned as to the merits of their
applications.
One indefensible aspect of the I.B.A.'s current procedures is its
failure to give meaningful reasons for its decisions. There are a number
of beneficial consequences which could flow from a requirement to give
reasons:
(a) It would encourage the Authority to give careful thought to the
facts, the issues and the effects of a decision.
(b) It would decrease the likelihood of its basing a decision on
extraneous matters.
(c) It would increase the appearance of fairness in the allocation
process.
(d) It would assist in the elaboration of the Authority's policy, in
the promotion of coherence and consistency, and in the
identification of legislative or policy difficulties.
(e) It would facilitate the exercise of any rights of review
available to applicants.
(f) It would provide an important basis upon which to realise greater
accountability.
(g) It would give greater visibility to the approach the I.B.A. takes
to its legislative mandate.
One potentially unavoidable flaw in any system of public interest
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allocation is that of inconsistency. 	 This would seem to be a particular
danger in the case of the I.B.A. with its emphasis on subjective judgment
at the expense of objectively verifiable standards. There are a number of
problems associated with inconsistency. First, it can allow the
regulatory agency to hide the real reasons for its decisions, thereby
permitting a factor not envisaged by the legislature to creep in to the
allocation decision. Second, inconsistency may in fact reflect a change
in policy, such change not having been discussed openly. As such, it can
amount to an abuse of power if the agency does not keep within the bounds
of its legislated discretion. Third, inconsistency leads to
unpredictability and uncertainty in the allocation process. This results
in unfairness where one applicant has 'inside knowledge' or if equally
qualified applicants are treated differently.
Such inconsistency would appear to be an inevitable aspect of a system
of contract allocation which relies on the exercise of subjective judgment.
The subjective judgment of the I.B.A. as to which applicant who meets their
threshold criteria is 'best' is likely to differ over time. 	 Further,
there is no consensus about what constitutes good or bad programming. The
obvious solution to the problem of inconsistency is to impose a requirement
to adhere to objective standards, yet to do so might compromise the goal of
good programming. It would seem to be impossible to specify the content
of broadcasts through detailed standards, but good programming is certainly
too important an objective to ignore in the allocation process.
Another approach to this dilemma would be for the I.B.A. to rely
explicitly upon subjective judgment, but, as Breyer points out, such a
tactic, 'would neither prevent inconsistent decisions in practice, nor cure
the other vices of inconsistent decision making. 	 In sum, the public
interest allocation process cannot readily avoid this significant
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defect'.
The difficulty in formulating objective standards thus casts the
I.B.A. in the unenviable role of censor with the task of comparing
programming proposals and of making subjective qualitative judgments.
Having to perform such a function makes the I.B.A. an easy target for
critics who can call into question the legitimacy of its decisions. The
argument here is that the present system is in need of reform if it is to
make out a more convincing case for its legitimacy.
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PART III - THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
CHAPTER SIX - THE LEGAL PARAMETERS 
The Formal Framework 
The present operations of Independent Local Radio are governed by the
Broadcasting Act 1981.
	 The 1981 Act is a codification of the legal
framework for Indpendent Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. The I.B.A.'s
predecessor, the Independent Television Authority, was set up for an
initial period by the Television Act 1954 to provide television
broadcasting services additional to those of the B.B.C., and was continued
in existence under the Television Act 1964. As described in Chapters Three
and Four, by the Sound Broadcasting Act 1972 the Authority was empowered to
provide local sound broadcasting services and its name was changed to the
Independent Broadcasting Authority, and the Authority was further continued
in existence by the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 1973.
	Thus the principal statute now governing the I.B.A. is
	 the
Broadcasting Act 1981, which consolidated the repealed Acts of 1973 and
1974, as well as the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 1978 and the
Broadcasting Act 1980.
The 1981 Act is divided into four parts. Parts One and Four contain
the provisions relevant to I.L.R.
	 Under Part One (ss. 1-45)	 the
constitution, functions, duties and powers of the Authority are specified
(ss. 1-3) and general provision is made concerning the content and balance
of programmes and advertisements. Contracts for programmes and programme
contractors are the subject of ss. 19-27, 32-35, and government controls
are contained in ss. 28-31. Part Four contains general provisions.
The Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984 empowered the Authority to equip
themselves for the future transmission of a national sound broadcasting
service. A short Broadcasting Act which affected I.T.V. only was passed in
1987 to amend s. 19 of the 1981 Act.
The 'key' regulatory provisions of the 1981 Act set out below:
(1) Section 2(1) requires the Authority to provide local sound
broadcasting service of "high quality (both as to the transmission
and as to the matter transmitted)".
(2) Section 2(2) requires the Authority to provide "a public service
disseminating information, education and entertainment". 	 Broadcasts
in each area are required to "maintain a high general standard in all
respects and in particular in respect of their content and quality,
and a proper balance and wide range in their subject", having regard
to the programmes as a whole and also to the days of the week on
which, and the times of day at which, the programmes are broadcast.
(3) Section 4(1) requires the Authority to satisfy themselves that the
programmes comply with the following requirements:
"(a)	 that nothing is included in the programmes which offends
against good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or
incite the crime or lead to disorder or be offensive to public
feeling;
(b) that a sufficient amount of time in the programmes is given to
news and news features and that all news given in the
programmes (in whatever form) is presented with due accuracy and
impartiality;
(c) that proper proportions of the recorded and other matter
included in the programmes are of British origin and of British
performance;
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(d) that the programmes broadcast from any station or stations
contain a suitable proportion of matter calculated to appeal
specially to the tastes and outlook of persons served by the
station or stations and, where another language as well as
English is in common use among those so served, a suitable
proportion of matter is in that language;
(e) in the case of local sound broadcasting services, that the
programmes broadcast from different stations for reception in
different localities do not consist of indentical or similar
material to an extent inconsistent with the character of the
services as local sound broadcasting services; and
(0 that due impartiality is preserved on the part of the persons
providing the programmes as respects matters of political or
industrial controversy or relating to current public policy."
(In applying this requirement, series of programmes may be
considered as a whole).
(4) Section 6 of the 1981 Act provides that, if the Authority so desires,
programmes in a local sound broadcasting service may be broadcast only
when they form part of a programme schedule previously approved by the
I.B.A. (Provisions enabling the I.B.A. to exercise this power are
included in the programme contract. A contractor's initial
schedules and any subsequent changes of continuing significance will
require prior IBA approval.)
(5) Section 8(6) forbids sponsorship of programmes, as qualified by some
limited exceptions.

3. The programmes provided by the Contractor shall be such that in the
opinion of the Authority:-
(1) due impartiality is preserved on the part of the Contractor as
respects matters of political or industrial controversy or relating to
current public policy;
(2) proper proportions of the recorded and other matter included
therein are of British origin and of British performance; and
(3) they do not consist of material identical or similar to that used
by other sound programme contractors to an extent which in the opinion
of the Authority is inconsistent with the character of its services as
local sound broadcasting services.
For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this Condition a series of
programmes may be considered as a whole and to ensure compliance by
the Contractor with paragraphs (2) or (3) of this Condition the
Authority may from time to time by notice require the Contractor to
observe such restrictions or qualifications in respect of the
programmes to be provided by it or any class of such programmes as the
Authority may consider necessary.
The procedure to be followed in the case of breach is outlined in the
contract. Clause 9 of Part I provides (in part) that:
8. (1) If in view of any breaches of this Agreement by the
Contractor the Authority after giving the Contractor a reasonable
opportunity of making representations with respect to the matter
thinks it necessary so to do the authority may serve on the Contractor
a written notice taking effect forthwith or on a date stated in the
notice to determine or suspend for such period as may be specified in
the notice or until a further notice is given the Authority's
obligation to broadcast the,programmes supplied by the Contractor
(without prejudice to the Contractor's obligations as to the supply of
programmes under this Agreement up to the date when the notice takes
effect) PROVIDED that no such notice shall be given
(0 unless the Contractor has broken this Agreement on at least three
occasions and in respect of each of those breaches has received from
the Authority written particulars of the breach within one month from
the time when the breach came to the notice of the Authority
or
(ii) in a case where the circumstances are such that there is a
continuing breach of this Agreement by the Contractor unless the
Contractor has received from the Authority written particulars of the
breach within one month of the time when the breach came to the notice
of the Authority and thereafter on at least two further occasions a
copy of such particulars.
In fact, the power of termination has never been used, although warning
notices have been issued, particularly in the early days of I.L.R. It is
impossible to get any clear picture of the details of such occurrences, since
such information is regarded as confidential to the contractual relationship
by the Authority. It is clear, however, that the issue of a warning notice is
in itself regarded as a major step and will be the culmination of a number of
informal warnings. 2
 In other words, the I.B.A. possesses more expansive powers
in relation to its contractors than it has found to be necessary. Perhaps this
is because of the public and media uproar which would ensue, similar to that
which occured when Radio Victory of Portsmouth failed to obtain a renewal of
its contract 3 or has occurred when I.T.V. franchises have not been renewed.4
Thus any description of the broad powers and capabilities associated with the
contract has to acknowledge the importance of the policy context and whether
their exercise could be viewed as legitimate.5
It has already been noted that, in addition to the statutory provisions
and the contract, policy and guidance is set down in somewhat greater detail
in the I.B.A.'s guidelines and codes of practice. It is these four sources
taken together which form what are generally recognised as the sources of the
parameters of the regulatory framework of I.L.R. They can also be seen as
laying down the desirable objectives of public service broadcasting. 6 A
succinct summary of the situation would be that, in effect, the statute
controls the I.B.A., whereas the I.L.R. companies are controlled by the terms
of their contracts.
Informal Regulatory Activity 
This is the outline of the formal regulatory framework, but it almost
goes without saying that the informal regulatory processes are equally
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important.	 The I.B.A. and the I.L.R. companies are in continuous contact
and dialogue with each other. They are constantly re-negotiating the
boundaries of what the companies will be permitted to do. The Authority is
continually re-assessing its policy and its interpretation of the
Broadcasting Act. 	 To a large extent the Authority sees its role as a
'facilitative' one; assisting the industry to push forward the boundaries
7
of what is permissible under the terms of the legislation.
	
It is also
true to say that the 'understandings' reached by the I.B.A. and the
companies do to a large extent form the real 'rules' controlling the
relationship: more will be said on this in Part IV.
Indeed, the activity of negotiation is pervasive through all of the
I.B.A.'s regulatory activities. Some negotiation is formal, in the context
of matters such as policy-making, rule-making or the processing of contract
applications. Formal negotiations are conducted within a long-established,
quasi-legal framework. Other negotiations are informal and can occur at
any point.
Negotiation is in fact central to both the formal and informal
regulatory processes of the Authority. To a large extent this relationship
based on negotiation results from the fact that both the I.B.A. and the
I.L.R. companies share a number of common goals including, for example, the
minimisation of economic costs and interferences with the established
routines. Vaughn has observed how in order to attain goals such as these,
negotiation defines a process where compliance is a mutually beneficial
outcome for both the regulatory agency and the regulated industry:
'compliance emerges as a product of the power-mediating efforts of both
parties, as compliance demands fewer resources from both agencies and
8
business firms than do adversarial activities....
	 Negotiation can also
contribute to the implementation of regulatory objectives in that it can
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help reduce what Bardoch describes as, 'the delays, misunderstandings, and the
confusion attending the implementation process'.9
Negotiation in the regulatory process does, however, create problems 10
of accountability and control. m The maintenance of the legitimacy of
negotiation in the regulatory process is vital to any solution of the
stringency versus accommodation dilemma." An excessively stringent approach
by the regulatory authority would preclude effective negotiation, while an
overly accommodative relationship could lead to the negotiation taking place
outside the public interest. Hawkins and Thomas further note that:12
[Negotiation] suffers a loss of legitimacy if it occurs by default
as a response to resource constraints, unclear policy objectives,
agency conflict, or inadequate incentives.
But much negotiation would appear to be inevitable, given that
regulators must attempt to balance the potentially conflicting objectives of
stringency and accommodation. They must be flexible in the perfomance of
their regulatory functions. As Daneceau puts it, 'it is both desirable and
possible for [regulators] to respond to the concerns and anxieties of both
business and industry without jeapardising either the goals of the programs
they represent or their own positions as [regulators]'.m
Thus there is a wide range of activity by a regulatory agency outside of
the formal functions and discretionary decision-making powers which are
stated formally in statutes or other regulations. The regulatory process
cannot accurately be defined solely in terms of these functions and powers.
There is a wide range of informal regulatory activity. Regulatory agencies,
such as the I.B.A., are involved continually in the giving of informal advice
and the interpretation of statutory provisions and their own regulations to
provide policy guidance for that advice. This guidance will commonly be given
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described by the agency's parent statute. Yet this is the level at which
much of the interaction between the regulators and the regulated will take
place.	 From one perspective this represents a more realistic view of the
nature of regulatory activity than, for example, functions such as awarding
programme contracts or approving programme schedules.
Conclusion
The contract is, therefore, the main instrument through which the
I.B.A. implements its policies in relation to programming, advertising and
other areas of regulation. The use of contracts in the regulation of
Independent Broadcasting makes the system unique. In other countries use
14
has been made of licences rather than contracts. 	 Although there can be
similarities between the two, the fundamental distinction is that contracts
derive from private law whereas governmental licensing systems are usually
set up in public law. The holder of a licence to broadcast can expect that
regulatory action associated with it will involve formal and elaborate
procedural protections deriving from public law. No such benefits accrue
to a party to a contract with the I.B.A.
	 The courts have refused to
impose the procedural trappings appropriate to a system of licensing on the
I.B.A., precisely because the relationship between the Authority and the
broadcaster is that of parties to a contract.
In the allocation of I.L.R. contracts, however, the I.B.A. is
performing a public law function, but the legal mechanism employed in the
15
'contract simpliciter'. 	 This has been described as a,	 separation of
16
function from form.' 	 This separation has clear implications for the
legal accountability of the Authority. Harden and Lewis argue that: 'The
contractual nature of the legal framework encourages the private and
unaccountable exercise of the I.B.A. 's powers and there are strong
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indications that even the limited canons of administrative law procedural
17
requirements could not be imposed on the I.B.A. through the courts'.
Thus the fact that, in its relationship with a broadcasting company,
the I.B.A. will be exercising private contractual rights will severely
limit the role of the courts in ensuring some degree of accountablity.
Accordingly, judicial review will give negligible procedural protection to
affected parties.	 Indeed, Lord Denning has said of the award of I.B.A.
programme contracts that, 'a hearing does not have to be given to those who
18
may be disappointed'.
It is arguable that the use of a system of contracts has given the
I.B.A. better control over the broadcasters than would a licensing system.
A contract clearly carries no right of renewal, whereas if a licensee has a
'legitimate expectation' of renewal, public law will protect that
19
expectation.	 In fact, it has been argued that it was to escape the
expectations of the licensee that the proponents of the Independent
Television Act of 1954 chose to establish a system of regulation based on
20
contract.	 It was considered that a contractor who performed badly would
be more easily disposed of than a licensee.
In brief, the contract represents the authorisation of the I.B.A. to
the broadcasting company for a specified time. 	 Provided the company
complies with the terms of the contract, it is free to pursue the activity
of broadcasting. Legally, the broadcaster has no right to contract renewal
or to tenure in the contract. Since the relationship is governed by the
private law of contract, contractors are unable to call upon the courts to
offer safeguards deriving from public law.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE LEGAL MANDATE AND DISCRETIONARY POWERS 
Introduction 
It is a fundamental principle of a system of Parliamentary democracy that
the activities of a regulatory agency must be founded on Parliamentary
authority. This authority should have its source in the statute that sets up
and gives instructions to the agency. These instructions can be fairly
specific, where an aXency is given adjudicative functions, for example. Where
the function is of a regulatory nature, however, the instructions given to
the agency commonly will be very broad indeed and may indeed amount to no
more than requiring the agency to decide matters 'in the public interest'.
It is, therefore, a problem common to many regulatory agencies,
particularly those having the duty to regulate economic activity, that they
are asked effectively to function as subordinate legislative bodies with
broad statutory mandates, vague goals and priorities which need not
necessarily be consistent with one another. H.L.A. Hart has observed that
legislators suffer from relative ignorance of fact and indeterminacy of aim.
This frequently leads to regulatory legislation being too broad in its scope,
covering activities that are not germane to the legislature's primary (if
indeterminate) aim. Alternatively, but less likely, the language used by the
legislature may be too limited, leaving beyond the literal words of the
legislation some occurrence which the legislature would have wished to
control or prohibit.
The problematic nature of legislative mandates means that they have to
be elaborated upon by the regulators. It has already been noted how
regulatory authorities are most commonly established when the legislature
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defines the existence of a particular socio-economic problem in broad terms
and responds by creating an agency to do something about it. It is left to
the discretion of the regulatory agency precisely how the 'problem' is to
be solved.	 This reliance upon the discretion and expertise of the
regulators is based upon the recognition that it would be impossible to
formulate precise legislative rules which would cover all the potential
contingencies.	 The legislative mandate will, as Hawkins has pointed out,
be, 'translated and crystallised into a series of agency objectives and
practices that comprise the policy which ostensibly informs the exercise of
3
discretion in some (as yet imperfectly understood) way'. 	 That is, the
agency will have to perform the function of law-elaboration.
The design and characteristics of a regulatory agency's legislative
mandate are such crucial issues because the legislation that an agency is
called upon to implement is without doubt the most vital legal influence
upon it. The specific terms of the legislation can be described as acting
as a 'prism' through which the agency's interpretation of the law is
4
'refracted'.
	
	 The legislation can also offer a simplified 'definition of
5
the situation'	 to a regulatory agency which is confronted with
uncertainties and potentially conflicting goals and which needs to reduce
these problems into a coherent and manageable set of categories. 	 The
relevant enabling legislation would appear to provide readily available and
authoritative definitions of the situation. If an agency sticks closely to
the definitions provided by the legislation, it will be both provided with
much needed guidance and given a shield against legal and political attack.
The obvious weakness of such an approach is that the statute will not
always provide clear definitions. Much legislation is vague and even
relatively precise statutes provide some leeway for interpretation in
relation to some cases. Although the actual words of a statute can be
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defined in different ways and legislative intentions debated, not all
statutory interpretations are plausible. In any scheme of regulation,
therefore, 'the rough boundaries of policy are likely to be charted by the
legal arguments that can plausibly be linked to the authorising legislation."
A lack of specificity in the expression of statutory mandates is
probably inevitable. There are a number of factors responsible for this
measure of vagueness. 7 It would be unrealistic to expect Parliament to specify
at the outset the details of the policies to be implemented by the agency.
For, as the Law Reform Commission of Canada has pointed out, 'it would
be.. .antithetical to the purpose of creating agencies to expect Parliament to
resolve in advance the very issues the agency is created to address.'8 It is
only realistic to note also that legislators may wish to avoid having to
resolve controversial policy issues and that the presence of 'constructive
ambiguities' 9 in the statutory instructions to the agency may be, 'the price
to be paid to ensure the passing of legislation.' w Fuchs has described how.
broad delegations avoid stalemate by providing a 'means for acting without
making final choices'.11 This means that in exercising the delegated powers
the agency is going to be confronted by the same problems as the legislature
in attempting to formulate consistent and successful policies. There is no
reason why the regulators should be any more successful in their attempts
than were the legislators.
The existence of a broad statutory mandate inevitably causes difficulties
for the regulatory authority. The 'abstract' and 'terse'statements	 of
Parliament have to be given form and purpose by the regulators. 12 The agency
will be forced to engage in what Unger has called 'ad hoc balancings'.° The
balance will have to be between a literal appliation 	 of the statutory
provisions or a 'relaxation' where the agency
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feels that strict	 implementation is not vital for the success of the
legislative programme.14 This balancing act will not normally be reducible
to general rules.15	 As a consequence, a degree of confusion about a
regulatory agency's aims and policies is only to be expected. There can be no
guarantee that the priorities set by the agency will be consistent with the
earlier expectation of either legislature or executive. Where the confusion
and inconsistency is great this can bring into question the legitimacy of the
actions of the regulators. If the relevant legislative provisions are applied
unpredictably, this will lead to a degree of cynicism or skepticism about
agency methods and objectives.
Confusion about agency priorities can also lead to a lack of
accountability. Uncertainty over objectives makes it difficult for interested
parties to evaluate how effectively the agency is operating.
The foregoing comments are clearly apposite in the case of the I.B.A. As
well as being conveniently vague, most of the provisions of the Broadcasting
Act are permissive rather than mandatory. The Act gives the I.B.A. very broad
discretionary powers. One M.P. made the following comment on the original
Sound Broadcasting Bill in 1971:16
What the bill does in essence.. .is to provide a legislative and legal
framework within which the I.B.A. will exercise its discretions. It
discretions are wide; and its discretions are virtually unlimited.
As far as this legislator was concerned, 'the Minister has clear ideas as to
how he wishes the Authority to behave. But he has not set them out in the
Bill, nor has he told the House of Commons how he wishes it to be done." 7 In
his opinion the Sound Broadcasting Bill was, 'one of the worst pieces of
legislative nonsense that I have seen for a long time.' th
 Some fifteen years
later an I.B.A. Officer was still able to observe that: 'The Act is so
wonderfully widely phrased that you can read anything into it' . 18a
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The difficulty in interpreting precisely what is the I.B.A.'s
legislative mandate is of central relevance to any discussion of
legitimacy.	 The giving of form and purpose to concepts such as 'quality'
or 'balance' must, of necessity, be contentious. One commentator made the
following observation on the style of drafting of the Television Act 1954,
19
the original source of the principal provisions of the present Act:
It is difficult to take very seriously this solemn enactment of the
legislator's own doubts about the possible implications of injecting
the system of commercial [broadcasting] into the national life.
Certainly this pompous asseveration of the need for proper standards
without any hint of what they are or as to how they are to be judged,
would appear on the face of it to confer [on the I.B.A.] a kind of
overall censorship.
It could be said, therefore, that the apparent 'regulatory failure' of the
I.B.A. is the consequence of defectively designed legislation.
	 Indeed,
Nonet and Selznick have observed that many instances of 'regulatory
failure' are in fact a failure to achieve a legislative mandate which a
20
regulatory agency was never given.
	 As the Managing Director of one
20a
I.L.R. station remarked, 'The I.B.A. can only interpret what it's got'.
In other words, a programme of regulation can only be as strong as the
relevant legislation allows it to be. If the legislative scheme is
defective, then the regulatory agency will be unable to meet popular
perceptions of adequate and appropriate enforcement, the regulated may be
able to avoid its full impact and those who are supposed to benefit may not
21
do so.
When Parliament created a regulatory agency such as the I.B.A.
ideally it would state as clearly as possible and in plain and unambiguous
language the broad objectives the agency is to pursue. This ideal may not
be realistic in practice, but it should be the aim of legislators. 	 As
Landis wrote some fifty years ago, 'wisdom in the formulation of standards,
in the grant of powers, is the first step toward realization of those hopes
112
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now so definitely held of the administrative process.' 	 Landis is not
saying here that there could ever be an exhaustive description of an agency
mandate. But the constituent Act is the legal linchpin for the regulatory
agency's activities and should seek to provide a coherent framework.
Legislation cannot, of course, cater adequately for all the complexities of
the issues which the agency must inevitably confront. Many questions of
policy will only come to light once the regulatory programme is under way.
An agency mandate that was too specific could have the equally undesirable
effect of stifling an agency and saddling it with inappropriate
restrictions. Any regulatory agency needs to be able to adopt to changing
circumstance.
Discretionary Powers 
The term 'discretion' is typically used to indicate the granting to
the regulatory agency by the legislature of a mandate to complete a job
begun by it. The term is used where legislation establishing the agency
25
contains only generalised instructions. 	 This use of the term
'discretion' clearly indicates that a fundamental aspect of regulatory
agencies is the role of 'fleshing out' the details of the legislative
programme. Descriptions of the nature of this power of regulatory agencies
are not difficult to find in the relevant literature. 	 Friendly suggests
the agency function as to general statutory language is, 'to define and
clarify it
	 to canalise the broad stream into a number of narrower
26
ones'.
	
	 Stewart notes that, 'discretion is most evident when agencies
27
adopt regulations in order to implement open-ended statutes'.
It is quite clear that the regulatory functions performed by the
28
I.B.A. consist of a mixture of both duties and discretionary powers.
	 For
example, the authority has a statutory function to ensure that programmes
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broadcast by it meet certain legislative standards as to balance, quality and
decency. This function entails both a duty to do what is necessary gain
information about a programme, and a discretionary power to determine whether
the programme complies with the statutory requirements.	 A vague, general
and ambiguous statute, such as the 1981 Broadcasting Act, serves only to
enlarge this discretionary power. The existence of such discretionary powers
obviously threatens the legitimacy of the I.B.A.'s 	 actions	 under the
'transmission belt' theory of administrative law.29 For, in implementing
the legislation, the Authority is itself acting as a law-maker when
it clarifies and elaborates legislative policies.30
Discretion of the kind exercised by the I.B.A. can be said to have two
main sources. m First, a regulatory agency can be endowed by the legislature
with plenary responsibilities in a certain area of activity and told that
within that area it has a free choice. Second, the relevant legislation may
include directions that are designed to constrain the agency's choices but
that, because of their generality, do not serve to determine choices in
particular cases.
The I.B.A. would appear to have discretion deriving from both these
sources. In the regulation of programme content, for example, the I.B.A.'s
discretionary powers are of the second type. But in the selection of programme
companies and the general development of I.L.R., the discretion granted to the
I.B.A. approaches the first type outlined above.
A more difficult task than describing the sources of discretion is that
of finding an adequate definition of the concept. It is possible to become
engaged in a rather pointless semantic discussion of, 'which aspects of
decision-making and judgment can properly be described a discretion' 32
In Dworkin's famous analogy, 'discretion, like the hole in the doughnut,
114
does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of
33
restriction.	 It is therefore a relative concept', 	 while according to
Davis, 'a public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on
his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action
34
or inaction'.	 Both these	 definitions see discretion in terms of
'restriction' or 'effective limits' and do not see it as merely choice. In
fact, it is important to distinguish the lawful scope of choice available
to the regulatory agency from any de facto freedom of choice which it
possesses.
	 Discretion would seem to imply a sense of legitimate decision
35
and a decision reached within the confines of certain restrictions.
Discretion is, therefore, perhaps best seen as merely the room for
36
manoeuvre passed by a regulator in making decisions. 	 It is rarely
absolute and is a matter of degree. It may well vary from one regulatory
context to another. A regulatory agency such as the I.B.A. will have a
high level of discretion when it is guided by such a vague standard as the
'public interest'. It is possible for discretion to be constrained by non-
37
legal factors: 'The doughnut ring may comprise many factors'.
	 Among the
most important non-legal factors would be the resources available to the
regulatory agency and the political pressures to which it may be subjected.
Discretion is thus a necessary and inevitable aspect of the
38
regulatory process. As Hawkins notes:
Discretion enables legal rules and mandates to be interpreted and
given purpose and form. It enables judgments to be made about the
application, reach and impact of the law.
Not all observers of the regulatory process have viewed the existence and
39
exercise of wide discretion quite as benevolently as this. 	 Regulatory
agencies such as the I.B.A. have often been criticised for their failure to
clarify the vague statutory standards under which they operate. It should
be clear, for example, from the account of the I.B.A.'s franchising
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procedures in Chapter Five, that the Authority has some considerable way to
go before its attempts to interpret the Broadcasting Act would attain Hawkins'
ideal.
A further criticism of wide discretion is that it makes regulatory
agencies more exposed to influence from the regulated, since, as Lowi has
pointed out, the regulators and regulated will have to reach some
understanding over where the boundaries of permissible conduct are to be
drawn up in practice.° Fuller suggested that the tendency of regulatory
agencies identifying with the regulated, 'may lie in a desire to escape from
the frustration of trying to act as a judge in a situation affording no
standard of decision. To escape from a moral vacuum one has to identify
oneself with something, and the most obvious object of identification lies
in the regulated industry. t41
Wide discretion can also lead to uncertainty, since those to whom a
legislative provision is addressed will not know what precisely is expected
of them. It may also result in unfairness if a standard applied to one of the
regulated is not applied to others in similar circumstances. Furthermore,
democratic theory requires that primacy should be given to the intention of
the legislature, so wide discretion is undesirable if it allows regulatory
agencies to substitute different goals from those envisaged by the
legislative 42
Despite such problems, it should not be thought that granting regulatory
decision-makers discretion will produce inconsistency and arbitrariness. A
regulatory agency can guide the exercise of discretion through the formulation
of policy and its articulation through rules. As Davis has long argued, the
issue is not whether discretion does nor should exist, but how it should be
guided, checked and reviewed. 43 Davis recommends confining the discretionary
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closely than has been the case in the past. He admits that some discretion
is necessary, but is concerned with the amount of 'unnecessary discretion'
which allows regulators to depart from official policy.
	 Davis suggests
that where discretion cannot be confined, it should be 'checked' or
49
structured'.
	
	 Thus, Davis argues that, 'one officer should check
45
another, as a protection against arbitrariness'.
	 By 'checking', he
46
means, 'both administrative and judicial supervision and review'.
Davis is perhaps best known for urging the use of precise rules to
confine discretion, by setting the boundaries for its exercise and limiting
it to the minimum necessary for the effective performance of the particular
regulatory function. He also emphasises the structuring of discretion, by
which he means that agencies should justify their decisions by relating
them publicly to other decisions, rules, standards, principles or policy
47
statements.	 Davis asserts that the ultimate obective is, 'to locate the
optimum degree of structuring in each respect for each discretionary
48
power'.
Both the merits and disadvantages of agency rule-making will be
addressed further in the next chapter. It is sufficient for the present to
outline the kind of problems confronting the I.B.A. in the exercise of its
wide discretionary powers.
	 The problem of finding a principled and
coherent basis for the exercise of the I.B.A.'s discretionary powers can be
seen as being inextricably linked to the substantive problem of balancing
49
the conflicting values of stringency and accommodation.
	 An emphasis on
regulation in accordance with precise rules may lead to unreasonable and
unjust results if applied to I.L.R. companies in financial difficulties.
Alternatively, the application of the rules may be overly accommodative if
the companies could afford to comply with more stringent requirements.
The dilemma confronting regulatory agencies such as the I.B.A. in
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their search for a legitimate basis for the exercise of their discretionary
powers is an unenviable one. Kagan aptly describes the problem as finding,
'an acceptable path betwen the Scylla of legalism and the Charybdis of
uncontrolled discretion, a method by which decisions are made both promptly
and consistently and rules are applied and adjusted in light of their
50
actual consequences'.	 But as Koch so aptly states, 'all types of
discretion are characterised by some sense that the agency needs a degree
51
of freedom to make mistakes'.
The question then becomes one of how to give legitimacy to
discretionary decisions. 	 In general terms, this may come to depend on
procedures for accountability and participation rather than with the
52
achievment of specified goals. 	 The ensuing discussion focusses on legal
accountability; participation and other forms of accountability will be
addressed further in later chapters.
Legal Accountability
It has been stressed throughout the discussion of the I.B.A. so far
that the Authority relies to a considerable extent on an expertise model
of legitimacy.	 This model relies heavily on the good judgement of the
I.B.A.'s officials and on informal procedures and negotiations. 	 The
traditional administrative lawyer would, 	 however, mistrust such
arrangements. Administrative legal doctrine would call for formal controls
as a protection against inaccurate or arbitrary decision-making.
	 This
legal approach would emphasise the importance of the accountability and
control basis for agency legitimacy.	 The accountability model would
emphasise the answerability of regulatory officials to the courts. 	 The
ideals supported by such an approach are outlined clearly by Kagan:
'predictability of decision and equality of treatment; decision according
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to systematized fact-finding procedures, such as court-like hearings, and
according to explicit, known rules; and finally, fixed procedures for
53
public participation in the agency['s] decision processes'.
These ideals described by Kagan are to a large extent reflected in
the doctrines of administrative law under which the decision of a
regulatory agency can be contested in the courts. Under these doctrines a
court can reverse an agency decision if it is illegal (that is, outside the
terms of the authorising statute), irrational or the result of procedural
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impropriety.
In general terms, therefore, the I.B.A. is subject to the principles
of administrative law and is subject to legal accountability. 	 However,
given the vagueness of its statutory mandate and the broad nature of its
discretionary powers, it would be very difficult successfully to challenge
55
the I.B.A. on any of these grounds.	 A further factor limiting the
potential role of the courts is that, in its relationship with an I.L.R.
56
company, the I.B.A. will be exercising private contractual rights.
This is not to say, of course, that the courts will not on occasion
take a 'hard look' at the procedures adopted by the I.B.A. On a number of
occasions such judicial scrutiny has taken place, but it has been made
clear that the courts will only intervene if the Authority and its members
had failed to fulfil the duty to establish a sound system of administration
57
and adhere to it.
	 A court would have to be persuaded that the action
taken was one that no reasonable regulator could have adopted in the light
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of his statutory duties.
	 This would be a hard test to satisfy. One view
would be that the courts have in effect placed a 'hands off' sign on the
I.B.A. directed at would-be litigants. For example, the Court of Appeal
has stated in the leading case concerning a challenge to the I.B.A.'s
59
television programming supervision that:
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good taste or decency would not inevitably mean that the system was
impeachable, or that it was not being operated. Such an occurrence might
certainly call for a review of the system itself, and of any safeguards
designed to ensure its proper operation, but that would be a matter for the
Authority.	 This 'thoroughly practical approach to the problem' w shows
a clear reliance on the perceived expertise of the I.B.A.
One can, therefore detect a reluctance on the part of the judiciary to
interfere with the judgements of an expert body such as the I.B.A. For
example, in an earlier judicial decision concerning a challenge to the
Authority's procedures for the supervision of television programming it was
said that:61
The authority were the people who mattered. ...The Courts had no right to
interfere with their decisions so long as they were in accordance with the
law.
Thus, a court can certainly be expected to defer to a policy judgement
made by the Authority, provided that it meets the minimum standards of
legality, rationality and procedural propriety. In other words, 'the kernel
of the expert model is incorporated in administrative legal doctrine' 62
Nevertheless, the doctrines of administrative law and the availability
of judicial review do have a limited potential to influence Authority
decisions. Most importantly, administrative law provides a set of standards
against which a regulatory agency can be assessed by the Courts. And the
court's interpretation of the Authority's constitutent legislation have had
an effect upon the mandate of the Authority. Questions relating to the
Authority's jurisdiction have raised fundamental issues about how much room
for manoeuvre it should have in defining its own role through the
interpretation of its statutory mandate.
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This is just one example of the difficult questions affecting the
institutional relationship because regulatory agencies and courts. Another
would be as to the point at which a court should be able to decide that an
agency has stretched the terms of its constituent Act beyond the bands of a
reasonable interpretation. As Hammond has put it:63
The role of the courts.. .is to assist in articulating the integrity of the
legislation, in seeing that that integrity is maintained, and in ensuring
agencies stay within the four corners of the legislative scheme as conceived.
[It] is a complex one and extends much further than the traditional models of
delegated legislation. As a method of ordering, it does not rest on fiat in
the traditional, hierarchial, linear sense. It explicitly recognises the
symbolic relationship among all organs of modern government and makes all
those organs responsible for the legislative health of an organic whole.
In reality, of course, each participant in the business of
governmental regulation is unlikely to share without reservation the
other's view as to how the different role should be played. There appears
to	 be a perennial tension between the advocates of strong 	 legal
accountability and those who perceive as unwarranted judicial intrusion
into areas of decision-making that really belong to regulators.
The root of this tension lies in the fact that, as Verkuil notes,
'the role assigned to administrative agencies is in many ways different
from that assigned the judicial'. 64 The two major differences would seem
to be that:
(1) Agencies act prospectively to plan, organise and set standards
(2) Courts intervene on an ex post facto basis and rely on a highly
structured adjudicatory process.
The potential of the courts to intervene in the procedures of the
I.B.A. is severely restricted. Only a minute proportion of the Authority's
decisions have been subject to litigation and all of these have concerned
I.T.V. rather than I.L.R. The impact of court decisions on the Authority
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is debatable.	 Court decisions have been viewed as impediments by the
Authority resulting sometimes in attempts to bypass them. For example, the
reason why the Authority has not made the I.L.R. Notes of Guidance 
publicly available is to avoid a legal challenge based on non-compliance
with them.65
It would only be exaggerating slightly to observe that the I.B.A.
lies within a policy space which is largely invisible to the administrative
legal order. 66 The doctrines of administrative law are of limited use in
this no-man's-land of justiciability. Of course, placing too much emphasis on
legal accountability can lead to one acquiring, 'a distorted view of the
performance of agencies, one focussed more on their "pathology" than on
their normal operations'. 67	Danger also lies in placing too much emphasis
on legal values, when a more appropriate system of accountability would
recognise the significance of 'moral, political, organisational and economic
values. ,68
In other words, the I.B.A. must not be addressed purely in terms of legal
values and accountability. The resources given to a regulatory agency are
necessarily limited and the imposition of legal values, such as fairness,
may have too high a cost. The dangers of judicialising the regulatory process
must be kept in mind. For, although judicialisation can lead to an increased
impression of fairness, it can, if excessive, result in delay and
inflexibility, and generate division rather than compromise.
After all, regulatory agencies are not courts. Their responsibilities as
governmental bodies go beyond mere dispute resolution and embrace the
formulation, development and implementation of rules and policies. This
function of law-elaboration forms the subject matter of Part IV.
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PART IV - THE LAW - ELABORATION FUNCTION 
CHAPTER EIGHT - POLICY-MAKING AND RULE-MAKING 
Introduction 
It has been reiterated throughout the preceding chapters that law-
elaboration is a major function of independent regulatory agencies. 	 Law-
elaboration	 involves the translation of a vague and aspirational
legislative mandate into specific policies and rules of conduct for those
to be regulated.	 It has been suggested that in many instances the
delegation to the regulatory agency is broad enough to amount to a quasi-
legislative power to interpret or expand on the stautory mandate. 	 Shapiro
is only exaggerating slightly when he notes that, 'the agency is placed
very much in the position of a legislative body with a limited capacity to
1
make laws and an almost infinite range of law-making options'.	 Under this
model of the regulatory process, the detailed formulation and articulation
of administrative policies and rules is left to the regulators who are
allocated substantial discretion both to make and apply policy. 	 The
explanation which can be given for this state of affairs is that the
legislature does not want to become involved in deciding the complex issues
2
surrounding particular regulatory decisions.	 As Walker has said (in the
3
context of penal law): 'The silence of the statutes is deliberate'. 	 Or as
4
K.C. Davis has explained:
What happens over and over is that a legislative body sees a problem
but does not know how to solve it; accordingly it delegates the power
to work on the problem, telling the delegate that what it wants is the
true, the good and the beautiful - or just and reasonable results, or
furtherance of the public interest.
Thus a regulatory agency charged with the implementation of a
(deliberately) vague legislative mandate will of necessity have to clarify
and elaborate legislative policies. In this sense, regulators are, as
128
Shapiro suggests, de facto law-makers.
To control the exercise of their discretionary powers, regulatory
agencies have to make decisions about the procedures they will follow in
performing regulatory acts.	 Rules, guidelines or standards will be
established to help to structure the law relating to regulatory procedures.
In turn, these rules can provide a means of ensuring that 'lower level'
regulators act in accordance with agency policy, whether that policy be
defined by the legislature or by the agency itself.
It would be appropriate to point out here that throughout this essay
the term 'rule' is used, following Diver's formulation, 'to refer to the
linguistic formula used by an administrative agency to express its
5
governing policy'.	 In other words, a rule represents the articulation in
a relatively precise form of the agency's policy. There is, of course, a
large jurisprudential literature on what amounts toa 'rule'. An extended
discussion of this issue would not be appropriate, but it is fair to point
out that the definition adopted here is somewhat more flexible than many
and would include within its scope guidelines and other less formal policy
statements.	 Two examples of more orthodox definitions should suffice to
illustrate the different approach adopted by Diver and utilised here.
	 The
6	 7
first definition is that of Pound; the second that of Jowell:
(1) [Al	 legal precept attaching a definite legal consequence to a
definite detailed state of fact.
(2) [Al concrete general direction in which legal consequences are
appended to the happening or nonhappening of an event or the occurence
of a situation.
More will be said about rule-types later in this chapter and those
utilised by the I.B.A. in Chapter Nine.
	
The meaning to be attributed to
the term 'policy' is discussed in the next section.
Policy-Making 
The making of policy is often considered to be particularly
appropriate for regulatory agencies. It can be seen as representing the
zenith of administrative authority and expertise. As has already been
observed, the legislature cannot perform all or even the major part of this
governmental function.
'Policy' is an imprecise and flexible word. This imprecision has its
source in the original Greek root 'politeia', which means 'government'.
Policy has been defined as the sum of those, 'considerations which a
governing body has in mind in legislating, deciding on a course of action
8
or otherwise acting'.	 In other words, making of policy involves,
9
'making decisions about how to decide particular classes of case'.	 In
general terms, one might say that policy includes those decisions that
advance some collective goal of the community as a whole, rather than those
10
decisions which secure some individual or group right. 	 The
'considerations which a governing body has in mind' would include the
advancement or protection of the public interest and of private rights and
freedoms.	 Policy-making can be said to involve, in Diver's words, 'the
reconciliation and elaboration of lofty values	 into operational
11
guidelines'.
Different meanings can, of course, be attributed to 'policy'.	 Smith
12
has argued there are three major types of governmental policy:
(1) Normative policy: this corresponds to what ought to be done.
(2) Operational policy: this is what actually is done.
(3) Strategic policy: this is what can be done.
In terms of this classification, the discussion of the I.B.A.'s
policy-making will be focussing on normative and operational policy.
Discussion of strategic policy will be adjourned until the Conclusion.
It is clear that regulatory agencies are concerned with the
formulation of normative policy. For, as Levin points out, 'the typical
statutory provision empowering an agency to promulgate regulations
indicates a desire by the legislature to place certain norm-setting
13
decisions in administrative hands.'
	 It is self-evident that regulatory
agencies are concerned with operational policy.
This role of policy-maker is, nevertheless, one of the most
controversial which a regulatory agency has to play. This power to make
policy can manifest itself in a variety of different forms.
	 It includes
the power to award contracts or licences, to make regulations, to exercise
discretionary powers and to interpret the agency's parent statute. Policy-
making involves the ability to interpret and shape the role the agency is
to play. This may be achieved by making broad general rules, by issuing
guidelines and codes of practice, or even by the way particular problems
are resolved. Hawkins and Thomas accurately describe 'policy formulation'
as, 'a process whereby the agency interprets and translates legislative
14
goals into rules, standards and plans of action'.
By no means, of course, is the making of policy by a regulator
agency a straightforward task. Many areas of policy will give rise to a
15
'polycentric' array of problems.
	
	 Among the issues to be decided in the
16
formation of regulatory policy will be the following:
(1) The subjects to be on the regulatory agenda.
(2) The priorities to be accorded to these subjects.
(3) The criteria by which rules are to be formulated.
(4) The exceptions to the rules which will be permitted.
(5) The corrective actions or remedies to be prescribed in the
event of violation of the rules.
The answers which the regulatory agency finds to these problems will
reflect once more the dilemma between what Kagan has called 'stringency'
17
and 'accommodation' 	 and will express the ways in which it has adapted to
these conflicting values.
	 This dilemma between stringency and
accommodation is played out actively in the formulation and articulation of
regulatory policy by the agency.
Kagan goes on to identify four main sources of influence which can
affect an agency's regulatory policy and determine whether it is stringent
or accommodative: the ideology of regulatory officials; the legal and
political mandate of the regulatory programme; the social and political
organisation of the regulatory process; and the economic effects of the
18
regulations.	 These explanations of regulatory policy will be addressed
further in the context of the I.B.A. in Chapter Ten.
The power to make policy possessed by a regulatory agency should not
be seen merely as a power to 'fill in the gaps' in the relevant
legislation.	 In policy-making, a regulatory agency is performing a role
which is more commonly attributed to the legislature itself, rather than
simply building on the earlier work of the legislators. In general terms,
of course, the decision as to what the legislation requires is matter of
statutory interpretation.
	 But as Diver so rightly points out, 'this
19
suggestion provides only the roughest of road maps'.
Given that much legislative guidance consists of a number of
different considerations which the agency must take into account the
20
agency will be obliged, as Levin points, to:
	 ...use its own creativity
in determining what weight to attach to these various [considerations]
under the circumstances of the particular regulatory program. In doing so,
the agency is not interpreting the legislative will but,
	 instead,
responding to a legislative invitation to make law'.
	 An active policy-
making role by a regulatory agency immediately raises fundamental issues
about accountability and the legitimacy of non-elected regulatory officials
21
making major policy decisions.
	 Indeed, the policy-making model perhaps
represents the ultimate in reliance on the expertise of the regulatory
agency.
	
	 As Freedman stresses, an agency is assigned or created to bring
22
expert judgment to a particular problem.
	 On one level this expertise
lies merely in the possession of specialist knowledge, but it must also
include the ability to analyse the relevant information and reach an
accurate decision. To a large extent, regulatory policy-making represents
this 'higher' level of expertise. This apparent expertise can serve to
legitimate the making of regulatory policy by agencies independent of the
elected government.
	 This expertise is, perhaps, the reason why the
legislature consents to the function being performed by an independent
agency.
	 The requirement that policy-making be guided by the 'public
interest' gives rise to a number of observations in relation to regulatory
agencies.	 It would seem to require that regulatory decisions should be
made with attention to public opinion. For, although policy-making has
been assigned to an 'expert' body, this does not mean that public opinion
should be regarded as of no relevance. In effect, the responsibility for
ascertaining and taking account of the public interest has been assigned to
the agency. In practice, however, the regulatory agency must be in a far
inferior position to that of legislators to discern public opinion. It is
also quite possible that the allocation of the policy-making functions is
23
the result of less noble reasons.
It is arguable that the policy-making function is allocated to an
independent agency so that policy can be formulated in an atmosphere of
expertise and objectivity.
	 A more cynical view would be that the
assignment ensures that agency officials, rather than legislators, will
24
bear the brunt of the inevitable dissatisfaction with the balance struck,
25
'between competing interests which vary in weight from case to case' 	 and
which may appear equally valid to the outside observer.
Rule-Making 
The power to fix procedures, criteria or policies in the form of
rules is one of the most important and significant powers given to a
regulatory agency.	 It is both inevitable and desirable that an agency
should articulate its policy and this will commonly be done by the making
of rules, in the broad sense of the term utilised here. The necessity to
make rules can come to a regulatory agency more by default than design,
where the mandate given by the legislature is so vague that it needs to be
clarified and given content before it can be implemented.	 On other
occasions, the relevant legislation may require the agency to make rules to
govern certain types of activity. Examples of rules deriving from both of
these sources can be found in the regulation of I.L.R. They are discussed
in detail in the next chapter.
Various attempts at classifying administrative rules can be found in
26
the literature. These vary from the philosophical and abstract 	 to the
27
practical and functional.	 It is debatable however, whether much is to
be gained by attempting to classify the varieties of rule made by regulatory
28
agencies. For, as Levin points out:
The agency may simply announce that a given policy is the course of
action it intends to pursue, or that regulated parties should pursue.
Such a pronouncement may leave the rest of the world in doubt as to
whether the agency is to rely on a perceived [legislative] mandate Or
its own policy preference or both.
It is important to distinguish both primary legislation and delegated
legislation, but beyond that it is questionable whether any very specific
distinctions can be drawn. Baldwin and Houghton distinguish between sub-
delegated legislation,' where it may not be clear whether Parliament has
delegated a power to an individual, nor is it always plain whether the
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authorisation runs to making prescriptions of full legal force' and
"unsanctioned administrative rules"' which, 'is the huge group comprising
all those rules, guides or other statements of general applicability that
are promulgated by administrators or others without express legislative
29
mandate'.	 In practice, such a distinction can disappear, it being
unclear whether a rule is 'sanctioned' or not and it is quite possible for
a rule or a body of rules to have both 'sanctioned' and 'unsanctioned'
elements in it.
To be fair to Baldwin and Houghton, however, they do stress that,
'the form in which a rule emerges is not necessarily related to its
30.
status'	 They go on to adopt a functionalist approach, identifying eight
31
models of administrative rules:
(1) Procedural Rules
(2) Interpretative Guides
(3) Instructions to Officials
(4) Prespective/Evidential Rules
(5) Commendatory Rules
(6) Voluntary Codes
(7) Rule of Practice, Management or Operation
(8) Consultative Decisions and Administrative Pronouncements
What Baldwin and Houghton classify as sub-delegated legislation and
unsanctioned administrative rules could correspond to any of these eight
categories.	 Baldwin and Houghton are concerned with the legal status of
rules and their typology is no doubt appropriate for discussion of that
issue, but an approach to the subject of rules which is more suitable to a
study of law-elaboration is the well-known one of K.C. Davis.
Davis uses the term l rule' in a sense similar to that of Diver,
mentioned above, to refer to plans, policy statements, guidelines or formal
rules.	 Davis distinguishes between 'legislative' and 'interpretative'
rules.	 He defines 'legislative' rules as those issued by an agency
exercising delegated power to make rules having the force of law; all other
32
rules are defined as 'interpretative'. 	 Adopting this classification, the
present study of the I.B.A. is primarily concerned with interpretative
rules.
Davis's definition of an interpretative rule as any rule that is not
'legislative' would appear to extend to general statements of policy, that
is, 'nonbinding statements whereby an agency explains how it uses or
33
intends to use its discretionary power'. 	 According to Jowell, 'an agency
makes interpretative rules when it "fills in the gaps" of clear policy,
rules	 Or decision or specifies the means of procedure for their
34
application.'
Again, however, there may be occasions when it will be difficult to
classify the rule of a regulatory agency as legislative or interpret
active.	 Nevertheless, a classification along the lines propounded by
Davis does allow for the fact that not everything an agency says is 'law',
in the sense of having legal force and effect. Many agency rules will not
possess these legal characteristics. Rules falling within this category
will be interpretative rules (including policy statements), as well as
expressions of policy prepared for use internally by the regulatory agency.
Statements by an agency of this nature are not necessarily designed to
create rights or obligations and they do not constrain an agency in the
35
same imperative way that a piece of primary legislation would.
A theme which prevades much of the administrative legal literature on
36
rule-making is that of the relationship between discretion and rules. 	 On
the one hand, it is felt that regulators need some room for manoeuvre in
1applying a policy to individual circumstances. On the other, there is the
requirement of both regulators and regulated for the certainty and guidance
which flow from having established standards and	 procedures.
Interpretative rules can perform a valuable role in structuring the
discretion which typifies much regulatory legislation. Legislative rules
are the legislature's own way of attempting to resolve the dilemma by
requiring the agency to articulate policy decisions in the form of rules.
The best known advocate of the proposal that agency rule-making may
provide a means of narrowing the discretion given to regulators by broadly
37
phrased statutes is K.C. Davis.	 Davis's arguments have already been
averted to briefly in the previous chapter. His intention is to reconcile
the inevitability of generous delegations of power to regulatory agencies
with the desire for predictability and consistency in regulatory
38
policies.	 Davis firmly believes that rule-making is an excellent policy-
39
making mechanism,	 but he also recognises that the value of formal justice
may often be out-weighed by the need for flexible and effective
40
administration.	 In short, he states that the ultimate objective is, in
his classic phrase, 'to locate the optimum degree of structuring in respect
41
of each discretionary power.'
Davis is aware, however, that if agency rules are unduly specific
they may create loopholes and invite circumvention and may not take account
of the need for flexibility to deal with particular circumstances.
42
Accordingly, his conclusion is that:
Even when rules can be written discretion is often better. Rules
without discretion cannot fully take into account the need for
tailoring results to unique facts and circumstances of particular
cases.
It is somewhat simplistic, therefore, to pose the issue in terms of
one general problem of achieving the right balance of rules and
43
discretion.	 When an agency has engaged in rule-making it will still
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that the
extent of
possess discretion within the framework of the rules and in determining
their applicability to any given situation.	 Furthermore, the general
problem of rules versus can be broken down into three separate matters
44
which need to be resolved:
(1) Should the agency attempt in the first instance to formulate a
comprehensive set of rules?
(2) Should the agency begin incrementally but rapidly develop a set of
precise rules through extrapolation of precedents?
(3) In what circumstances should departure from the rules be accepted?
As Galligan notes, these are question of, 'policy and strategy, and
it is difficult to conceive of any master plan as to how they are to be
45
resolved.'	 Likewise, 'it is necessary to be wary of any question which
is put simply in terms of the merits of choosing between rules and
46
discretion.'
Davis does acknowledge that legislative bodies will often find it
impractical to formulate precise standards to be employed by regulatory
47
officials.	 He argues that since legislators are, 'often unable or
unwilling to supply' standards the emphasis should be on the protection of,
'private parties against injustice on account of unnecessary and
uncontrolled discretionary power,' rather than on the prevention of the,
'delegation of legislative power or to require meaningful
48
standards'.	 Davis urges that in the absence of legislated
regulatory bodies should create their own standards as a result
49
experience over time.
Implicit within Davis's writings is the suggestion
experience of regulation itself aids agencies in narrowing the
statutory
standards
of their
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their discretionary powers.	 Indeed, he envisages a process whereby
initially wide discretion is narrowed - first by standards, second by
50
principles, and finally by rules.	 Davis recommends that, l[w]hen
legislative bodies delegate discretionary power without meaningful
standards, administrators should develop standards at the earliest feasible
time, and then, as circumstances permit, should further confine their own
51
discretion through principles and rules'.	 Another writer who has
52
advocated such a process is Friendly:
[W]here the initial standard [provided by the legislature] is thus
general, it is imperative that steps be taken over the years to define
and clarify it - to canalize the broad stream into a number of
narrower ones. I do not suggest this process can be so carried out
that all cases can be determined by computers; I do suggest it ought
to be carried to the point of affording a fair degree of
predictability of decision in the great majority of cases and of
intelligibility in all.
It is possible to suggest a number of benefits which flow from such
53
an emphasis on rule-making in the regulatory process. 	 Firstly, rule-
making enables a regulatory agency to formulate and articulate criteria to
resolve a whole class of 'cases'. In this way, an investment in rule-
making can lessen the number of decisions which the agency would otherwise
have to make if each of the cases to which the rules applies had to be
resolved individually.
	
Secondly, rule-making is an effective way of
communicating the agency's policy preferences and promote compliance with
agency requirements. Thirdly, it is arguable that an agency can improve
the quality of its policy decisions by concentrating its decision-making
resources in the making of rules. An approach based on rule-making can
give an agency the opportunity to explore the underlying regulatory problem
in greater depth than would otherwise be the case. 	 In this way, the
regulators can develop a set of solutions that are more effective than
those that the agency could derive from a series of cases involving only
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one or a few parties. Finally, once rules have been issued, they provide
the regulated with the opportunity to comply with them, thereby reducing
the need for further action by the agency.
Not all verdicts on administrative rule-making have been as positive
as this. In the first instance, one has to be aware of the fallacy noted
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by Goodin:
Logically, the opposite of enjoying discretion is being bound by a
rule. So, logically, the natural response to finding that certain
problems are inherent in discretion is to impose rules in place of
those discretions. The assumption that that will automatically solve
the problem of discretion, however, entails an unwarranted presumption
that every problem necessarily has a solution.
Other criticisms of administrative rule-making relate to its costs
and the perception that it imposes unnecessary restrictions on
administrators.	 In a well-known article, Ehrlich and Posner identify a
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number of the 'costs' of rule-making. 	 Like Goodin, they note that rules
are not necessarily the most rational means for achieving given purposes.
They argue that the process of rule-making can be too selective and reflect
an oversimplistic view of the regulatory process. 	 There can be no
guarantee that the gains in certainty will be sufficient to outweigh any
reduced effectiveness. Ehrlich and Posner also refer to the, 'necessarily
imperfect fit between the convergence of a rule and the conduct sought to
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be regulated.'	 This is the problem of the inevitable imprecision of
rules. A rule may have consequences which are not germane to the aims of
its formulator, whet situations which he did intend to come within its
scope may in fact be excluded.
A second strand of criticisms, made by Ehrlich and Posner and others,
is that rules may place unwarranted obstacles in the way of a regulator.
These arguments have been well summarised by Galligan and it is worth
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quoting at length from his account:
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[R]ules by nature impose restrictions on the considerations that may
be taken into account in decision-making. To formulate a rule is to
select in advance the relatively few factors that are relevant to the
decision; the greater the number and complexity of these, the less
clearly rule-governed the decision becomes. Accordingly, rules
narrowly drawn and strictly applied impose a rigidity and an inability
to accommodate new, unforeseen, complex or unusual
situations...[R]ules restrict consideration of wider factors, and may
prevent the making of decisions in a way which provides the best
accommodation of values and purposes, and which achieves the best
result in the particular case.
Conclusion
To some extent, the debate concerning the merits of administrative
rule-making is a fairly sterile one. In practice, regulatory agencies do
make rules which, even if not dispositive of particular issues because of
their imprecision, do at least give some indication of what the policy of
the agency is. Regulatory agencies are involved in policy-making and it is
both inevitable and desirable that their policies are articulated in the
form of 'rules'. There may well be debate about the 'optimal precision' of
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a given rule or body of rules,
	 but to condemn administrative rule-making,
as traditional administrative legal doctrine does, would be to show a
misunderstanding of the nature of the administrative process. It is simply
impractical to expect regulators to proceed on a 'case by case' basis,
applying the relevant statutory provisions in all the situations that
confront them.
	 This is not to say that a regulatory agency should not
make provision for, 'changing circumstances and for changing official
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attitudes.'
	 This is a necessary part of the role played by regulatory
agencies and is one that the I.B.A. has fulfilled. This calls for a broad
view of what a 'rule' is and has been the perspective adopted in the
discussion thus far. This need for flexibility, as Galligan rightly points
out, 'might best be accommodated in an environment of open standards rather
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than precise rules'.
It is in this context that one needs to be aware of the tension
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between what Nonet and Selznick describe as 'openness' and 'fidelity'.
By 'openness' they mean the ability to make decisions according to an
underlying framework of broad principles free from the constraining
influence of precise or detailed rules. By 'fidelity' they mean that the
existing rules are applied consistently and to all affected parties in the
same way.
Which of these two values is favoured, however, would seem to depend
upon one's position in the regulatory order. It would seem quite natural
for someone on the receiving end of regulation to stress the importance of
fidelity and precise rules. On the other hand, it would appear sensible
for a regulator to favour the value of openness and to view precise rules
as an insupportable obstacle.
The fundamental principle informing the discussion of law-elaboration
in this chapter is that rarely will a provision of a regulatory agency's
constituent Act be so precise that the agency need not interpret it. 	 In
many cases an agency will have to exercise discretion when applying
statutory provisions in specific circumstances. 	 It is,	 therefore,
inevitable that regulatory agencies will continue to play a key role in the
formulation of regulatory policy. By establishing an independent agency,
Parliament inevitably authorises them to make policy even where no explicit
statutory authorisation is granted. It is desirable that an agency should
articulate the criteria upon which their decisions are to be based, so that
interested parties can plan their activities with knowledge of the
agency's policy preferences and requirements. There is also an important
value in providing an opportunity for these interested parties to
participate in the policy-making process.
A regulatory agency has to play a normative role.
	 Unlike a common
law court, it is not expected to rely on an evolutionary method of
decision-making.	 The emphasis is upon administration rather than
adjudication or dispute resolution.
On a broader front, there does seem to be an increasing recognition
among public lawyers that administrative rule-making indicates a new
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direction which the law should take in the modern regulatory state. 	 The
law should not just be concerned with vested rights before the ordinary
courts or set limits to the exercise of power through parliamentary action.
It should focus upon planned and principled action and upon participation
in the policy-making process. Above all, administrative law should ensure
that regulation is carried out in the public interest.
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CHAPTER NINE - LAW-ELABORATION AND THE I.B.A. 
Introduction 
According to traditional administrative legal theory, the source of
the I.B.A.'s authority to formulate policies and make rules should
originate in its parent statute, the 1981 Broadcasting Act. It has been
repeatedly stressed, however, that this 'transmission belt' theory is
inaccurate as a description of the role played by independent regulatory
agencies. The aim of this chapter is to examine in detail the policies and
rules made by the I.B.A. in order to determine the 'types' of rule employed
in the regulation of I.L.R. and from where the power to formulate these
rules derives.	 In particular, the areas of programming and advertising
will be examined.	 Another major area of I.B.A. policy-making is, of
course, the award of programme contracts. This topic was examined in
detail in Chapter Five and it is not intended to add to that discussion
here. There is also the matter of the regulation of technical standards, a
subject mentioned in Chapter Three. This is an area of little controversy
and it is not thought worthy of an extended discussion here.
The fields of programming and advertising should be seen as case
studies of the law-elaboration function described in the preceding pages.
In essence, when making rules for the regulation of I.L.R., the I.B.A. is
in the business of policy making. In general terms, it is only to the good
if the I.B.A. articulates its policies in the form of rules. For as Hart
and Sacks pointed out some thirty years ago: 'The utility of policies as
guides without the help of implementing rules and standards is obviously
1
minimal'.
In terms of the distinctions outlined in the previous chapter, the
rule-types employed by the Authority include those which are 'sanctioned'
as well as those which are l unsanctioned'; and those which are
'legislative' as well as those which are 'interpretative'. 	 It bears
repeating that a very flexible definition of the term rule is necessitated
by the subject matter of the present study. It is debatable whether the
officials of the Authority would see all of their 'rules' as fitting a
legalistic definition of the term. Here, for example, are three similar
views of the I.L.R. Programming Notes of Guidance put forward by I.B.A.
Officers:
(1) 'We are very careful not to say that they are rules, because rules are
something that are either broken or adhered to absolutely strictly and
in our interpretation of the guidelines we do try as far as possible
to get a certain uniformity, but allow in that for differing
circumstances.'
(2) 'They are the gentlemen's agreement under which the companies will
provide programmes.'
(3) 'They are what they say they are - guidelines.'
On the other hand, a somewhat different perspective was forthcoming
from the Managing Director of an I.L.R. station: 'This quasi -law is
extremely important. Virtually all of our activities are related back in a
structured form quite regularly to the codes of practice that arise out of
the Broadcasting Act.'
There remains to be redrawn the fundamental distinction between
'legislative' and 'interpretative' rules. Legislative rules are made
pursuant to some kind of delegated legislative authority and are thus
'sanctioned' (even if indirectly) by the legislature. By way of contrast,
interpretative rules represent the regulatory agency's view of the meaning
of the law and generally remain 'unsanctioned' by the legislature.
The regulatory function of interpretation is a vital one. It consists
of clarifying the meaning of statutes, previous regulations and of other
materials which are declaratory of the law. The issuing by a regulatory
agency of interpretative rules of general application is perhaps the most
important technique of interpretation. Interpretation can also occur in
the making of legislative rules, as well as less formally through the
giving of advice.
The resultant interpretative rules and policy statements are of great
importance in clarifying and articulating the regulatory agency's position
on substantive matters.	 They can have a significant impact on the
behaviour both of the regulators and of the regulated. 	 In practice,
interpretative rules may differ little in their impact from legislative
rules.	 The main difference between the two types of rule being that
legislative rules are those that are issued pursuant to a specific 
statutory delegation of rule-making power.
It almost goes without saying that interpretative rules, or at least
some kinds of policy statement, are indispensable to proper administration.
Regulatory agencies cannot perform effectively unless they clarify the law
through interpretative rules and channel their discretion through the
formulation and articulation of policy.	 Both legislative and
interpretative rulemaking are needed to guide regulatory officials in
administering the statutory provisions and in assisting the regulated to
comply with the law
The ensuing discussion will demonstrate that the I.B.A. is involved in
the promulgation of both legislative and interpretative rules.
	 The
discussion will consider programming first, followed by advertising.
Programming 
The main body of administrative rules issued by the Authority relating
to I.L.R. programming are the Notes of Guidance. 	 In essence they are a
2
'means of explanation of the Broadcasting Act,' but not all in fact derive
from the Act. The stated intention of the Notes of Guidance is, 'not to
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fetter normal editorial discretion, but to give guidance on a basis either
of proven I.L.R. experience or of the requirements of relevant legislation
3
and the contracts.'
	
The Notes of Guidance cover only some of the
programming matters with which the programme companies and the Authority
are concerned. Not all relevant aspects of the Broadcasting Act or of the
companies' contracts dealing with programming matters are referred to.
This is not because the aspects not referred to are unimportant, but only
because the Authority has not seen fit to issue Notes of Guidance in
relation to them. 	 Thus the Notes of Guidance are at best only a partial
guide to the regulation of I.L.R. programming: they provide guidance only
in those areas with which they are concerned.
varies
The nature of the guidance given/from topic to topic.	 Some Notes 
describe specific requirements that have to be met; others point to areas
where careful local judgment is needed, and indicate the general
considerations which should be taken into account. 	 Several of the Notes 
of Guidance emphasise the need for prior consultation with I.B.A. staff.
The range of topics covered in the Notes of Guidance is notably wide
and covers some fields which do not feature in the Broadcasting Act.
Examples of the latter category would include Note 12.1 on 'Obituary
Procedures' and Note 5.2 on 'Election Broadcasting' which outlines the
relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1969.	 Among
the matters covered in the Notes of Guidance which can be related (if
indirectly) to the relevant provisions of the Broadcasting Act are possible
offence to good taste and decency, indirect advertising and sponsorship,
accuracy, privacy, fairness and impartiality, crime, politics, and so on.
The Notes of Guidance include a number of good examples of
interpretative rules. Three examples should suffice to illustrate how the
bare statutory provisions have been amplified by the Authority. Section 4
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(1) (c) of the 1981 Act requires that, 'proper proportions of the recorded
and other matter included in the programmes are of British origin and of
British performance.'	 Such a provision clearly leaves	 considerable
discretion to the I.B.A. in determining what amounts to a proper'
proportion. Some indication of how this discretion will be interpreted in
practice is given in Note  2.3, 'The Use of Non-British Material.'	 This
rule provides (in part) that
The authority does not lay down percentage limits, but expects
that it is individual items of foreign material, such as a
record or interview, that will constitute the main 'non-
British' element in the broadcast output. Contractors must
seek prior approval from the I.B.A. for the use of foreign
material on any significant scale... The I.B.A. is likely to
restrict the number of any lengthy or regular programmes of
exclusively foreign material that an I.L.R. company may wish to
broadcast.
The requirement in section 4(1)(f) of the Broadcasting Act that the
Authority should ensure that, so far as possible, 'due impartiality is
preserved on the part of the persons providing the programmes as respects
matters of political or industrial controversy or relating to current
4
public policy' has already been referred to. 	 Likewise is the requirement
that all news given in the programmes is presented with due accuracy and
impartiality.	 The I.B.A.'s guidance on, 'Fairness Impartiality and
Accuracy is contained in Note 3.1. 	 A number of different possible
'problem' areas are covered by this rule. They are:
(1) Conduct of interviews
(2) Editing of interviews
(3) 'Trial by broadcasting'
(4) Defamation
(5) Reconstruction
(6) Simulated news broadcasts
(7) Right of reply
None of these areas is referred to in the Broadcasting Act, but guidance on
them has proved necessary to the I.B.A.'s ensuring that the requirements of
section 4 are complied with.	 It will always be debatable	 however,
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whether the I.B.A.'s guidance is an accurate interpretation of the
legislation, or goes further than is really necessary. It is an inevitable
feature of an interpretative rule that its legitimacy can be called into
question, given that the legislative provision will only give the most
general of guidance to the regulatory agency. 	 The task facing the
regulators is that of making their guidance to the regulated more
meaningful and effective than that of the legislators.
The final example of an interpretative rule to consider is Note 7.3,
relating to, 'Programmes Funded by Non-Broadcasters'.	 This Note is
concerned with the safeguarding of broadcasters' editorial independence and
with their legal responsibility for the content of programmes. The basic
rule is stated as being: 'In all instances, programmes broadcast by the
I.B.A. or its contractors should not comprise an undue element of
advertisements.'
The statutory basis of Note 7.3 is section 8 of the Broadcasting Act.
Section 8(6) lays down that - with important exceptions - 'nothing shall be
included in any programmes broadcast by the authority, whether in an
advertisement or not, which states, suggests or implies (or could
reasonably be taken to state, suggest or imply) that any part of any
programme broadcast by the Authority which is not an advertisement has been
supplied or suggested by any advertisers: and, except as an advertisement,
nothing shall be included in any programme broadcast by the Authority which
could reasonably be supposed to have included in the programme in return
for payment or other valuable consideration to the relevant programme
contractor or the Authority'.
Exceptions to this 'no-sponsorship' rule are set out in Scetion 8(7).
The exception related to the guidelines is for 'items consisting of factual
portrayals of doings, happenings, places or things, being items which in
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the opinion of the Authority are proper for inclusion by reason of their
intrinsic interest or instructiveness and do not comprise an undue element
of advertisement'. However, as previously noted, Section 4(1) (f) of the
Broadcasting Act demands 'that due impartiality is preserved on the part of
the persons providing the programmes as respects matters of political or
industrial controversy or relating to current public policy'.
Section 8 (7)(c) of the Act emphasises that the types of programmes where
funding by non-broadcasters may be permitted are, 'factual portrayals of
doings, happenings, 	 places or things.'	 The Authority gives the
following interpretation of this provision:
This implies that fictional programmes are unlikely to be acceptable
for funding by non-broadcasters although dramatic reconstructions of
factual events or circumstances may be permissible and every
proposal will be judged on its merits. 'Of intrinsic interest of
instructiveness' suggests that only projects that will enhance the
existing service should be considered. The I.B.A. may wish to limit
the number of such projects undertaken at any one time.
Note 7.3. also contains a number of detailed procedural requirements that
have to be followed by the I.L.R. companies. The Authority retains a 'veto'
over	 the	 type of organisation which will	 be	 permitted	 to	 fund
broadcasts:
The I.B.A. reserves the right to approve the participation of all
suggested non-broadcasters, particularly with regard to the subject
matter of the programme and also to organisations prohibited from
purchasing advertising time. In all instances the I.L.R. companies must
maintain absolute editorial control and independence. When a programme
is funded in whole or in part by a commerical organisation, the editorial
content of the programme must not include any element of advertisment on
behalf of the funder, and must not be directly related to the funder's
commercial activities.
To a large extent, therefore, the rule-making power of the I.B.A.
derives from the necessity to interpret the provisions of the Broadcasting
Act.	 But Parliament has conferred on the I.B.A. a de iure, power to make
legislative rules as well as a de facto power to issue interpretative
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rules. Section 5 of the 1981 Act provides that:
5.	 (1)	 The Authority shall draw up, and from to time review, a code
giving guidance -
(a) as to the rules to be observed in regard to the showing of
violence and in regard to the inclusion in local sound broadcasts of
sounds suggestive of violence, particularly when large numbers of
children and young persons may be expected to be watching or listening
to the programmes, and
(b) as to such other matters concerning standards and practice for
programmes (other than advertisements) broadcast by the Authority as
the Authority may consider suitable for inclusion in the code;
and, in considering what other matters ought to be included in the
code in pursuance of paragraph (b), the Authority shall have special
regard to programmes broadcast when large numbers of children and
young persons may be expected to be watching or listening.
(2) The Authority shall secure that the provisions of the code and
under this section are observed in relation to all programmes (other
than advertisements) broadcast by them.
(3) The Authority may, in the discharge of their general
responsibility for programmes other than advertisements, impose
requirement as to standards and practice for such programmes which go
beyond, or relate to matters not covered by, the provisions of the
code under this section.
(4) The methods of control exercisable by the Authority for the
purpose of securing that the provisions of the code under this section
are observed, and for the purpose of securing compliance with
requirements imposed under subsection (3) which go beyond, or relate
to matters not covered by, the code, shall include a power to give
directions to a programme contractor (or any other person providing
programmes other than advertisements) imposing prohibitions or
restrictions as respects items of a specified class or description or
as respects a particular item.
In practice this power to issue legislative rules has remained largely
dormant.	 The Notes of Guidance (with one exception) do not constitute a
Code drawn up under s.5(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1981. Nor do the Notes 
represent formal requirements under s.5(3) of the Broadcasting Act. 	 The
Authority has, however, drawn up a code of practice on the portrayal of
violence on Independent Television and the I.L.R. companies are required to
comply with its requirements under the terms of their contracts with the
5
Authority.	 This Code is included in the Notes of Guidance. Note 8.1
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contains the following preamble by way of explanation:
In any radio production that includes scenes of violence, the
considerations that need to be borne in mind are similar to those
contained in the I.T.V. Code on Violence... The wording of the Code
is in terms of visual portrayal, but the same principles apply to
sound representation also.
Given that the I.B.A. has found it unnecessary to utilise its full
panoply of legislative rule-making powers, one is drawn to the conclusion
that the combination of the Notes of Guidance and the terms of the contract
have proved effective from the Authority's point of view. The terms of the
contract represent the 'bottom line', whereas the Notes of Guidance are
noticeably more flexible. Indeed, the Notes of Guidance most certainly are
not intended to be the last word on the matters to which they refer.	 And
as will be shown in greater detail later in the next chapter, the Notes of 
Guidance are subject to interpretation in the light of changing
circumstances and on occasion it has proved necessary to provide fresh or
reviewed notes.
Advertising 
A clear example of a body of legislative rules is to be found in the
regulation of advertising by the I.B.A. Section 9 of the Broadcasting Act
1981 makes it the statutory duty of the Authority:
(a) to draw up, and from time to time review, a Code governing
standards and practice in advertising and prescribing the
advertisements and methods of advertising to be prohibited or
prohibited in particular circumstances; and
(b) to secure compliance with the Code.
The rules promulgated by the I.B.A. under the authority of this
statutory provision govern all advertising on both I.T.V. and I.L.R.
It should also be noted that s.9(2) of the Broadcasting Act, like its
predecessors, expressly reserves the right of the Authority to impose
requirements as to advertisements and methods of advertising which go
beyond the requirements imposed by the Code of Advertising Standards and 
Practice.	 The powers of control open to the Authority would include such
measures as the giving of directions as to the exclusion of either classes
and descriptions of advertisements or of individual advertisements - either
in general or in particular circumstances. This power is a considerable
one and has been exercised with restraint by the Authority. On the rare
occasions when the Authority has issued such a direction, it has done so in
close consultation with the I.T.C.A. and A.I.R.C. before doing so.	 An
example of the exercise of this power is the banning of any advertisements
6
designed to encourage children to buy air rifles, even though no rule in
the Code specifically prevents them.
In addition to the Code of Advertising Standards and Practice, the
I.B.A. has issued I.L.R. Advertising Guidelines. There have been prepared
to assist advertisers, their agents and other interested parties in the
interpretation of the Code and of the relevant statutory provisions. 	 The
avowed intent of these interpretative rules is not to be, 	 'fully
comprehensive but [to] deal with some of the more difficult and problem
7
areas'.
The general rules concerning all advertisements are contained in
Schedule 2 of the Broadcasting Act. It is a requirement that advertisements
be clearly distinguishable as such and recognisably separate from the rest
of the programme; be recognisably separate, in the case of successive
advertisements; not be arranged or presented in such a way that any
separate advertisement appears to be part of a continuous feature; not be
excessively nosiy or strident; may only be inserted at the beginning or
ends of programmes or in natural breaks. It is also provided that the
amount of time given to advertising must not be so great as to detract from
the value of the programmes as a medium of education, information and
entertainment.	 Rules are also made as to those broadcasts (particularly
religious services) which may not contain advertisements, and the interval
which must elapse between any such broadcast and any previous or subsequent
period given over to advertisements.
The Schedule further provides that in accepting advertisements there
must be no unreasonable discrimination either against or in favour of any
particular advertiser. No advertisement may be inserted by or on behalf of
any body whose objects are wholly or mainly of a religious or political
nature, and no advertisement is permitted which is directed towards any
religious or political and or has any relation to any industrial dispute.
Even a quick persual of the Code of Advertising Standards and Practice 
will demonstrate that much of Schedule 2 is contained in it.	 This
examination of the Code will also demonstrate that it goes beyond what a
strictly legalistic reading of the Broadcasting Act would require. In fact
8
the Code can accurately be described as, 'a detailed body of standards'.
It runs to thirty seven paragraphs and four appendices.	 Some of the
statutory rules are repeated in the Code (for the convenience of its
users, no doubt), but the Code also legislates for matters not mentioned in
the Act. Such a legislative function is, of course, formally legitimated
by the terms of s.9 of the Broadcasting Act. The function delegated to the
I.B.A. in this area is a clear example of an instruction along with lines
9
of: 'Here is the problem. Deal with it.'
Thus the I.B.A., 'might, perfectly legally, have gone little further
10
than the statutory rules,'	 but it has not, of course, done so. To have
followed such a course of action would have been an abdication of
responsiblity and not in keeping with the regulatory ethos of the I.B.A.
The	 I.B.A's Code of Advertising Standards and Practice is a
comprehensive document. The general rules which it contains range from the
prohbition of 'subliminal' advertising, the exclusion of advertisements of
breath-testing devices, matrimonial agencies, undertakers, betting tipsters
and bookmakers, private investigation agencies, or for cigarettes, through
conditions for the offer of guarantees, mail ordering and the sale of goods
direct to the public to restraints on trade descriptions and claims. The
three main appendices deal in detail with advertising in relation to
children, financial advertising and the advertising of medicines and
treatments.
The I.L.R. companies are obliged by the terms of their contracts with
the Authority to follow the requirements of the Code of Advertising Standards 
and Practice. Schedule 3 of the standard contract requires compliance with
the Code and with the statutory provisions in relation to advertising. The
key provisions of the Broadcasting Act are, in fact, repeated in the
schedule. For example, clause 5 (2) of Schedule 3 repeats the requirements
originally contained in paragraph 8 of Schedule 2 of the Broadcasting Act
that:
No advertisement shall be permitted which is inserted by or on behalf of
anybody whose objects are wholly or mainly of a religious or political
nature, and no advertisement shall be permitted which is directed towards
any religious or political end or has any relation to any industrial
disputes.
This statutory requirement is similarly repeated in paragraphs 9 and 10
of the Code of Advertising Standards and Practice. In the Code there is an
additional sentence (which seems to add nothing of substance to the statutory
requirement) to the effect that advertisements should not, 'show partiality
as respects matters of political or industrial controversy or relating to
current public policy'.
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appears to have been to avoid television advertising being used to
influence public opinion about matters of controversy. An examination of
the way that the I.B.A. has gone about implementing this legislation
requirement supplies a good example of the interpretative and policy making
functions of the authority.
It appears that in 1957 the Authority sought counsel's opinion on the
interpretation of the statutory provision. The Authority was advised
that:
[F]or the purpose of paragraph 8 of the Second Schedule a 'political' end
would mean the purpose of affecting in some respect (whether by altering
it or maintaining it) the manner in which a community is governed or
organised, or in which the power of government (central or local) is
exercised, and would include any purpose which would lead to a result
which affected members of the community as members of that community in
general or members of a class within the community. Advertisements which
would have this purpose or effect are, therefore, prohibited by paragraph
8, including advertisements which would have the effect or would have the
purpose of affecting opinion on such matters mentioned above and
advertisements which attempted to influence Government policy whether or
not they reflected the views of any political party.
This: intpretation has been affirmed over the years. In relation to
political advertising, the I.B.A.'s current attitude is that:12
The legislation does not prevent central Govenment or local authorities
from placing particular advertisements in the capacity of an executive
carrying out the law (e.g. the availability of supplementary and child
benefits, advice about road saftey, fire prevention, family planning
services, cheap fares, travel cards etc.), but in considering advertising
proposals Advertising Control staff must ensure that the advertisements
themselves contain no reference to the merits of (central or local)
Government policies on the matters to which they relate.
It has already been mentioned that in addition to the Code of 
Advertising Standards and Practice, Advertising Guidelines which interpret
the Code have been produced. Not surprisingly, these have a considerable
amount to say on paragraph 9 of the Code on political, industrial and
public controversy. Paragraph 9 is interpreted as 'expressly' prohibiting
four types of advertisement:13
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(a) an advertisement of any kind - even an advertisement for office
staff 7 by or on behalf of any political party or body whose objects
are wholly or mainly of a political nature;
(b) an advertisement from any source which is directed towards any
political end, local or national;
(c) an advertisement which has any relation to any industrial dispute;
(d) an advertisement from any source which is not impartial about
matters of political or industrial controversy or current public
policy, local or national.
Further guidance is given on types (c) and (d). All kinds of industrial
disputes (official or unofficial) are covered by (c). The only exception
14
permitted is, 'where the safety of the public is concerned':
For example, during a dispute where gas supplies are affected,
announcements can be accepted which merely inform radio listeners of
the safety precautions they should take in the event of gas pressure
variations in their areas. Such exceptions need to be worded with the
greatest care in order to avoid giving the impression that a point of
view is being expressed on the industrial issue involved.
Prohibition (d) is interpreted as requiring that, 'there may not be
broadcast in an advertisement any words or phrases which could themselves
create or reinforce public opinion on controversial political, industrial
15
or public policy questions.
Thus the I.B.A.'s interpretation of paragraph 9 of the Code of 
Advertising Standards and Practice is made fairly clear in the Advertising 
Guidelines.	 The Authority's interpretation is not the only one possible,
of course, and views as to what amounts to 'controversial' issue of
politics and public policy will differ. For example, some listeners (and
viewers) would place advertisements connected with the privatisation of
state owned industries in this category. The I.B.A.'s interpretation is
that once a 'controversial' issue has been made the subject of legislation,
16
it ceases to be covered by paragraph 9
	 In legal terms, this is a
perfectly 'reasonable' view to take, but critics of the Authority will
certainly not accept the substantive legitimacy of such an interpretation.
Conclusion 
The regulation of I.L.R. programming and advertising provide two classic
examples of the employment of 'quasi-law' by a regulatory agency. The rules
used by the I.B.A. constitute a heady mixture of statutory provisions, codes
of practice, contractual clauses and interpretative guidelines. As has been
demonstrated, the same rule can derive from all or any of these four sources.
It is hardly surprising that, in practice, both the officers of the I.B.A.
and the management of I.L.R. stations demonstrate a certain amount of
confusion about the precise status of particular rules. Two partially
accurate observations by I.B.A. Officers should suffice to illustrate the
point:
(1) 'It is written in to the contract with the company that it must abide by
the requirements of the Broadcasting Act and the I.B.A. Notes of Guidance'.
(2) 'If they breach the [Notes of Guidance] then in essence they are breaking
a section of the Act'.
It has been shown that the Notes of Guidance cohtain statutory
provisions, legislative rules (the Code on Violence), interpretative rules
and some matters completely outside the terms of the Broadcasting Act, or of
any other legislation (for example, the rules on obituaries). Such a confused
and confusing mass of rules may lead one to the view that any attempt at
distinguishing between legislative and interpretative rules is doomed to
failure in relation to a study of the I.B.A. On the other hand, it can be
argued with some force that it is precisely in a context such as that of the
regulation of I.L.R. that the distinction should be drawn. There is a need to
identify those rules which it is 'obligatory' for the regulated to follow in
the sense that they do derive directly from the provisions of the
Broadcasting Act. In fact, very few of the rules
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employed are legislative rather than interpretative and interpretations are
often open to question. In other words, the rules employed by the I.B.A.
must derive their legitimacy from something other than a legislative basis.
To a large extent one is thrown back yet again on the expertise of the
I.B.A.	 They are the specialist regulatory body, so their interpretative
rules necessarily carry a lot of weight. The Authority also has the
ultimate sanction if a contractor fails to comply with its requirements:
non-renewal of the franchise.
	 And as will be discussed in the next
chapter, the rules also acquire much legitimacy from the fact that they
derive typically from an extensive consultation process with those affected
by them: the I.L.R. companies.
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CHAPTER TEN - THE INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES OF LAW-ELABORATION 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined in detail the ways in which the I.B.A.
articulates its policies in the form of rules. The aim of this chapter is to
describe the institutions and procedures utilised by the Authority when
performing this function of law-elaboration. An attempt will also be made to
analyse the factors which influence the Authority in its policy decisions.
That is, what forces lead the I.B.A. to adopt either 'stringent' or
'accommodative' policies in relation to I.L.R.?
As has already been mentioned, Kagan identifies four factors on which
explanations of regulatory policy typically focus. These are:
(1) the ideology or philosophy of the regulators;
(2) the legislative mandate of the regulatory programme;
(3) the social and political organisation of the regulatory process;
(4) the economic effects of the regulatory programme.
These policy influences will be examined in greater detail in relation
to I.L.R. once the policy-making procedures of the Authority have been
described. It will suffice for the present to state the obvious: that the
four explanatory factors outlined above are not mutually exclusive, but
neither are they necessarily of equal importance in a given policy area.
Rather, as Kagan has it: 'Each directs our attention to variables that
undoubtedly influence an agency's relative stress on stringency or
accommodation...'
Institutions and Procedures 
The ensuing discussion will focus once again on the areas of
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programming and advertising.
(1) Programming 
The first thing to say about the I.B.A.'s policies in relation to
I.L.R. programming is that they are the outcome of discussions, both formal
and informal, with the I.L.R. companies. The authority consults with the
industry on a regular basis. The main institutional forum for consultation
is the Radio Consultative Committee (R.C.C.), chaired by the Director
General of the Authority, which meets four times a year. Meetings of the
R.C.C. are attended by senior I.B.A. staff and by the Managing Directors of
the I.L.R. companies.
The R.C.C. has an impact on the articulation of programming policies
into the form of Notes of Guidance. 	 A sub-committee of the R.C.C.
discusses and comments upon Notes of Guidance before their issue. As one
senior I.B.A. Officer remarked: 'Policy issues are thrashed out with them
4
there'.	 It appears that the Members of the Authority have little input
into the making of programming policy. Normally, 'they would not be
5
troubled with'	 the minutiae of I.L.R. regulation, given their wide
responsibilities.
It would also be fair to point out that after fifteen years the
parameters of I.B.A. policy in relation to I.L.R. programming are fairly
well defined.	 It is unlikely that the Authority could be persuaded to
issue a Note of Guidance which represented a radical change of policy.
There have, of course, been changes of 'interpretation' by the Authority,
but these have not been a reflection of changes in the underlying
regulatory philosophy.
The main changes of interpretation in recent years as indicated in
the Notes of Guidance are in the area of 'Indirect Advertising' (Note 7.1),
'Competitions and Prizes' (Note 7.2) and 'Programmes Funded by Non-
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Broadcasters' (Note 7.3).
	
These policy changes have been held to be
necessary by the I.B.A. to alleviate the financial hardships faced by the
I.L.R. companies.
	 The new Note on Indirect Advertising issued in November
1984 illustrates how a subtle change in wording can reflect a new
interpretation of the Broadcasting Act and a significant policy change.
Section 8(6) of the Act requires the exclusion from I.L.R. programmes of
anything which:
(a) could reasonably be taken to state, suggest or imply that any
part of any programme has been supplied or suggested by any
advertiser; or
(b) could reasonably be supposed to have been included in return for
payment or other valuable consideration to the contractor.
Under the heading, 'Independently produced programmes funded by non-
broadcasters,' Note 7.1 gives the following 'guidance':
There is an increasing range of material, some of it attractive and
intrinsically worthwhile, where the production is financed or
underwritten by commercial concerns and the programmes are compiled
and offered to I.L.R. In this event there is no payment or valuable
consideration to the programme company. They are only acceptable,
however, provided that:
(a) they do not contain an undue element of advertising;
(b) their broadcast could not reasonably be supposed to give rise
to 'impressions of sponsorship';
(c) no advertising connected with the programme is currently being
broadcast on the station.
What is revealing of a policy change is the fact that the previous
version of Note 7.1 (dated April 1980) includes an additional sentence to
the effect that: "Sponsored programmes" in the normal sense of the term
are not allowed on Independent Broadcasting'. The previous heading for
this section was, 'Sponsored programmes'. There was also an additional
requirement that 'sponsored programmes' were only permissible if, 'they are
purchased by the programme company at a rate commensurate with normal
programming costs'.
It would seem that this change in wording has considerable financial
implications and the new, generous interpretation of s.8(6) has been well
received by the I.L.R. companies. It is worth pointing out, however, that
this change in policy was not made in a public forum and the I.B.A. was not
accountable in any meaningful sense for this exercise of its expertise and
judgement.	 In particular, there was no opportunity for participation by
the listening public. Rather, the view taken by the Authority was that,
6
'it had to get detailed guidance agreed with the companies.'
(2) Advertising 
The main institutional forum for the making of advertising policy is
the Advertising Advisory Committee (A.A.C.) Under section 16 (2) (b) of
the Broadcasting Act 1981 the Authority is required to appoint:
[A] committee so constituted to be representative of both -
(i) organisations, authorities and persons concerned with standards
of conduct in the advertising of goods and services (including in
particular the advertising of goods or services for meidcal or
surgical purposes), and
(ii) the public as consumers, to give advice to the Authority with a
view to the exclusion of misleading advertising...and otherwise as to
the principles to be followed in connection with the advertisements...
Section 16 (3) provides that:
The functions of the committee...shall include the duty of keeping
under review the [Code of Advertising Standards and Practice]... and
submitting to the Authority recommendations as to any alterations
which appear to them to be desirable.
The Broadcasting Act requires that the Chairman of the A.A.C. be
7
independent of any financial or business interests in advertising. 	 On the
A.A.C. there are, therefore, representatives of consumers, the advertising
industry and the medical profession. Recommendations from the Committee
are usually accepted by the Authority, although there is no statutory
directions to
advertisements
the programme contractors, 'with
10
are to be allowed'	 and it also
respect to the times that
says that the Authority may
obligation to do so.
An additional factor in the policy-making process is that Government
has imposed on the Authority in section 8 (5) a duty to:
(a) ...consult...with the Secretary of State as to the classes and
descriptions of advertisements which must not be broadcast and the
methods of advertising which must not be employed; and
(b) ...carry out any directions which he may give them in those
respects.
This means, in practice, that the Authority is normally required to
obtain approval from the Home Secretary for any significant change to the
Code of Advertising Standards and Practice. The reserve power to direct
the Authority has been utilised on two occasions only since the inception
of Independenting Broadcasting services in 1955. The first occasion was to
ban so-called 'advertising magazines' in 1964 and the second to prohibit
8
the advertising of cigarettes and cigarette tobaccos in 1965.
There are also some areas of advertising policy which are outside the
jurisdiction of the A.A.C.	 Perhaps the most notable relates to the
control of the amount of advertising. The Broadcasting Act does not lay
down precisely the amount of advertising that may be allowed. 	 It simply
places on the Authority a duty to ensure that, 'the amount of time given to
advertising in the programme shall not be so great as to detract from the
value of the programmes as a medium of information, education and
9
entertainment.'	 The Act confers upon the Authority a power to give
stipulate the maximum time for advertising in any hour, and the minimum
11
interval between advertisements.
In fact, since the beginning of I.L.R., the Authority's policy has
been to allow a maximum of nine minutes of advertisements in any one clock-
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hour.	 This rule provides a clear example of legislative policy-making by
the I.B.A. The relevant statutory provisions are permissive rather than
mandatory.	 The actual ground rules have been formulated by the Authority
in line with its own judgment of what is acceptable and appropriate.
12
Explaining I.B.A. Policies 
There can be little doubt that the parent statute of a regulatory
13
agency is, 'a primary determinant' of its 'policy-making style'. 	 But as
has been shown, the precise relationship between the provisions of the
Broadcasting Act and the policies pursued by the I.B.A. is a problematic
one.	 If the policies implemented by the Authority are viewed as overly
accommodative to the interests of the I.L.R. companies, the explanation
could lie in the ambiguity and vagueness of the Broadcasting Act,
which in turn could reflect a lack of resolution on the part of Parliament
about the goals of the regulatory programme. Conversely, if the I.B.A.'s
policies are viewed as too stringent in a particular area of regulation,
this could be explained as the result of a too specific or too stringent
provision in the Broadcasting Act.
Accomodative policies could also be the result of the nature of the
relationship between the regulators and the regulated. In practice, the
I.B.A. frequently appears to act as a shield for the I.L.R. companies,
deflecting rather than responding to public criticism. In particular, the
Authority has treated the 'failure' of I.L.R. stations as something to be
14
avoided at almost any cost. 	 This can be seen as partly due to the
Authority's perception of the interests of the consumer in having a local
radio station, but it has to be pointed out that the I.B.A. relies on
revenues from the stations to fund the system and any further expansion of
it, and to pay for its own administrative costs. The following comment of
Kagan is clearly appropriate to the I.B.A.:
	 'Accommodative regulatory
policies are often explained by reference to regulatory officials' personal
concern for the stability and growth of the regulated industry or of
15
particular firms in it.'
	 Such a perspective is apparent in the following
comment by a senior I.B.A. official: 'If you're wondering whether a station
is going to close down next week because it can't pay its bills then you're
16
inclined not to be making too many programme judgments'.
One is again drawn back to the weaknesses of the Broadcasting Act
which allows the Authority large discretionary powers (leaving the drawing
of the boundaries of appropriate behaviour to subsequent negotiations),
imposes too few concrete obligations and does not provide sufficiently for
the accountability of the Authority's policies.
	 These weaknesses are
reflected in the closed and hierarchial way in which the I.B.A. conducts
its affairs and its unwillingness to distance itself from the companies it
regulates.
A common theme among writers on regulation is that of the 'capture'
of the regulators by those whom they are supposed to be regulating.
Following Quirk, Baldwin lists three criteria for establishing the degree
17
of capture of a regulatory agency:
(1) Agency decisions are based on information supplied by the
industry and only industrial interests are represented at formal
proceedings.
(2) Individuals appointed to high regulatory office identify industry
interests with a view to past or future employment.
(3) Industry control over agencies' policies is exerted by threat.
Even the sternest critic of the I.B.A. would, however, be hard-
pressed to argue that these three criteria apply in more than a highly
limited way to the Authority. Criterion (1) is true of some of the areas
of policy-making described in this chapter. Criterion (2) is largely
unquantifiable, but it is not a criticism that has often been made of the
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Authority.	 Rather, a criticism which is sometimes voiced is that too few 
of the I.B.A.'s Officers have direct experience of broadcasting. 	 Nothing
quite so crude as criterion (3) applies in the regulation of I.L.R. A more
accurate description would be along the lines that, 'agency policy is
molded by the interactions between the agency and relevant interest
18
group... 	 What one cannot fail to notice is, however, the tremendous
community of interest that exists between the I.B.A. and the I.L.R.
companies. It has not been a case of a regulatory agency being captured by
a pre-existing industry it was established to regulate. 	 The I.B.A. is
responsible for the very existence of I.L.R. and the interests of the two
must often be indistinguishable.
Given this state of affairs, it is not very surprising that the
policy and rule-making procedures of the Authority appear to conflict with
values such as clarity, openness, formality and predictability. Much of
the regulation of I.L.R. is done on a relatively informal and discretionary
basis.	 The rules and guidelines are applied with a great deal of
flexibility.	 It is not necessarily the case that this is either
undesirable or against the public interest. The intention may be to
establish a protected framework for the pursuit of profit, but at least the
I.L.R. companies are restrained from the excesses of commercialism and,
more ddImmbly	 a reasonably high standard of programming is maintained.
In recent years, however, the commercial imperative has become more
influential in Authority policy-making. The financial problems confronting
I.L.R. have been discussed in Part Two.	 As a consequence of these
pressures, more consideration has been given by the Authority to the costs
imposed on I.L.R. companies by regulation and the effect upon their
competitive position.	 Programming policies have certainly moved in an
accommodative direction as part of the attempt . to increase industry
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profitability. The authority has been forced to change its interpretation
of the Broadcasting Act by economic circumstances. These changes can be
19
described as, 'by force majeure... reactive all the time' 	 Experiences in
the regulation of I.L.R. would thus seem to lend some support to Kagan's
20
thesis that:
[T]he outer limits of regulatory stringency are likely to be set out
by the economic impact of stringent regulations, and hence at bottom,
by the primacy of values of economic continuity. If there is no
'slack' in the regulated firms with which to absorb the costs of
compliance with stringent regulations, significant accommodative
modifications are likely regardless of the ideology of the regulators,
their legal mandate, or the social organization of the regulatory
process.
Conclusion 
The legitimacy of the of policy-making procedures detailed above can
only be derived in part from the terms of the Broadcasting Act. 	 Part of
their legitimacy derives once more from the expertise of the Authority.
There is also some emphasis on 'due process', in the form of extensive
consultation with the regulated I.L.R. companies. The authority is largely
unaccountable for the policy decisions it makes and there is precious
little opportunity for public participation in the formulation of the
Authority's statements of objectives.
Although there are certainly dangers in the relationship between the
I.B.A. and the I.L.R. companies becoming too close, there are a nunber of
advantages which flow from the participation of the I.L.R. companies in the
21
law-elaboration process.	 First, the Authority derives much needed
information from the regulated companies. It does not possess all the
relevant information and cannot anticipate the consequences and problems
that will flow from the adoption of a new rule. This sort of information
can only be derived from those working in the industry. It is also more
likely that the I.L.R. companies will abide by the terms of a rule if they
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have been allowed to participate in its formulation.	 Participation in
rule-making also has values which transcend these pragmatic ones.
	 In a
democratic system of government, participation in governmental decision-
22
making by affected persons represents an important value in itself. 	 This
is particularly true in the case of independent regulatory agencies, which
are not as immediately responsive to political pressures as Parliament or
the Government. As has been seen in the case of the I.B.A., most agency
23
policy and rule-making is not supervised at all. 	 Regulatory agencies
make laws behind closed doors. Participation by those who will be affected
by an agency policy can help to increase the responsiveness of the agency
to democratic pressures. 	 Finally, it should not be thought that
participation in the formulation of interpretative rules is any less
necessary than in legislative rule-making. A regulatory agency is as much
in need of information when it interprets a statutory provision or a
regulation, or when it articulates guidelines for the exercise of its
discretion, as when it issues a legislative rule. It has been seen in the
case of the I.B.A. that the impact of an interpretative rule can be as
great as that of a legislative rule. Participation in the making of either
type produces better rules and enhances the acceptability of the rules to
the regulated.
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PART FIVE - CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER ELEVEN - EVALUATING REGULATORY LEGITIMACY 
Introduction 
The range of administrative powers exercised by a regulatory agency such
as the I.B.A. are of great variety. What have been in question in this study
are powers of policy formulation by means of administrative rule-making,
powers of law-elaboration by way of general statutory interpretation and
powers of law-application by way of adjudication in particular cases. The
basic theoretical premise has been that an understanding of the nature of
legitimacy is critical to an adequate normative analysis of policy
formulation.'
In particular, there has been an attempt to address, in relation to the
I.B.A., Freedman's general question about regulatory agencies: 'What
justifies the exercise of such extensive lawmaking powers by groups that lack
the political accountability of the legislation?' 2 In similar vein, Stewart
has written that: 'The ultimate problem is to control and validate the
exercise of essentially legislative powers by administrative agencies that do
not enjoy the formal legitimation of one-person one-vote election.'3
Two potential-critiques of the I.B.A.'s regulatory procedures have been
indentified. 4 First, they are closed and undemocratic, which implies the need
to expand public access and participation. The idea that, as a sub-unit of a
democratic government, the Authority itself should be democratic is an
attractive one. The philosophy of public accountability underlying the
current system is that it is the Members of the Authority who provide, 'the
means by which Independent Broadcasting is responsible to the public'. 5 The
corollary of this principle is that, as far as the
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I.B.A. itself is concerned, there is no place for, 'public accountability,
with the implication that accountability to the public can be exercised
6
somehow more directly that by accounting to [Parliament]'.
The second critique of the I.B.A. is technocratic rather than
democratic and represents a more accurate representation of much current
thought about regulatory agencies.
	 According to this perspective,
regulatory agencies are not democratic institutions and their inherent
nature as unelected bureaucracies precludes their acting like mini-
legislatures.	 That is, the I.B.A. can and should take account of public
sentiment, but it must do so with the awareness that' its legitimacy is
based on the exercise of expertise within the bounds set by, and under the
7
control of, the truly democratic institutions of society.
Deconstructing and Reconstructing Regulatory Legitimacy
The concept of legitimacy has been invoked in a number of studies of
regulatory agencies. 	 A common theme in this literature is that a
regulatory agency functions most effectively when its actions are perceived
to be legitimate and entitled to compliance. This legitimacy is perceived
to be derived from the agency's effectiveness in fulfilling its statutory
8
mandate.
Legitimacy does, however, possess connotations which go beyond
considerations of 'effectiveness'. Selznick has described how the idea of
legitimacy in our legal culture has increasingly come to require not merely
9
formal legal justification but, 'legitimacy in depth'. 	 That is, rather
than a decision of the I.B.A. being in accordance with a valid rule,
promulgated by lawfully appointed officials, the contention would be that
the decision, or at least the rule itself, must be substantively justified.
In the assessment of the legitimacy of the. regulation of I.L.R.
177
presented here, use has been made of four 'models'. It should not be
thought that these models, 'are being presented as determinative of
10
legitimacy'. ' Rather, they are indicative of the considerations which an
enquiry into regulatory legitimacy must take into account and of the values
which should be reflected in the regulatory process. 	 It is not the
intention to be able to give a conclusive answer as to the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the regulation of I.L.R. by the I.B.A.
The evidence presented thus far has indicated the problems inherent
in any claim to legitimacy by the I.B.A. on the basis of its legislative
mandate, its accountability, its respect for due process or its expertise.
It is perhaps not too surprising, therefore, that the regulation of I.L.R.
has been running into difficulty. In other words, the legitimacy of the
regulation can certainly be questioned.
Before making a number of concluding comments about each of the four
models of regulatory legitimacy in turn, it is necessary to enter a final
caveat.	 There is considerable attraction in the thought that the four
models could be combined, 'to cure the defects of each one considered
11
separately'.	 Indeed, it is not uncommon for the models to be merged
together.	 Thus an administrative lawyer might say that, 	 a regulatory
agency can, pursuant to its delegated power, exercise its own expert
discretion as long as anyone affected by its action can, when appropriate,
intervene in its decision making and subject the decision, once made, to
12
judicial review'.	 Elements of each of the four models can be detected in
this statement. The weakness of combining the models in this way is that
to do so, 'only shifts the problem ... away from any particular model and
13
locates it instead in the boundaries between different models'. 	 It is,
therefore, more useful to examine each of the criteria of regulatory
legitimacy individually, although it is important to be aware of possible
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interrelationships between them.
(1) Legislative Mandate. The key question here relates to how complex or
detailed a skeleton can be described in advance by Parliament when creating
a regulatory agency such as the I.B.A. How narrow can the 'gaps' properly be
made? Even in the most comprehensive legislative scheme, agency application
inevitably makes new law. As Diver has pointed out: 'Experience has taught
that the statutory command is an exceedingly blunt instrument for regulating
the policymaking process'. 14
 Moreover, rarely will the legislature have in
mind the specific situation confronted by the regulators. It is more likely
that the legislators envisaged some much more general conditions or ideas.15
In other words, it would be unrealistic to expect that Parliament, when
passing the 1981 Broadcasting Act and its predecessors, would have framed its
decisions in such specific terms that their implementation would not entail
the exercise of broad policy-making powers by the Authority. Kagan makes the
general point that:16
[A]uthorizing statutes are often devoid of explicit rules or guides to
decision of the hard issues. They merely transfer the problem of choice,
and hence of contending with conflicting political interests, to the
regulatory body.
The evidence presented in earlier chapters would support this contention.
Parliament has legislated for Independent Broadcasting in broad terms and it
has relied upon the Authority to fill in the necessary details. The enabling
legislation confers considerable administrative powers upon the Authority.
These include the power to make policy and to articulate that policy in the
form of legislative and interpretative rules. Some of this power is intended,
but some appears to have been granted inadvertently by Parliament leaving
questions for the Authority to answer.
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A further criticism of this method of legislating is that the
legislature's failure to make its preferences clear results in the failure
of the regulatory agency to develop coherent policy. Law will be replaced
17
by ad hoc bargaining and regulators will lose their legitimacy.
	 These
views are particularly associated with Lowi in The End of Liberalism. Lowi
argues that more use of legislatively specified rules would produce
regulation whose legitimacy was more widely recognised by the public.
	 An
echo of Lowi's perspective can be found in Ely's Democracy and Distrust.
Ely argues that the failure of, 'legislators to legislate [i.e. to decide
policy questions]' is one of the major obstacles to a truly representative
18
democracy.
There can be no guarantee, however, that a more authoritative use of
law would produce better regulatory policy. Nor is it clear how a
regulatory regime reconstructed along these lines would operate in
practice.	 Some generality and vagueness in a statutory mandate seem
inevitable. Legislators tend to be pragmatists rather than idealists.
The main difficulty confronting the I.B.A. in the implementation of
its legislative mandate is that of determining the statutory 'intent'.
This	 concept of	 'legislative intent'
	 masks profound conceptual
19
difficulties.	 It is nearly always artificial to attribute a single goal
to a group legislators who cast votes with divergent objectives and degrees
of awareness. Some of the divergence of opinion surrounding the terms of
the Broadcasting Act and its predecessors has been illustrated in earlier
chapters. Thus the legislative mandate of the I.B.A. probably masks rather
than resolves conflicts both among and within individual legislators.
Indeed, it is unlikely that the legislators had made up their minds at all,
either individually or collectively, on any details of the Authority's
20
exercise of power.
	 This lack of clear statutory authority deeply
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compromises the Authority's legitimacy and efficacy.
It could be argued that the analysis of legislative mandates adopted
here is too simplistic. For, as Mashaw points out: 'In theory, at least,
legitimacy may flow from general statutory principles as well as from
21
precise statutory rules.' 	 From a purely legalistic perspective, this
statement is unexceptionable. 	 If the concern is with substantive
legitimacy, however, the evidence derived from a study of the I.B.A. would
not seem to offer support to Mashaw.
2.	 Accountability The potential value of a broad statutory mandate as a
source of legitimacy might be enhanced if it could be demonstrated that the
regulatory agency was accountable for its exercise.
	 Of particular
22
significance in this context is accountability to Parliament.
Once a regulatory programme has been approved and established by
Parliament and implemented by the agency, the application of the statutory
provisions should be controlled in order to ensure that it remains
appropriate and effective. Parliament should retain an effective review
function concerning agency law and activities. To this end, Parliament
should be kept informed of any subsequent developments of policy by the
agency.
It should be apparent that the regulation of I.L.R. is a long way
removed from this ideal. It has been seen in relation to the award of
I.L.R. programme contracts how little accountability to Parliament is
23
present.	 In relation to the supervision of I.L.R. programming, one would
24
have to question the pre-eminence of the Broadcasting Act.
The main form of communication between the I.B.A. and Parliament is
25
the Annual Report.	 These tend to be 'what' rather than 'why' reports.
They convey far too little detailed information to be an effective means of
keeping the Authority accountable to Parliament. For the Annual Report to
become an effective instrument of Parliamentary accountability it would
need to be reconstructed along very different lines to those which exist at
present.	 Some idea of what would be required has been provided by
26
Slatter:
The ... report should do several things. It should first of all
identify the mandate of the agency, and set out any objectives
specified for the agency in the statute. It should then contain a
discussion by the ... agency on how they interpret those objectives,
especially where they are stated in vague or contradictory terms.
This exposition should reveal the philosophy the agency brings to its
task... Also included should be a summary of the major policy-making,
rule-making and decision-making activities of the year.. .The basis on
which any discretionary powers are exercised should also be outlined.
The I.B.A. is largely independent of Parliamentary supervision and
control in its day-to-day business.
	 There are only limited opportunities
for Members of Parliament to voice their opinions of the Authority. Out of
a concern to protect the political independence of the Authority there has
arisen a tradition of not discussing its current management.
	 Furthermore,
since the I.B.A. normally acts free from Government direction or control,
Ministers are not obliged to defend or discuss the actions of the Authority
in Parliament.
One possible key to strengthening accountability to Parliament lies
in the role of the Select Committee system. The supervising role of these
committees has, however, tended to be sporadic and largely ineffective in
relation to Independent Broadcasting. The frequently shifting membership
of Parliamentary committees together with a lack of adequate staffing have
served to undermine their potential effectiveness as regulatory
scrutineers.
In addition, a number of governmental committees have been
instituted. These have played a similarly limited role in the development
27
of Independent Broadcasting. As Heller has pointed out:
The[ir] record...does not indicate that they have been particularly
effective.. .Few of their recommendations have been adopted and the
major changes [including the introduction of I.L.R.]...have been
made independently, without reference to committee investigations.
Political control over Independent Broadcasting is thus largely
confined to determining the overall structure of the system, rather than
the continuing policies and procedures of the Authority.	 This lack of
political control over the I.B.A. depends to a large extent on prevalent
attitudes regarding the Authority's place in the machinery of government
and the degree of independence it should have. 	 The Authority can be
conceived as operating under an original mandate given by statute, whose
policy decisions are limited only by its own expert norms or by the threat
of judicial review.
The spectre of judicial review immediately raises that perennial
question of administrative lawyers as to, 'whether administrative agencies
or courts should exercise greater authority over statutory interpretation. ,28
As Diver further points out, 	 'most statutes are.. .delegations to
administrative agencies to issue and enforce [commands]'. m The task is to
achieve, 'an appropriate allocation of interpretive authority between
agencies and courts'." This task of drawing an appropriate line between the
role of the agency and the role of the courts is not one that can be achieved
by using a ruler.m
The issue can be seen as one of institutional competence. The courts will
usually recognise the practical significance of the regulatory agency's
primary responsibility and will hesitate, when controversies come before
them, to overturn any well-considered decision which the agency has reached.
It	 is	 unrealistic	 to	 expect	 the	 courts	 to	 redress	 every
administrative failure."
The difficulty lies in achieving a proper balance between 'too
little' and 'too much' judicial review. As Frug points out:"
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Too little judicial intervention would render the bureaucracy
uncontrolled and allow it to exercise arbitrary power. But too much
intervention would prevent the bureaucracy from adequately performing
its functions...The boundary between courts and bureaucracy must
therefore enable the judiciary to deter bureaucratic abuse while
permitting the bureaucracy to exercise necessary freedom of action.
In relation to the I.B.A., it can safely be stated that there has
been too little judicial intervention. This has had serious implications
for the accountability of the Authority. It also goes some way to
explaining the somewhat cavalier attitude to due process values displayed
by the Authority. The main obstruction to judicial intervention has been
the fact that the source of many of the powers is contractual rather than
34
statutory and therefore substantially outside the public law domain.
Even when judicial review has been possible, the courts have tended to
display a	 somawhat
	
deferential attitude to the expertise of the
35
Authority.
The argument here is far from being that judicial review is a panacea
36
for all administrative ills. According to Landis:
The positive reason for declining judicial review over administrative
findings of fact is the belief that the expertness of the
administrative, if guarded by adequate procedures, can be trusted to
determine these issues as capably as judges. If so, it is only delay
that results from insistence upon independent judicial examination of
the administrative's conclusion.
Nevertheless, Landis is quite well aware of the variable quality of
37
decision-making in different regulatory agencies:
If the extent of judicial review is being shaped...by reference to an
appreciation of the quality of expertness for decision that the
administrative may possess, important consequences follow. The
constitution of the administrative and the procedure employed by it
become of great importance...Different agencies receive different
treatment from the courts.
If this analysis is correct, the I.B.A. must display a quite exceptional
'quality of expertness.'
Certainly a regulatory agency will possess greater expertise in
policy-making than a court. This will be one reason why the legislature
assigned the task to the agency in the first place.	 Courts should be
meticulous in avoiding circumvention of this choice. If a broad policy
perspective is desirable, the dominant role should be played by the agency
rather than the court. It can be argued that an, 'agency's policymaking is
superior to the court's both in obtaining information and making judgments
38	 39
based on that information.'	 Furthermore, as Koch points out:
Because any policymaking involves substantial uncertainty, it is
important that courts do not inadvertently assume authority they are
neither intended to have nor capable of exercising. In the context of
policymaking, courts should not evaluate the decision too critically
lest judicial policymaking judgment replace administrative
policymaking.
Despite such misgivings, judicial review is essential to regulatory
legitimacy. It is essential for the very simple reason that self-policing
is no more credible when practised by regulatory officials than when it is
40
practised by anyone else in society. 	 It is the function of the courts to
serve, in Jaffe's terms, as, 'a constant reminder to the administration and
41
a constant source of assurance and security to the citizen'.
3.	 Due Process The administrative lawyer's answer to most regulatory
problems tends to be, 'more respect for due process' or 'better procedure'.
Some of these proceduralists place their faith in formalising the informal
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rule-making process.	 While it cannot be denied that this might represent
an improvement and make at least some difference, it is difficult to
believe that changes in agency procedure alone could bring about any major
change in government regulation. A more realistic view is that the cause
of regulatory failure lies in a lack of adequate control and supervision of
the relevant agency.
Nevertheless, there is a degree of validity in the argument that, 'if
a policy is to be credible, it must be the product of a credible
process."3
	One significant aspect of this credibility test is the extent
to which those affected by a policy decision are consulted before it is made.
As Stewart notes: 'Agency decisions made after consideration of all affected
interests would have, in microcosm, legitimacy based on the same principles
as legislation and therefore the fact that statutes cannot control
agency discretion would become largely irrelevant.'"
Where such a pluralist theory of legitimacy falls down in practice,
however, is the fact that regulatory agencies, such as the I.B.A., tend
only to take account of the interests of the regulated and not of
unorganised groups. 45 Certainly the I.L.R. companies are closely involved in
the formulation of I.B.A. policy, but scant attention is paid to other
viewwpoints. 46
 If the I.B.A. wished to claim legitimacy for its regulatory
decisions on the basis of well-designed procedures, it would have to go much
further to ensure the representation of conflicting opinions and the
examination of a wide range of alternatives. Some indication of the possible
form of these reconstructed procedures has already been given in the account
of the franchising process in Chapter Five.
In general terms, it is desirable that the policies and procedures of any
regulatory agency should be readily accessible to both the regulated and to
members of the general public. This is a straightforward question of fairness
and accountability. The general public should be enabled to assert their
democratic right to assess the performance of the agency and cause their
representatives to make any necessary amendments to the agency's legislative
mandate.
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4.	 Expertise	 The ideal underlying the expertise model of regulatory
legitimacy is government by expert judgment rather than formal law.	 The
regulator should engage in what Weber described as 'substantively rational'
48
decision-making.	 That is, decision-making which is oriented to the
individual requirements of each case, unrestrained by formal Or legal
49
procedures. Kagan describes the expertise model as follows:
Because the appropriate balance between stringency and accommodation
is dependent upon the facts of specific cases, regulatory decisions
should not be prescribed in advance either by legislation or fixed
legal rules. Regulatory officials must be free to formulate policies
in response to the problems at hand, adapting decisions to varied and
changing situations on the basis of their accumulating knowledge,
making intuitive judgments as to what result will maximise the public
interest.
From this perspective, regulatory agencies commend themselves because
they offer, 'the possibility of achieving expertise in the treatment of
special problems, relative freedom from the exigencies of party politics in
50
their consideration, and expeditiousness in their disposition.' 	 As
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Landis further notes:
The demand for expertise, for a continuity of concern, naturally leads
to the creation of authorities limited in their sphere of action to
the new tasks that government may conclude to undertake...[T]he need
for expertness.. .requires knowledge of [regulating an industry],
ability to shift requirements as the condition of the industry may
dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures.. .and the power through
enforcement to realize conclusions as to policy.
It has been stressed that the I.B.A. does rely upon such an ideology
of expertise to legitimate many of its regulatory activities. 	 It would,
however, take a brave observer to idealise the Authority as an embodiment
52
of Weberian Zweckrationalitat.	 There has been increasing discontent both
with the Authority's inability to alter its requirements to suit the poor
financial condition of I.L.R. and with its diffident attitude to policy-
53
making and implementation.
The utility of the ideology of expertise to the Authority has been
that of providing comfort and reassurance in the face of the critical
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uncertainties of policy-making.
	 It enabled Parliament to assume that once
the broad policy objectives had been stated in legislation, the I.B.A.
could be left to determine the appropriate means for their accomplishment
through the exercise of expertise. It has allowed the Authority to create
the impression that its policy decisions flow directly from the expert
judgment of its officials, even where the conceptual basis of these
54
decisions has been uncertain and controversial.
	 The courts, too, have
found the ideology useful in allocating institutional responsibility
between the judiciary and the Authority - crediting to regulatory expertise
what they were unable to justify in terms of the authorising statute,
55
rationality or procedural propriety.
Conclusion 
The regulation of I.L.R. by the I.B.A. faces a crisis of legitimacy.
There are two main approaches which could be adopted as possible solutions
to the crisis.	 The first, which would be strongly advocated by many
economists, is deregulation. Their concern would be with the efficiency of
the outcomes of the regulatory policies adopted by the Authority.
	 Thirty
years ago, Coase felt able to state that: 1 [T]he belief that broadcasting
is unique and requires regulation of a kind which would be unthinkable in
other media...is now so firmly held as perhaps to be beyond the reach of
56
critical examination.'
	 This assertion is no longer a truism so far as
I.L.R. concerned.
	 There are many who would justify deregulation on the
basis of the inefficiency of regulation when measured by the standards of
an economic optimum.
By way of contrast, administrative lawyers would tend to be less
impressed by the evidence of regulatory failure. They would instead rely
upon procedural innovations to improve the way in which the Authority
examines the evidence, analyses a wide range of alternatives and takes
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conflicting opinions and interests into account in its decision-making.
The approach adopted here has been broadly within this second
tradition of scholarship. There has, however, been somewhat more emphasis
on the outcome of the regulatory process than would be typical of most
administrative lawyers. There has also been an emphasis on the fact that
legislation can provide only a hazy background for what really occurs.
Regulation is a relational process, involving interaction between agency
and regulated entity. The argument is that administrative law should be
called upon not simply to address defects in decsion-making, but to become
that branch of the law which provides structure and guidance for the
formulation, articulation and implementation of regulatory policy.
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APPENDIX ONE: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
(1) Interviews 
A number of interviews were conducted with officials of the I.B.A.
and with those working in the I.L.R. industry. As the reader will have
gathered, this thesis does not purport to be an implementation study. As
a consequence, these interviews were intended to provide background
information on the regulatory practices of the Authority rather than as
part of any structured fieldwork. Nevertheless, it has been possible to
incorporate a number of quotations from these interviews in the preceding
pages. Some of the interviewees were guaranteed anonymity, but as full
details as possible are given in this appendix.
I.B.A. Officials 
Officials in the following regional offices were interviewed: East
of England (Norwich); Midlands (Birmingham and Nottingham); North West
England (Manchester); Yorkshire (Leeds); South of England (Southampton);
Wales and West of England (Bristol).
Interviews were also conducted with two officials of the Radio
Division of the Authority in London.
Employees of I.L.R. Companies 
Two programme controllers, one chief executive and one managing
director were interviewed.
Others 
Professor Aubrey Diamond, Chairman of the Advertising Advisory Committee.
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Mr. Brian West, Director of the Association of Independent Radio Companies.
(2) Access to information 
Access was readily given by the Radio Division of the I.B.A. to the
Notes of Guidance. Relevant extracts are included in Appendix 2. All the
other information sources utilised in this thesis are available to the
general public (although a visit to the Authority's own library might be
necessary).
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ILR Programming Notes of Guidance - Foreword.
Purpose of the notes.
1. From time to time, following discussions with ILR companies, the
Authority has produced notes of guidance on certain radio programming
matters. These notes have normally been presented as Radio Papers to the
Radio Consultative Committee. It would be to the benefit both of the
existing companies and of new companies as they prepare to come on air to
have this guidance available in readily accessible form. Relevant notes,
revised where necessary, have therefore been brought together in this
folder.
2. The intention of these notes is to reinforce the guidance that
companies themselves provide for their staffs. 	 Companies' own
responsibility for their output remains undiminished. These notes are not
designed to fetter normal editorial discretion, but to give guidance on
a basis either of proven ILR experience or of the requirements of relevant
legislation and the contracts.
Their scope 
3. These notes cover only some of the programming matters with which the
Authority, and companies, are concerned. Not all aspects of the IBA Act,
of the companies' contracts, dealing with programming matters are referred
to. This is not because those aspects are unimportant, but only
because they happen not to have been the occasion so far for notes of
guidance. Notes contained in this folder are therefore not a complete
guide to good practice in ILR: they provide guidance only on those matters
with which they deal. No one should seek to defend the indefensible by
arguing that nothing in these notes forbade it.
4. It is essential that everyone connected with programming matters in
ILR is familiar with the statutory requirements. The main terms of
Sections 2 (1), 2 (2), 4 (1) and 8 (6) of the Act are set out in the first
of these notes.
Nature of the guidance.
5. Guidance given in these notes varies from topic to topic. Some notes
describe specific requirements that have to be met; others point to areas
where careful local judgement is needed, and indicate the general
considerations which should be taken into account. Several notes emphasise
the need for prior consultation with the IBA staff: such consultation is
essential if guidelines are to combine flexibility in local broadcasting
with the precision necessary on certain matters.
Need for revision 
6. These notes are not necessarily the last word on the matters to which
they refer. Quite apart from any changes that may be required as a result
of new legislation, any guidance needs updating and checking at regular
intervals: this will normally be done through the Radio Consultative
Committee. On some matters it may be necessary to provide additional or
revised guidelines from time to time.
(April 1980).
ILR Note 2.1.
Hours of Broadcasting 
1. Under the terms of their contracts, companies must give the IBA 28
days notice of any proposed departure from previously agreed hours of
broadcasting. In exceptional circumstances, the IBA may be prepared to
waive the requirement to give the full 28 days' notice: in a genuine
local crisis or emergency, approval may even be given over the telephone,
to be confirmed later in writing. Advance approval must, however, be
sought in every instance; and no announcement or promotion of extra hours
may be made before approval has been obtained.
2. In instances of genuine urgency or emergency out of normal office
hours, companies should telephone the Duty Clerk at IBA headquarters, who
will arrange for IBA Radio staff to contact the company direct. (Clerk
available each weekday except between 23.45 and 9.00). (Sept. 1982).
ILR Note 2.2.
Advance Hearing of Programmes 
Under the terms of their contracts, companies may be required to arrange
for the IBA to hear a recording of a programme in advance of its being
broadcast. Normally this is not necessary: the immediacy of ILR is one
of its strengths, and there is no wish to restrict this unreasonably.
From time to time, however, advance hearing may be needed, for statutory
or other legal reasons. Senior programming staff need to be aware of the
contractual obligation and of the practical need, so that they can comply
promptly with any such requests.
(April 1980).
ILR Note 2.3.
The Act requires that 'proper proportions of the recorded and other matter
included in the
	 programmes are of British origin and of British
performance'.	 The Authority does not lay down percentage limits, but
expects that it is individual items of foreign material, such as a record
or interview, that will constitute the main 'non-British' element in the
broadcast output. Contractors must seek prior approval from the IBA for
the use of foreign material on any significant scale, i.e. for the use of
other than short individual items. The IBA is likely to restrict the
number of any lengthy or regular programmes of exclusively foreign material
that an ILR company may wish to broadcast.
	 The Authority requires
companies' stations identification material to be British based, and use
of library music should be focused on material of British origin.
(Amended June 1985).
• (`
(Al..EZZr_r_13.CrE)
FAIFNESS ,1701,1:2=IALITY	 ACCURACY
1. The following parayiaphs indicate areas in which care may be
particularly needed in order to ensure fair dealing. There are in
addition the specific requirements in the Act that the Authority
should ensure that, so far as possible, 'due impartiality is
preserved on the part of the persons providing the programmes as
respects matters of political or industrial controversy or relating
to current public policy'; and that all news given in the programmes
(in whatever form) is presented with due accuracy and impartiality.
Conduct of interviews 
2. In addition to the normal general requirements about fairness
and impartiality, it is important in normal circumstances to ensure:
(a) that an interviewee Chosen as a representative of an
organised group is in a position to speak on behalf of
others involved;
(b) that, whether the interview is recorded or live, the
interviewee has been made adeauately aware of the way
which his contribution is likely to be used;
(c) that he has been told the identity and intended role of
any other participants in a programme.
If exceptional circumstances require departure from these normal
practices, there should be consultation with the Authority in
advance.
Editing of interviews 
3. Subject to agreement to the contrary, it is proper to edit
an interview to present the views of an interviewee in shortened
form; or to compress consistent questions or replies from a number
of people. Material should not be presented to suggest falsely
that people are in conversation with one another or commenting on
each other's views; to omit significant qualifications advanced by
contributors in the course of an interview; to associate
contributors with views not held by them; or otherwise to
misrepresent materially the import of the full interview. Care
should also be taken over stock or library material; it cannot be
taken for granted that the views expressed by an interviewee on a
/particular
particular subject and previously recorded are still held When it
is proposed to re—broadcast an extract. Steps should be taken if
necessary to seek new recordings or to identify and announce the
date and context of the original.
'Trial by broadcastial 
4. Liirely to be a rarity in radio, but to attract particular
attention When it is arranged and presented, is the programme in
Which a man is answaring charges of alleged criminal wrongdoing.
There is an obvious need for the company to be aware in planning
such a programme of the legal risks of defamation (see paragraph 5
below) .
 and contempt of court (see Note 4.2 and .the Attachment to it).
In addition every effort should be made in the conduct of the
programme to ensure fairness and the appearance of fairness. The
subject of any accusations which are to be made must, for example,
be disclosed in detail to the person who is to defend himself
against them, and sufficiently in advance to allow himself to
prepare his answers. He must know from whom the accusations are to
come; and, if he wishes, he must be allowed to have present
witnesses prepared to support him. There must be no verdict, for
even were it thongrit proper for a verdict to be reached through
the processes of broadcasting, the time available is insufficient
for the necessary sifting or completion of evidence.
Defamation
5. All relevant staff need to be aware of the law on defamation
and of what may constitute a defamatory statement. If a broadcast
is planned that does include what may constitute such a statement,
then the Authority, before deciding whether it may be broadcast,
will require the company concerned t_ seek competent legal advice
on 7,senether the statement is actionable and if so whether a successful
defence miht be made. If the advice is that the statement is not
actionable or that a successful defence could be made, this does not
itself mean that the programme or programme , item then has an automatic
right to be broadcast, since the Authority will need to take into
account wider considerations, such as those of fairness and
impartiality, that lie outside the law of defamation. Legal advice
on the defamatory aspects of the statement will, however, be required.
A brief guide to the law of defamation in England and Wales is
attached to this note.
Reconstructions 
6. The use of 'reconstructions' in documentary and dramatised
documentary programmes for the purposes of greater authenticity or
dramatic verisimilitude, as o pposed to mere effect, is legitimte,
so long as they do not distort reality. Wherever a reconstruction is
used in a documentary, it should be clearly identifiable as such so
that the listener is not misled.
Simulated news broadcasts 
7. In no circumstances should a simulation of a news bulletin or
news flash be broadcast without the prior approval of the Authority.
/This
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This will only be given in exceptional circilmtances and when there
is no appreciable risk that listeners will be led to believe that
the news broadcast is a gennine one.
Rilat of reply
8.	 Despite all the efforts which are made by the companies and
the Authority to observe fairness, accuracy and due impartiality,
there may be occasions when an individual or organisation is mis-
represented in a programme. A mis-statement of fact can sometimes
be simply corrected, particularly if the programme is live, since
there is then the opportunity for a correction to be made within 
the programme itself. If this is not possible, then, unless the
need for correction is urgent, it may be best, if the error has
occurred in a regular news programme, for example, to wait until the
next bulletin from the station in question. Corrections of factual
errors should in any event be broadcast as soon as is sP1-1ib1y
possible alter the original error.
9.	 Calls for a ri4at of reply may also come from those who feel
that a programme as a whole or in part has been misleading and unfair
in a more general sense t1.12n that resulting from straightforward
mis -statement of fact. Requests for such a reply may come either
clivect to the IRA or to the company itself. In both situations the
raL will normally need to be involved in discussion with the company
before a decision is taken whether to grant a reply, and if so what
form it should take. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate
for a statement to appear instead in print. When a complainant
refers a matter to the Authority's Complaints Review Board, for
example, and it is decidei that it is not appropriate tllat an on-
air statement should be broadcast, the Board's conclusions may be
printed LI the IBA Quarterly 'Independent Broadcasting'. Is
recorded in the separate note on the FPI-Idl i ng of Complaints, the
Broadcasting Bill now before Parliament contairq proposals for a
Broadcasting Complaints Commission, and fresh guidance will be given
when this comes into effect.
/ATTACESNT
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PRIVACY, GATHERING OF INFORMATION, ETC.
1. The broadcasters' freedom of access to information, and
freedom to publish, are subject to certain limitations. These
limitations arise not only from considerations of national
security, and from the laws of libel, contempt and trespass,
and the IBA Act itself, but also from the individual's right
to privacy. Though it is not a legQ1 right, it has moral
force, and it is not necessarily abPrdoned when an individual
leaves his home or office. There will be occasions when the
irdividual l s right to privacy must be balanced against the
public interest. The IBA is concerned that this right should
be protected from unwarranted intrusion.
Recording members of the public 
2. Most recordings made in public comprise material Which
may be considered to be in the Public dom_AAn However, care
sh.ould be taken when, for exam ple, recordings are made in
cd-cumstances where the reporter would not gain access or
opportunity without permission. A refusal in such
circumstances to allow the recording to be broadcast should
normally be respected: any proposed departure from this practice 
should be discussed with the Authority to ensure that the
entitlement to reasonable privacy is not abused. It cannot
always be taken for granted that apparently willing co-operation
in a recorded interview automatically implies PiEreement to
Imspecified use in a broadcast.
Interviewing of child's 
3- Any interviewing of children reauires case. Children
Should not be interrogated to elicit views on private family
matters.
Recorded telephone interviews 
4 .	 Interviews or conversations conducted by telephone should
normally not be recorded for broadcasting unless the interviewer
has identified h i mqelf as smekirg on behalf of the ma company
seeking information to be broadcast, and the interviewee has
given his consent to the use of the conversation. The Authority
/recognises
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recognises, however, that there may be very rare cases, such as
those involving investigation of allegedly cr i minal or otherwise
disreputable behaviour, in which these no-,..mal requirements may
need to be waived. When in the considered judgment of the
producer and his company management such a case arises, there
should be consultation with IBA staff before such material is
recorded. In exceptional circumstances, advance consultation
with company mPrasement and IBA staff before recording may be
impossible; but in any event the Authority's approval for the 
transmission of such material is reouired, and it will need to
be convinced that the purposes of the broadcast will be better
served by transmission of the actual conversation than by
incorporation of the information obtained from it.
Hidden microphones 
5. The use of hidden microphones to record individuals who
are unaware that they are being recorded is acceptable only
when it is clear that the evidence so acquired is essential to
establish the credibility and authority of the story, and where
the story itself is equally clearly of important public interest.
When in the considered judgement of the proaucer and his company
management such a case arises, there needs to be consultation
with the Authority, and approval at the level of Chairman or
Director General, before such material is recorded. In
exceptional circumstances, advance consultation with company
mqrAEcuent and the Authority may not be possible; but in ,-,ny 
event the Authority's approval is r,aaniro%-d for the transmission 
of such material.
Wireless Telearaphy Act 19.9 
6. Under Section 5 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, it
is an offence for anyone to use a wireless receiver with intent
to obtain information about any message which he is not authorised
to receive. It is also an offence for anyone to pass on any
information about an Interce pted message, whoever aid the
intercepting. These provisions are not affected by' the
regulations made In 1970 which did away with the necessity for
a licence for the reception of sound as distinct from vision.
That exemption is confined to the use of a wireless set for the
reception of messages sent from authorised broadcasting stations
for general reception, and messages sent from licensed amateur
stations.
Official Secrets Acts and 'D ? Notices 
7. In recent years there has been increased public discussion
of some matters which would previously have been considered
forbidden territory. Nevertheless, all sections of the Official
Secrets Acts remPI TI in force, and there are pitfalls for broad-
casters who come upon matters covered by the provisions of the
Acts. They would be prudent to check carefully on the nature
and status of any infor-ration about affairs of state generally
in order to be confidant that it has not reached them thronji
nrPuthorised nhprrpls.
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8.	 From time to time tD I Notices covering security matters
are issued to the press and the broadcasters. The Secretary of
the I D' Notice Committee may sometimes also be prepared to give
advice (but without commitment) on a smecific matter. There
should be a named person in each company to whom reference can
be made in respect of 1 D I Notices covering any matter likely
to be the subject of programming, and the Authority should be
kept informed who this person is.
April 1980 
Note 4.1. Crime Reporting, Etc. 
Interviews with criminals 
1. The Authority is required to satisfy itself that, so far as possible,
'nothing is included in the programme which offends against good taste or
decency or is likely to be offensive to public feeling'(Section 4 (1) (a)
of the I.B.A. Act). Interviews with criminals are likely to run the risk
of infringing this section of the Act, and there needs always to be careful
consideration whether or not such an interview is justified in the public
interest. Any programme item which on any reasonable judgement would be
said to encourage or incite crime or lead to disorder is unacceptable.
2. Apart from the requirements of the I.B.A. Act, other legal
considerations also need to be borne in mind. When an interviewee is
known to be wanted by the police or on the run from prison, there are two
statutes which may be relevant. The Criminal Justice Act 1961 s.22 (2)
states broadly that it is an offence for anyone to give to a person who is
unlawfully at large any assistance with intent to prevent, hinder or
interfere with his being taken into custody. The Criminal Law Act 1967
s. 4 (1) states 'where a person has committed an arrestable offence, any
other person who, knowing or believing him to be guilty of the offence or
of some other arrestable offence, does without lawful authority or
reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or
prosecution shall be guilty of an offence'. To be held guilty of an
offence under the above, it would have to be shown that the person charged
either misled the police or gave the criminal some assistance. Assistance
is difficult to define, but it would only be necessary to prove some
element of encouragement. In the case of an ordinary criminal who has
escaped from jail, considerable risks would be run by employees of a
programme company or of IRN who conducted an interview unless everything
possible was done to secure the criminal's arrest.
3.	 In Northern Ireland, Section 5 (1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern
Ireland) 1967 imposes a duty to give a constable information which is
likely to secure or assist in securing the apprehension of any person who
has committed an arrestable offence. Unlike under English Law, therefore,
an offence is committed in Northern Ireland simply by the withholding of
information, and the act of either misleading the police or actively
assisting the criminal does not have to be proved to obtain conviction on
indictment.
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4. Political dissidents from foreign countries who are guilty
of offences under the laws of their own countries may be interviewed,
subject to the normal requirements of impartiality.
Interviews with people Who use or advocate violence or other
criminal measures 
5. Any plans for a programme item Which explores and exposes
the views of people Who within the British Isles use or advocate
violence or other criminal measures for the achievement of political
ends must be referred to the Authority before any arrangements for
recording are made. No member of a station's staff should plan to
interview members of proscribed organisations, for example members
of the Provisional IRA or other para-military organisations, without
previous discussion with his company's top management. The manage-
ment, if they think the item may be justified, will then consult -
the Authority.
6. In exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, it may be
impossible for members of staff to consult before recording such an
item. Consultation with the Authority is still essential to
determine whether the item can be transmitted.
7. Where a programme gives the views of people Who use violence
outside the British Isles to attain political ends, com panies may
go ahead without consultation with the Authority only if there is no
possibility either of the law being broken or of there being
incitement to crime or significant offence to public feeling.
Nevertheless, companies are strongly advised to consult with
IBA Whenever possible in such circumstances.
Exposition of criminal techniques 
8. In broadcasts dealing with criminal activities, in news,
fictional or documentary form, there may be conflict between the
demands of accurate realism and the risk of unintentionally assist-
ing the criminally inclined. Careful thought should be given and, -
where appropriate, advice taken from the police, before itPms are
included which give detailed information about criminal methods
and techniques: a public-spirited warning to the general public
against novel or ingenious criminal methods, for example, may defeat
its own aims by giving those methods wider currency than they might
otherwise have. Similar caution is needed in the representation of
police techniques of crime prevention and detection.
Relations with the police
9. Most companies regularly broadcast material designed to
solicit public support in the prevention and detection of crime.
There is also a variety of other messages to the public which police
forces may from time to time request broadcasters to transmit.
These include, for example, warnings to stay away from a crash or
motorway Pile-up; information about road hazards for motorists;
warnings of missing drugs; requests for hel p in tracing missing
persons; and so on. There is normally no need for prior
/consultation
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consultation with the Authority on such broadcasts. Companies
should be aware, however, of the need to ensure that information
about persons or objects suspected of association with crime is not
broadcast in contempt of court (see Note 4.2 on Contempt of Court).
Police requests for, or authorisation of, such broadcasts do not
necessary legitimize them. Companies are asked to consult in 
advance with IBA staff whenever such matters may arise.
Reporting demonstrations and scenes of public disturbance 
10. Companies will be conscious of the need to be on guard
against attempts to exploit radio. The aim of any public meeting
or demonstration is to attract public attention, but there is
always the possibility that the presence of radio reporters may
provoke incidents that would not otherwise have occurred, especially
Where coverage is live. Every effort must be made to place What is
being broadcast in context, so that listeners can properly evaluate
the significance of activities that have arisen from the hope of
radio coverage.
Reports on young offenders 
11. Under the Children and Young Persons Acts 1933 and 1969, it
is an offence to publish the names or addresses of persons aged 17
or under who are involved in court proceedings, or to publish any
information calculated to reveal their identity unless the court,
or Secretary of State, has given specific permission for this to be
done.
acking and kidnapping reports 
12. Information about criminal activities such as hijacks can on
occasion be picked up by monitoring communications between aircraft
and the ground, or between police radio cars and their base control.
It is an offence under Section 5 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949
to use a wireless receiver to obtain information about any message
Which the user is not authorised to receive, and it is also an
offence to pass on any information obtained by the interceptions of
such a message. Quite apart from these formal legal requirements,
it would almost invariably be wrong to broadcast any information,
Whether derived from monitoring of communications or from any other
source, that could endanger lives or prejudice the success of attempts
to deal with the criminal activity or hijack. Similar considerations
apply to all other forms of kidna pping. (See also paragraphs 13-14
below.)
Requests to withhold news or information When human lives are at risk
13. On some past occasions there have been requests for an item
of news or information to be withheld in order to preserve the lives
of innocent people — for example, during the Spaghetti House and
the Balcombe Street sieges. Such instances pose complex editorial
problems. Each case has to be viewed individually. The IBA has no
wish to lay down rules to pre—determine the decisions to be taken in
all the unpredictable circumstances in which a broadcast might put a
human life at risk.
•.‘
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PONE-flN PROGRAMMES 
1. The following paragraphs offer guidance on some of the
problems and practical points which may arise in phone-in programmes.
Due impartiality of presenters 
2. A member of a station's staff tPking part in a phone-in
prpgramme is free to act as a neutral chairman, to provide
information, ask stimulating questions, and play devil's advocate,
but should not editorialise on 'matters of political or industrial
controversy or relating to current public policy'. An outsider,
possibly even as a guest presenter, may sometimes appropriately act
in this way, but only if due impartiality is sought over a series
of programmes.
3. This guidance on the role of presenters in phone-in programmes
will not be affected if the changes to Section 4(2) of the present
Act that are proposed in the the new Broadcasting Bill are implemented.
The guidance is based on the requirements in Section 4(1)(f) about due
impartiality, and does not rely upon the present wording of Section
4(2)
,Due impartiality of contributors 
4. When impartiality is required in a phone-in prpgramme, it is not
always 'sufficient to rely upon the presence of a neutral chairman to
act, if necessary, as advocate for points of view not being expressed
by those Who phone in. In phone-ins during the penHing period of a
Parliamentary or local government election, it may be necessary to
seek a balance in the range of contributions. This may be done not
simply through the selection of studio guests, but also by discovering
from callers in advance of broadcasting their calls the tenor of What
they intend to say. (See also Note 5.2 and Attachments on Election
broadcasting).
5. If it is ever felt appropriate to hold a phone-in on a subject
of especial sensitivity, such as Northern Ireland or race relations,
then the same course will need to be adopted. Other considerations
apart from due impartiality will arise, as indicated in the following
paragraphs.
/ Safeguards 
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Safeguards against defamatory remarks, obscenity, etc. 
6. The main safeguards against the broadcasting of defamatory
remarks, obscenities, etc, is the use of the delay mechanism which
all companies are required to have. Other safeguards which it may
be appropriate to use at certain times include: (i) finding out in
some detail what callers are likely to say before putting them on
air; (ii) cautioning callers in advance about their legal liabilities;
(iii) taking the name and telephone number of each caller, and
re turning the call if there is any doubt about it; (iv) retairirg for
a period the name and telephone number of the caller for every call
which is broadcast, in case there is a need later, for legal or other
reasons, to get in touch with a caller at a later date.
7. It should be noted that under the Race Relations Act 1976 it is
an offence to publish, distribute or use threatening, abusive or in-
sulting language in circumstances likely to stir up racial hatred:
for a prosecution to be successful it is no longer necessary, as it
was under the 1965 Act, to prove an intention to stir up racial hatred.
8. Particular problems arise if calls are received from persons
who claim to be crimirAls. The considerations that need to be borne
in mind are set out in Note 4.1 on Crime Reporting.
April 1980. 
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PEESONAL ADVICE PROGEAMNENG
1. .Programming in which advice is given on emotional, sexual and
other personal problems is heavily dependent upon the judgement and
skill of the person giving the advice, and the editorial supervision
given by the station. The following notes do not attempt to lay down
precise rules, but to iraicate some of the factors Which companies
undertaking such programming need to bear in mind.
Selection of subject matter
2. In detsrminire possible causes of offence against "good taste
and decency" (see Section 4(1)(b) of the IRA Act), it is necessary to
consider not only the subject matter but also the timing, the context,
and the manner in which the programming is presented. Under the ERA
Act there can be no case for causing offence for its own sake. Any
decision to broadcast something which will shock or offend listeners
needs specific justification on other editorial grounds as part of the
public service 'maintaining a high general standard in all respects'
which it is the IRA's statutory duty to provide.
3. There is no overriding objection to the broadcasting of advice
on sexual matters, provided that it is scheduled at an appropriate
time, and the aim is genrinely to help and not to seek an audience
through sensationalism. Specific discussion of any unlawful sexual
activity - especially that associated with violence - is unlikely to
be acceptable at any time.
4. In accordance with the requirements of Section 4(1)(a) of the
Act, care should be taken to ensure that contributors, if advocating
a particular point of view about drugs, for example, or about sexual
behaviour, do not encourage the commission of any criminAl offence.
Contributors are free to express the view that some aspect of the law
should be changed, but the discussion as a whole must be duly impartial.
Sclnizr1,114,z..
5. The IBA would not normally agree to the scheduling of programmes
designed for adults and young adults at times when there is a part-
icularly large audience of young children. Each proposal will be
exPmined on its merits, but companies should bear in mind that many
young children are usually listening daring the daytime at weekends
and during the school holidays, and during the following hours on
weekdays in school terms: 7.00-9.00 a.m. and 4.00-6.00 p.m. It is
/necessary
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necessary to consider carefully for what audience a particular
programme is designed and who is likely to be listening at any
particular time. A programme designed for adults might approp-
riately be broadcast at 10.00 a.m. during school term time but be
inappropriate at that hour, unless the content is altered, during
the school holidays or half-term breaks.
6.	 It may on rare occasions be necessary for some programmes to
give a warning at the beginning that some people may find the subject
matter unsuitable for children or be offended by it. Such warnings
should be phrased and voiced in a manner which respects the
sensitivities of those for whose benefit they are designed.
Context and manner of presentation
7.	 The main need is for advice programming to be handled skilfully,
and with integrity.. Each programme has to be judged by the attitudes
it demonstrates towards its participants, its subject matter and its
audience. The aim must be to help callers and 'not to exploit them,
and there is a responsibility to ensure that this aim is achieved.
Care has to be taken over the expectations aroused in callers by the
way the programme is described and the 'adviser/ presented, as well
as through what the adviser actually says. Stations also have an
• obligation to ensure, thraugh the way in which calls are handled,
that radio does not supplant iraividual consultation of the family
doctor or appropriate specialist. Indeed, in many cases it will be
appropriate to advite such consultation. Stations need to consider
also their responsibilities towards those callers whose calls it is
not possible to deal with fully on air.
Qualifications of presenters 
(i)
	
General advice
8.	 The selection of presenters and contributors is a matter for
the judgement of individual programme companies. The IBA recommends,
however, that while presenters will no doubt come from a variety of
backgrounds, relevant experience or recognised training in an approp-
riate field should be part of their qualifications-. It is also
suggested that their appointment should be the direct responsibility
of the programme controller or managing director, and approved after
a trial period, when the quality of the advice given has been
adequately monitored.
(ii)	 Specialist advice .
9.	 In some specialist fields, companies will need to refer listeners'
personal queries to a qualified practitioner invited to take part in
the programme, or else state that they are not qualified to give an
answer. This would amply in the case of medical and legal matters, for
example, and could well apply also in cases where psychological training
and expertise are required. It is important to bear this in mind when
devising, and when publicising, a programme likely to venture into such
areas. When a programme sets out to answer specific questions requiring
specialist opinion, this should be provided by appropriately qualified
experts.
/ Note
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Note: Broadcasters with regular advice spots who are
connected with outside organisations with a relevant interest of
some kind should not take advantage of their broadcasting position
to mention their organisations in a way that would seem to constitute
an advertisement far it.
Inclusion of a range of views 
10.	 Advice programmes, like other programmes, must observe due
impartiality on 'matters of political or industrial controversy or
relating to current public policy' as required under Section 4(1)(f)
of the IRA Act. In dealing with topics which are outside this
category but Which involve moral judgements or social attitudes that
are likely to be controversial, a range of views :should be included,
over a period of time, in the station's output as a whole. It would
not be serving the public fully if, in dealing with topics involving
controversial moral judgements, a station drew only upon a single,
extreme strand of opinion and failed to take reasonable account of
opposing views. Among the practical steps which stations can take
to ensure the airing of a range of views on controversial subjects
are the occasional inclusion in an appropriate context of programme
guests of differing attitudes and, where feasible, the brief para-
phrasing by the presenter of opposing points of view.
trkt.kr
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INDIRECT ADVERTISING
1.	 In accordance with Section 8(6) of the IBA Act (see Note 1.1,
paragraph 4), companies are required to exclude from programmes
anything which:
(a) could reasorAlly be taken to state, suggest or
imply that any part of any programme has been
supplied or suggested by any advertiser; or
(b) could reasonably be supposed to have been
included in return for payment or other valuable
consideration to the contractor.
As stated in Section 8(7), this requirement does not prohibit the
inclusion of reviews, for example, of literary, artistic or other
publications or productions, inclliaing current entertainments, or
the inclusion of items consisting of factual portrayals of 'doings,
happenings, places or things, being items which in the opinion of
the Authority are proper for inclusion by reason of their intrinsic
interest or instructiveness' and do not comnrise an undue element 
of advertisement.
2. Companies should consult IBA. Radio staff in advance about
any project which involves outside commercial Interests and/or
which might involve 'impressions of sponsorship'.
Sponsored records 
3. It is a recogmized marketing ploy to use records featuring
or relatinE to other products or services to try to gain indirect
(and free) advertising. Records produced in connection with an
advertising campaign therefore need careful consideration before
being included in progranning. They should not in any event
'comprise an undue element of advertisement' for any products
or services. A record issued as part of a product marketing
campaign, usinE material from an advertisement, and mentioning
a product brand name, is unlikely to be acceptable under the terms
of the Act. Such records should not be broadcast on IIR, unless
special circumstances apply.
/Promotiorq l
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Promotional tapes 
4.	 Section 8(6) of the Act also governs the use of programme
material supplied to stations by outside companies. Some of the
material which is on offer for programming purposes has as its
underlying aim to publicise products, goods or services. Examples
of such material include brief interviews produced directly or
indirectly by publishing firms with the authors of current books;
short features on particular, products or processes courtesy of the
manufacturer; and taped interviews with pop stars in which gaps are
left in the tape for each station's presenter to 'ask' his own
questions. As purely promotional materials, these are unacceptable
under the Act.	 It is possible, however, that some items may have
an intrinsic interest and provide a worthwhile element in
programming. If this is so, then their use is not necessarily ruled
out. They must not, however, contain an undue element of
advertising, and must not give an impression of sponsorship.
Moreover, in considering the possibility of using any such material,
companies should bear in mind their obligations under the IBA Act,
not only as regards Section 8 but also for example as regards
Section 4(1), and the need clearly to be preserving their editorial
independence (and critical faculty).
5.	 Any programme material which is offered to a company in
relation to a current advertising campaign is likely to be a prima
facie breach of the Act. If in doubt, companies should consult with
IBA Radio staff.
Independently produced programmes funded by non—broadcasters 
(For programmes funded by non—broadcasters but produced by
companies, please see Note 7.3).
6.	 There is an increasing range of material, some of it
attractive and intrinsically worthwhile, where the production is
financed or underwritten by commercial concerns and the programmes
are compiled and offered to ILR. In this event there is no payment
or valuable consideration to the programme company. They are only
acceptable, however, provided that:
(a) they do not contain an undue element of advertising;
(b) their broadcast could not reasonably be supposed to
give rise to 'impressions of sponsorship';
(c) no advertising connected with the programme is
currently being broadcast on the station.
7.	 If companies, in genuine exercise of their editorial
discretion, wish to use such programmes, they are asked to keep IBA
Radio staff informed, as part of the schedule consultation process.
.	 /Offers
(Amended November 1984) 
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Offers of free services, facilitiescetc.
a.	 Many organisations (not all of them commercial) and official
bodies are prepared to offer programme-makers free services in
return for the presumed commercial or public relations advantages
thought to accrue from the presentation of their organisation and
its activities on radio. Although in the majority of instances
such arrangements are justifiable, all such offers should be
treated with circumspection. Nothing should be done that might
give rise to doubts about the iraPpendence, impartiality and
integrity of the programme. No commeroial organisation that
provides services should be allowed to engage before the broadcast
in any advertising campaign, in the press or elsewhere, linked
to the programme in question.
Records in prograthmes and advertisements 
9. Care must be exercised by companies to ensure that there
is a reasonable separation between record playa in programmes,
and commercials for the same record or tracks from the record.
Where a record is being advertised, jilays in programming should
be kept as far away from the advertisement as possible. Pre-
planning is therefore necessary to avoid any conflict with
programming formats. Where the need arises companies should
re-schedule commercials in order to ensure reasonable separation
from a record which has already been played in programming. In
any event a record in programming should never be broadcast less
than a break away from its most recent exposure in an advertisement.
There must be a similar separation between an advertisement for
an LP and a playing of a track from that LP during a programme.
PROMOTIONS AND OUTSIDE BROADCASTS 
Promotion of radio companies' own products or services 
10.. under their contracts with the IBA, companies are prohibited
from promoting on-air their own products or
	 (apart from
programme promotion or programme jourmals) without the Authority's
approval.
11. Approval of the promotion of programme companies' merchan-
dising and other activities is governed by the extent to which the
promotion can reasonably be deemed to be related closely to the
functions of the companies as broadcasters, or to be positively
promoting TraPpendent Local Radio Promotion on-air should not
give 11nr11e advantage to the programme company compared with
competitors in the same field. Announcements about the availability
of free orlow-cost wall-stickers, posters, programme company
mobiles and T-shirts are likely to be acceptable. The promotion
of goods and services which would appear to compete with outside
commercial interests or to be extending the functions of the
contractors into the retail and other fields would not be approved.
/12. Companies
12. Companies Should consult with MBAkiveatising Control staff, at an
early stage, before embarking an promotional campaigns which require
Authority approval. Where approval is given, particular care must be
exercised in the amount of promotion, because the general effect of
these promotional its will be governed by the frequency with which
they are mentioned on-air.
Joint promotional activities involving commercial interests 
13. Too close an association between on-air programme material and the
promotion of advertisers', goods and services may blur the necessary
distinction between programming and advertisements. This may arise when
a commercial enterprise joins with a programme contractor in activities
"designed to promote the interests of both and involving an-air publicity
either in programme time or in an advertisement. The impression may be
given that part of the company's programming has been supplied or
suggested by an advertiser, contrary to Section 8(6) of the Act.
Comoanies should consult in advance with IBA Radio and Advertising 
Control staff whenever such joint promotional activity is contemplated. 
14. A company may have involvement with local events provided that they
are of 'intrinsic interest' to listeners and that the programme does not
include an undue element of advertising. For. example, where Ideal Home,
Motor Car or Do-It-Yourself Exhibitions are well-established annual
events, it is possible for programmes to be broadcast from them,
provided that the Object of the programme is not to promote the
commercial interests involved but is designed to bring to tice listeners
items of interest to them. Even so, it is important to exclude any
material which incliiriel any undue element of advertising, such as the
gratuitous naming of product brands.
Choosing locations for outside broadcasts 
15. Wherever possible, non-oommercial rather than commercial venues
Should be chosen for outside broadcasts. The venue must never be chosen
for commercial considerations; furthermore the company shall receive no
payment or benefit in kind in respect of staging an outside broadcast.
16. Managing Directors are personally responsible for deciding whether
a broadcast from named commercial premises is warranted on editorial
grounds. The requirements of Section 8(6) of the Broadcasting Act 1981
must be met. It is essential that broadcasts ErLJAInamed commercial
premises are not seen as vehicles for advertising. Advertisements for
the commercial premises involved may not be transmitted during or
immediately around the programme.
Amended June 1985 
I.L.R. Note 9.1 
Expressions of Opinion By Programme Companies.
Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act 1980 removed the restrictions that had
previously existed under Section 4 (2) of the I.B.A. Act upon expressions
of opinion in ITV or ILR programmes by the directors or officers of
programme companies (and by persons or companies controlling programme
companies). Under these previous restrictions, people in the proscribed
categories were prohibited from expressing their opinion on matters of
political or industrial controversy or of current public policy. Now they
are subject only to the same regulations and requirements as apply under
the 1973 and 1980 Acts to anyone who takes part in a broadcast on ITV or
ILR.
There are, however, still constraints upon the expressions of opinion by
programme companies themselves: expressions of opinion by them on matters
other than broadcasting which are of political or industrial controversy
or relate to current public policy must be excluded from programmes
broadcast by the IBA. If a director or officer of a programme company
expresses an opinion on such matters in a broadcast on ITV or ILR, it must
be in a context which makes clear that he or she is not expressing the
opinion of the company.
The restrictions in relation to programme companies apply to broadcasts
both on ITV and ILR, irrespective of which company the medium serves. It
also applies to broadcasts which take place outside the coverage area of
the company concerned. For example, an opinion of a Scottish ITV company
on the prescribed matters could not be broadcast or reported in an ILR
programme in the South of England.
Under Section 2 (1) of the I.B.A. Act 1978, as amended by Section 31 of the
Broadcasting Act 1980, the restrictions do not apply to broadcast of
proceedings in either House of Parliament, or of proceedings of local
authorities. Expressions of programme company opinion on the proscribed
matters therefore do not have to be excluded from broadcasts of such
proceedings.
The revised provisions of the 1980 Act apply within the overall
requirements of due impartiality under Section 4 (1) (f) of the 1973 Act
and of due accuracy and impartiality of news under Section 4 (1) (b).
These wider requirements must be borne in mind when any question arises
of the inclusion of permitted expressions of opinion by programme companies
or those associated with them.
(May 1981).
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CHARITART7, APPEALS AND PUBLICTIY FOR CHARIT1hb 
1.	 Under the Act, the Authority's previous approval is required
for any item 'which gives or is designed to give publicity to the
needs or objects of any association or organisation conducted for
charitable or benevolent purposes'. One purpose of that requirement
is to ensure that broadcast appeals for funds by charitable
organisations are carefully controlled. Most charities are,
necessarily, registered with the Charity Commission; but registration
means only that their aims have been accepted as legally charitable,
and does not indicate that the Commissioners have investigated and
approved their conduct of their affairs. Care therefore needs to
be taken to protect the public and ensure as far as possible that
their money will be well spent. It is desirable also to ensure
that appeals are fairly allocated among a variety of charities, and
that other types of publicity for charities, in addition to overt
appeals for funds, should also be subject to controls.
Appeals for funds 
(i)
	
Basic principles 
2. Appeals should be on behalf of local charitable causes, with
the proceeds normally being distributed through recognised charities.
Appeals should not normally provide an outlet for national rhP—ities
that could be expected to apply for Trv appeals, nor for local
branches of such charities, unless they are appealing for funds to
meet some specific local need.
3. While most appeals are likely to be concerned with the relief
of human suffering and distress, appeals for other charitable
purposes are not ruled out. It is desirable that a wide range of
causes should benefit: while attention must be paid to the
particular needs of the area, it is hoped that no station will
concentrate all its appeals on one narrow field of need.
4. A wide spread of charities should benefit: there should not
be charities with a special relationship with the station which get
an undue share of any appeal time. (This does not apply to a Trust
which the station itself has set up as a means of distributing funds
to a range of local charitable purposes.)
/ The ....
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(ii) Particular types of appeal 
5.	 Major fund-raising projects,	 radiothons,	 etc,	 should
not be on behalf of specific named charities, but for a
particular field of need, with the proceeds subsequently being
distributed to a number of charities on the basis of local
advice.
6. Shorter appeals on behalf of specific named charities
are permissible so long as the station has assured itself that
there is some particular local need which the funds collected
would help to meet. (NOTE: the IBA may want •to specify the
maximum number of appeals permissible in any period).
7. Emergency appeals for funds to help meet some local
disaster should normally only be broadcast if a separate appeal
fund has already been established. This does not rule out the
possibility of a station itself taking the initiative to set up
such a fund, but care needs to be taken to ensure its charitable
status, and it will normally be desirable for the appeal fund to
be organised in conjunction with other local interests.
Procedures 
8. Approval for appeals must be obtained in advance from
the IBA. After the appeal, a letter signed by the company's
Managing Director should be sent to the IBA, detailing the
amounts received and distributed and the recipient charities.
Once a year a report on all ILR appeals will be presented to the
Central Appeals Advisory Committee (where appropriate, the
Scottish Appeals Advisory Committee and Northern Ireland Appeals
Advisory Committee), and subsequently to the Authority.
9. The funds collected must be distributed for the
purposes for which they were sought. None Of the funds collected
should be used to meet programming expenses or other costs
incurred by the station. The only exceptional circumstances in
which it would be legitimate for a station to deduct part of the
proceeds to meet its own expenses, of any kind, would be if it
made clear throughout the appeal that it was going to do so. A
different matter would be a fund-raising event such as a gala
concert for which tickets are sold in aid of some charity. In
such an event it is usually only the profits that go to the
charity, after expenses have been deducted; this is perfectly
legitimate so long as the position is made clear and there is no
suggestion that the full price of each ticket is going to the
charity.
10. Where regular charity appeals are undertaken, it is strongly
recommended that a trust, registered with the charity
commissioners, be established. Trustees will wish to assure
themselves that proper procedures are followed, for handling
funds. It would be proper and desirbale for an audit to be
conducted, with expenses deducted from trust funds. If no trust
ILR NOTE 10.1
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is established, it is essential that funds received by stations
as agents for charities should be paid into a separate account
and disbursed as rapidly as possible. Figures should be
available for audit, if requested.
Appeals for non-monetary purposes 
11. In addition to appeals for money, there may be appeals
for goods, toys etc.	 (These have been particularly common at
Christmas and Easter). Where the appeal is conducted in
association with a particular charitable organisation, IBA
approval should be sought. A record of the total amount of
goods, etc, received, and how they were distributed should be
kept. This will be included in the IBA's annual summary of
charitable activity on ILR.
Other publicity for charities 
12. There is no objection to mention being made of the
objects of a charity when this is justified by the intrinsic
interest of the charity's work, as opposed for example to its
public relations activities. An account of the Royal National
Lifeboat Institution, for instance, could hardly be required to
avoid mentioning the fact that the Institution's object was to
save life at sea.
13. Mention of a charity's needs runs the risk of being a
covert appeal, and references to a charity's financial state or
fund-raising activities need to be considered with care. This
does not rule out, of course, reports in news programmes of, for
example, the launching of a national or local appeal of special
significance (e.g. a Cathedral Restoration Fund) or of events
organised by charitable bodies, when these events are themselves
of news interest or warrant inclusion in a local "what's on"
report. Neither does it rule out the reporting of other events
of obvious newsworthiness, such as a well-known charity becoming
insolvent. Care should be taken, however, to avoid any such
reports constituting an appeal, and donations should not be 
solicited. "Collecting organisations", i.e. charities which
exist primarily or solely to raise funds for subsequent
distribution to other bodies, vary in their standards and
practices: especial care needs to be taken to consider whether
or not mention of their activities is justified or is a form of
unpaid-for advertisement or indirect appeal. Mention of
charitable events, such as fetes or gymkhanas, flag days and
other activities, should concentrate on the events themselves, as
items of local interest. Any such coverage should not constitute
an endorsement of the purposes of the lottery.
14. Programme items that set out to describe certain areas
of need or distress may, if necessary, give an account of the
work of charities active in those areas, but they should not give
undue publicity to the names of the charities.
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15. When a programme item seeks to inform listeners about
particular services that are available, the names of charities
providing such services may be mentioned in addition to those of
statutory organisations. Emphasis should be on the specific
services that can be provided, rather than on general publicity
for the charities concerned.
16. When a programme item seeks to inform listeners about the
opportunity to take part in voluntary work, care needs to be
taken to avoid the item being an advertisement for one particular
charity. There is no objection to specific charities being
mentioned by name, but a wide range of charities should be
included over time, and listeners should, if possible, be given
an indication of ways in which they might pursue opportunities
for voluntary service other than through the particular charities
mentioned.
January 1986 
I.L.R. Note 13.1 The Handling of Complaints.
1. It is important to ensure that members of the public who wish to
contact their local ILR company have no difficulty in doing so. Every
company should therefore ensure that, in addition to information that is
given on-air, its address and telephone number are easily found in all
telephone directories within its coverage area.
2. The handling of complaints from listeners needs careful attention.
Set out below are notes of guidance drawn up by the Authority's Complaints
Review Board, which reviews complaints about programme matters on ILR and
ITV. Companies will need to have their own procedures, for sifting the
trivial from the important, and for responding to criticisms and
suggestions. The following notes constitute a general 'code of best
practice', adaptable to individual circumstances, which, if followed
throughout the Independent Broadcasting System, would ensure that our
handling of complaints was seen to be rapid, courteous, fair and
comprehensive.
(i) Companies should be equipped to receive calls
throughout the hours of transmission. Where an
'answer-phone' service is used during the night'
hours, it should provide facilities for listeners
to record their name and address and the reason
for their call.
(ii) Telephoned and written complaints should, if
possible, be handled by one office in the company.
The practice of transferring an angry listener to
the producer or someone else intimately involved
in a programme just transmitted is likely to lead
to further acrimony, although at times there will
probably be no-one else in the station to speak
to.	 Where it is the practice for letters
addressed to the Managing Director or to other
senior officers to be replied to personally by the
addressee it should continue.
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(ill) The temptation to answer complaints off the cuff
should be resisted. If there is a known and
reasonable answer to a complaint, it should be
given and an attempt made to satisfy the
complainant there and then; if this fails, an
offer should be made to investigate and reply
later. It may be advisable in certain circum-
stances to ask the caller to put the complaint
in writing.
(iv) Switchboard operators should be fully briefed
on the handling of complaints. They should not
normally be expected themselves to answer
complaints, other than those of a routine nature,
and should know to whom complaints should be
referred. If for any reason there happens to
be nobody available for referral, and the eerier
wants a reply, switchboard operators should invite
this caller to put the complaint in writing to the
company (or, if the substance of the complaint is
clear, to leave his or her name and address), and
should say that the complaint will be investigated
and a reply sent as soon as possible.
(v) Calls and letters from listeners are important as
an indication of the public's response to
programmes. Records should be kept of the number
of calls and letters received, and of the
programmes to which they relate. Regular summaries
show-I/16
  
the general trend of complaints, and 	 .
	 cating any programme attracting a large number
of complAinte, should be drawn to the attention of
the Managing Director and senior management staff,
together with information about any case of substance
where a complaint has been shown to be justified,
and about complaints from MPs, local councillors,
etc. This information should also be provided, as
appropriate, to the Authority's Regional Officer or
headquarters staff. This will be valuable as a
means of informing the Authority of matters dealt
with locally which might raise points of wider
. significance.
Delays in investigating complaints are sometimes
inevitable (staff absent an leave or other duties,
etc.). It is therefore important that when a full
reply cannot be sent immediately, written acknow-
ledgement should be sent.
(vii) Complaints addressed to inaividual members of the
commany and replied to by them directly should
nonetheless be recorded and copies of the corres-
pondence held by the central office responsible
for handling complaints.
/(viii) It
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(viii) It is inevitable that mistakes and errors of
judgement will be made from time to time. When
investigation shows that this has happened,
appropriate acknowledgement and apologies should.
be
 made. If possible, an indication should be
given that steps are being taken to avoid a
recurrence.
(ix) Certain complaints may not be considered to be
well-founded or reasonable; but they may
represent strongly held beliefs on the part of
the complainant. If it is felt necessary to
make clear that the company does not agree with
the complAirpnt's views, it may still be appropriate
to express regret that he or she person al ly felt
offended.
(x) In general, the aim of the procedure for the
/lanolin& of complaints should not be only to
'satisfy the complainant'. If a fault or
mistake is revealed, action should also be taken
to remedy it and prevent it from happening again.
The Complaints Review Board
3 .	 When a complainant expresses dissatisfaction after corres-
pondence with the company about a complaint, attention should be
drawn to the Authority's function in relation to complaints, and
the complainant be sent a copy of the leaflet 'The Independent
Broadcasting Authority and . the Public: the Handling of Complaints'
(Copies are available from the IBA ) The text of the leaflet,
which also gives the composition of the Complaints Review Board,
is as follows:
"The Authority is the body charged by Parliament with the
supervision of the Independent Broadcasting services of
television and local radio. The conduct of the services
is governed by the Independent Broadcasting Authority
Act of 1973.
The programmes which the Authority broadcasts are provided
to it by the programme companies. Complaints to the
Authority that any programme has not complied with the
required standards are investigated by its staff, and a
reply is then sent to the complaint.
If a complainant is dissatisfied after such investigation
and reply, and remains so after further correspondence on
the subject, the matter may, if the complainant so wishes,
be referred to the Authority's Complaints Review Board,
none of whose members is concerned with the day-to-day
control of programmes. The Board will then investigate
and report to the Authority. After that a full further
reply will be sent.
/Under
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Under its terms of reference, the Board is concerned
with complaints from the public or from persona
appearing in programmes about the content of programmes
transmitted or the preparation of programmes for
transmission. It does not deal with advertising
matters, with the business relations between programme
companies and those appearing in programmes, or with
matters which a complainant wishes to make the subject
of legal action. In addition to considering specific
complaints When a complaint remains dissatisfied
after investigation and reply by the Authority's staff,
the Board keeps nnder review regular reports of complaints
investigated by the staff, and considers specific
complaints referred to it by the Chairman r f the
Authority."
The establishment of an independent Broadcasting Complaints
Commission is proposed in the new Broadcasting Bill. When
this proposal is put into effect, revised guidance will be
issued.
Programme transcripts and recordings 
Provision to the Authority 
4. Under the terms of the programme contracts, the Authority
can require a company to provide it with a script or recording of
broadcast material at any time up to three months after the
broadcast was made.
Provision to others 
5. When a person or organisation can establish a reasonable
claim that somethi ng-derogatory bas been said about them on
Independent Local Radio, or that they are affected by alleged
strictures, unfairness or inaccuracies in matter broadcast by
an ma station, and request a transcript or recording, the
request should normally be met.
6. This does not imply the automatic and. Imnediate despatch
of transcripts or recordings to applicants where the company feels
that it is more appropriate, as a first step, to attem pt to satisfy
them in some other way, for example by a letter of explanation or
apology; or where it is felt necessary to ask then to establish
that they have a proper interest in the matter at issue; or where
there is clear legal advice that, in the circumstances of a
particular request, it is inadvisable that a transcript or recording
should be provided at that stage.
7. When requests are made on any of the grounds listed in
paragraph 5, the Authority should be informed not only when the
company concerned proposes to withhold a transcript or recording,
but also whenever it agrees to provide one. Occasions can arise
when withholding it on legal advice in an attem pt to protect a
company against the possibility of legal action clashes with the
need to be fair to a complainPnt: on such occasions, discussion
between the company and the Authority is necessary.
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